POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Edited for the Academy of Political Science by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University

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Volume LXX *September 1955* *Number 3*

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY OF MAO TSE-TUNG

. . . the main form of struggle is war, the main form of organization is the army . . . without armed struggle there would be no place for the proletariat, there will be no place for the people, there will be no place for the Communist Party, and there will be no victory in revolution.—Mao Tse-tung[1]

THE white man's burden, so it is generally agreed, was considerably lightened by the marvelous works performed by the Maxim machine gun. It was Western military technology that established white supremacy in Africa and the Far East. It was the iron warship, first used against the Chinese, that fabulous whistle on "Chinese" Gordon's river boat, the dumdum bullet, the mountain-type "75", and eventually the light reconnaissance plane that so lowered the cost of colonial warfare as to make it, and keep it, attractive to the peoples who paid the bills. But recent developments in colonial warfare would seem to indicate that absolute technical superiority cannot of itself win cheap wars.

In other words, the success of Western military technology in the past can only be explained with an addendum to the effect that the tactics of the indigenous armies made its use possible. Whether it was the Fuzzy-Wuzzies, the Boxers, or the troops of Haile Selassie, indigenous peoples fought Western troops on terms favorable to the latter, namely their own. It is this error of strategy, with the ensuing tactical errors concomitant thereto, that explains their defeat. At least this would be the

[1] Cited by Chu Te, "25 Years of the Chinese People's Liberation Army", *NCNA*, Peking, August 1, 1952.

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explanation of the theorist of anti-colonial warfare, the Dictator of Communist China, Mao Tse-tung.

I

Mao Tse-tung has done for war what Lenin did for imperialism and Marx for capitalism: he has given war "scientific" schemata. And as such his writings have been given a Communist-world-wide circulation.[2] His work has been studied in Russia where it was used as the theoretical base of Russian guerrilla tactics,[3] although, according to the Chinese, the Russians did not really understand the subject.[4] In simplified form his writings are the military Bible of the Viet Minh in Indo-China, of the Huks in the Philippines, and of the insurgents in Malaya.[5]

Mao's military philosophy did not flow from his agile mind a finished product. His first important military piece, *The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains* (1928), is dated. His most important work, *On the Protracted War* (1938), purports to be, and probably is; a classic and timeless. The first deals with a set of problems, the last with a set of premises. Mao, in other words, finally universalized his own experience. And that is why his work has become a primer for action for all those whose situation was and is in any way comparable.

[2] Until his works were brought out by Lawrence and Wishart in England and by International Publishers in the United States in 1954, Mao's writings, which had been translated and were available, were virtually unobtainable in the United States. Including the Library of Congress, they were simply unavailable, except for a stray pamphlet here or there. They were not even in the Service libraries where one would certainly expect to find them.

[3] Brigadier C. Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn, *Communist Guerrilla Warfare* (New York, 1954), p. 29.

[4] Charles P. Fitzgerald, *Revolution in China* (New York, 1952), pp. 96, 97.

[5] An analysis of Maoist doctrine as it is being applied today in Malaya appears in Gene Z. Hanrahan, *The Communist Struggle in Malaya* (New York, 1954), in particular pp. 109–129. Communist revolutionary strategy in Indo-China has been outlined in *Yueh-nan jen-min fan-ti tou-cheng shih* (A *History of the Vietnamese People's Anti-Imperialist Struggle*) (in Chinese) by Lu Ku (Shanghai, 1951), chapter 6, and also by General V. N. Giap in Bernard B. Fall, *The Viet-Minh Regime* (New York, 1954), pp. 79–83. Huk strategic doctrine has been outlined in a memorandum issued by the Central Executive Committee to the Central Committee, Philippine Communist Party, dated November 1952.

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In Mao's Communist cultural heritage there has been great interest in military affairs as well as some remarkable thinking. Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin agreed on the historical necessity of war as a concomitant of revolution. Hence all at one time or another expressed an interest in the special problems of a people's war.[6] Their studies, however, were not systematized within an ideological framework, as are those of Mao. Mao claims to have applied to warfare the "immutable laws" that fellow-Communists have detected in socio-economic behavior. Essentially he discovered these for himself.

From his ideological forebears, most frequently from Lenin, Mao borrowed quotations—apparently more to give tone to his argument, like Biblical quotations to political orations, than for any other reason. And, of course, he borrowed an angle of sight, the notion that war is the midwife of revolution, and that war like revolution follows a course which is "scientifically ascertainable". Chang Kuo-tao, a former Chinese Communist leader and for many years an intimate of Mao, has characterized Mao as "a calculating and practical Chinese schemer gold-plated with Communism."[7] For a one-line sketch of Mao's military-political thinking this approximates the truth.

Nor does Mao's thinking seem to have been extensively influenced by Western military thinkers. Mao read, as had Lenin and Trotsky and Stalin before him, some Clausewitz in Chinese translation as early as 1928. What he learned about Western military thought from Chu Te (now Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and second only to Mao in the party hierarchy) who had Western military training is unknown. And some of Mao's later concepts are

[6] Dixon and Heilbrunn, *op. cit.*, chap. 1; F. O. Mitsche, *Secret Forces: The Technique of Underground Movements* (London, 1950), chap. 1. In general see Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton, 1952), chap. 7, "Marx and Engels", and chap. 14, "Lenin and Stalin". See also Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed* (New York and London, 1954), pp. 477–485, and Raymond L. Gartoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine* (Glencoe, Ill., 1953), Part I.

[7] Chang Kuo-tao, "Mao—A New Portrait by an Old Colleague", *New York Times Magazine*, August 2, 1953, p. 5. See also Ch'en Yi, "Learn from the Marxist-Leninist Creative Style of Work of Chairman Mao", *NCNA*, Peking, July 31, 1951.

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much like those expressed by Jomini in his study of *The Art of War*.[8]

There can be no doubt of Mao's intimate acquaintance with the great military classics of Sun Tzu and lesser Chinese military thinkers. Yet, although much of his thinking is like theirs, direct influence is difficult to trace. He uses his military classics, however, as he uses his Marxist classics, simply as a mine of good examples and corroborative quotations for what appears to be his own independent thinking. True, there is much in guerrilla warfare that can be traced back even to the American Indians, but never before has it been given so clear and concise a synthesis. Mao, like Clausewitz, in regular military theory, did not invent something new. His ability lies, rather, in pulling together a group of previously unrelated and unstudied techniques—shaping these into a single operational pattern. He is the man who has written it down for others; the man who has presented the Communist revolutionary with the workable blueprint. As such it is a remarkable theoretical extrapolation from his own experience with fixed politico-military conditions in China—hung loosely on a Marxist framework.

II

The war which Mao Tse-tung fought from his early days as a peasant organizer and agitator in South China in 1927 was one in which the first rule was simple survival.[9] So as the cornerstone of military planning Mao Tse-tung has placed a politico-revolutionary sense of time. Whereas Western military men have spent most of their lives considering the problems of the concentration of force *in time*, Mao has spent his life and thought on how to gain *time to*.

In the Western view, war is usually seen as a struggle which, like a football game, has a series of critical points at no one of

[8] Antoine H. Jomini, *The Art of War* (Harrisburg, 1947), p. 70. Mao's analysis of the nature of the defensive offensive is remarkably parallel to that outlined by Jomini here.

[9] For details on his life see Mao Tse-tung, *Autobiography* (Canton, 1944); Lionel M. Chassin, *L'ascension de Mao Tse-tung, 1921–1945* (Paris, 1953); Pierre Fromentin, *Mao Tse-tung, le dragon rouge* (Paris, 1949); P. S. R. Payne, *Mao Tse-tung: Ruler of Red China* (New York, 1950).

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which is a certain outcome foreseeable. Crises are usually attributed, as are defeats, to failures to have a flotilla or division at the right place at the right time. If Grouchy had arrived in time at Waterloo. . ., if Hitler had moved more troops from the Southern to the Northern Russian front in time. . ., and so on.

In Western thought time is considered in terms of hours and days, months and years. In these terms time not specifically saved is considered time wasted. Particularly in United States military thought economy of time is considered far more important than the principle laid down in the texts—economy of force. That is to say, in American planning the least militarily necessary in terms of increments of force has been thought to be the most obtainable. This has been our operative principle from the Civil War to date. The war of attrition—i.e., one in which the principle of economy of force not time comes first—has been considered simply an auxiliary form of war.

"The ten years' revolutionary war we have fought may be surprising to other countries, but for us it is only like the presentation, amplification and preliminary exposition of the theme in an . . . essay with many exciting paragraphs yet to follow", wrote Mao in 1936.[10] Time, Mao believes, can be made to defeat technology. And unlimited time depends primarily on unlimited space. Unlike Western writers Mao does not concentrate on the problem of ending a war quickly. His problem is to keep it going. Again and again he returns to this theme: "Our War of Resistance cannot be quickly won and can only be a protracted war."[11] Again, "as 'a distant journey tests the strength of a horse and a long task proves the character of a man', [so] guerrilla warfare will demonstrate its enormous power in the course of a long and ruthless war. . . ."[12]

Western military thought in the 1930's, when most of Mao's

[10] *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (New York, 1954), "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War", vol. 1, p. 248.

[11] *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (London, 1954), "On the Protracted War", vol. 2, p. 183. Compare with Stalin's comment: "We shall act as we did in the Red Army: they may beat us a hundred times, but the hundred and first time we shall beat them all."

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 225.

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important military work was written, was concerned with industrial problems: industrial mobilization and its converse, industrial destruction. All Western thinkers shared an interest in the impact of industrialization on strategy. Some were interested, as were Douhet and Mitchell, in industrial destruction by bombing the industrial heart. Others, the tank men—de Gaulle, Fuller, Guderian—thought to achieve the same end by cutting off the roads and railways, the arteries of the industrial state. Navies saw the problem of war as one of cutting off the industrial intake of raw materials by blocking the sea lanes. But all were thinking, even the navies, in terms of limited space—which Mao was not.

Space in military terms may be described as square mileage plus obstacles minus a workable communications network. Thus ten square miles of mountainous jungle might be equal to a hundred square miles of rolling plain, and this in turn might be equal to a thousand square miles cut by roads and railroads. That space in China could be made to yield time, and time, revolutionary organization, and political cohesion, victory—this is the basis of Mao's optimism.

From the military point of view how then does Mao think that space can be made to yield time?

III

The Chinese Revolutionary Army was born in sublime poverty: no clothing, no guns, no cash, no food. Recognizing this as hard fact, Mao had to rerank the elements necessary to win a war. He pointed out that "in studying the guiding laws of war of different historical stages, of different characters, of different places and of different nations, we must keep our eyes on their respective characteristics and their development, and must oppose a mechanical approach to the problem of war."[13] He told his readers that "[we had to] familiarise ourselves with all aspects of the enemy's situation as well as our own, to discover the laws of the actions of both sides, and to take these laws into account in our own actions."[14]

[13] *Selected Works*, "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War", vol. 1, p. 178.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 183.

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Mao did not merely rethink but initially formulated a philosophy of war based on a reëstimate of strength ratios. Guns were few in the early days of the struggle and Mao, from necessity, found that arms were not the only effective tools in a revolution. "Weapons are an important factor in war but not the decisive one; it is man and not material that counts", he wrote.[15] With neither military nor economic means he was forced to emphasize that "the ratio of strength is not only a comparison between military and economic strength, but also between manpower and the minds of men."[16] Mao would scoff at the tale, which has at least the status of the apocryphal in the Western world, of the loss of the nail from the shoe of the horse, which lost the battle and then the empire. His theory is, in essence, a theory of substitution: substitution of propaganda for guns, subversion for air power, men for machines, space for mechanization, political for industrial mobilization. The theory was formed intuitively in day-to-day practice. Reflection then turned practice into a theory of war.

In his early pronouncements Mao stressed two points: the first, the necessity of political education; the second, the need for a "democratic" army. But those features of his democratic army which so impressed foreign military observers at first,[17] such as complete equality between officers and men, tended to be less emphasized as the Red Army grew. And Mao's commentaries ceased to mention them. The emphasis on political education has, of course, remained, and with it that essential concomitant, the inculcation of "iron" discipline. It was political education which time was to yield. And it was political discipline which was to yield more time.

Political mobilization, Mao believes, "is the most fundamental condition for winning the war."[18] And elsewhere he

[15] *Selected Works*, "On the Protracted War", vol. 2, p. 192.

[16] Cited in Kuo Kau-jo, "On the Occasion of the 15th Anniversary of the Publication of 'On the Protracted War'", *Jen-min Jih-pao*, June 3, 1953, p. 4.

[17] See Evans F. Carlson, *The Chinese Army: Its Organization* . . . (New York, 1940).

[18] *Selected Works*, "On the Protracted War", vol. 2, p. 241. See also Mao's "Interview with the British Correspondent James Bertram", *ibid.*, pp. 92 *et seq.*

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gives the reason in a simile, a form he dearly loves: "The people are like water and the army is like fish."[19] "With the common people of the whole country mobilised, we shall create a vast sea of humanity and drown the enemy in it. . . ."[20] Mao holds out military salvation, in a truly ideological sense, as a concomitant of political conversion.

Year after year Mao returned to the problems involved in creating a political revolution through a protracted armed struggle. In 1929 he complained in a resolution presented to the Ninth Conference of the party organization of the Fourth Army that any separation of the political task from the military task of the Army would make both impossible. He warned:

> When the Red Army fights, it fights not merely for the sake of fighting, but to agitate the masses, to organise them, to arm them, and to help them establish revolutionary political power; apart from such objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army the reason for its existence.[21]

And as the Red Army is the torch of revolution, so is war the flame that purifies the revolution. ". . . [War] is an antitoxin . . . ," he wrote, "not only capable of expelling the evil influences of the enemy, but also of purging ourselves of all impurities."[22] A curious and ancient thought!

Political mobilization, however, depends not only on routing out the dissidents and equipping military units with mimeograph

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In this, Mao is consistent with sound Marxist-Leninist doctrine. One of Communist China's foremost theoreticians, Kuo Hua-ja, attributes this to Mao's study of the works of both Marx and Lenin. See Kuo Hua-jo, *Chun-shih pan-she* (*Military Dialectics*) (Peking, 1951), in particular chaps. 2 and 3. This doctrine, of course, was applied in the Russian Red Army as well. See Erich Wollenberg, *The Red Army* (London, 1938), p. 184.

[19] Mao Tse-tung, *Aspects of China's Anti-Japanese Struggle* (edition of Bombay, 1948), p. 48. This work is included in *Selected Works*, vol. 2, pp. 119–156, under the title of "Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War". This London publication is perhaps more grammatically correct than the Bombay edition, but the picturesqueness of the Bombay edition deserves quotation at times.

[20] *Selected Works*, "On the Protracted War", vol. 2, p. 204.

[21] *Selected Works*, "On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party", vol. 1, p. 106.

[22] Cited in Hsiao Hua, "The Communist Party of China and the Chinese People's Liberation Army", *NCNA*, Peking, July 25, 1951.

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machines, and "chalk cans and big brushes" for cartoon warfare. Political mobilization depends directly on military tactics. Mao recognizes that there are two politico-military dangers. The first is too great a penchant for heroism—desperadoism, he calls it. The other is, as one might expect, a willingness to give up too soon.[23]

Discouragement requires that war must be at once constantly successful and most cautiously fought. Losses must be kept at a minimum, and local successes must be continuous. The very price of survival is caution. Hence Mao's repetitive insistence on the necessity of local superiority: five and even ten against one is his formula. The political control necessary to maintain the formula undiluted in a situation in which revolutionary ardor is present is, of course, extraordinarily difficult. It accounts for Mao's insistence on absolute discipline.

IV

Guerrilla warfare is the great timeserver of military strategy. Guerrilla operations are the muck, the quicksand in which military machinery bogs down in futility. And it is the cheapest kind of war to wage. It can also be the most futile, if left undirected. Like mud it can stave off defeat, but it cannot bring victory. Because he could not himself direct all operations, Mao outlined his doctrinal position on this type of war in a series of pamphlets: *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War* (1936), *Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War* (1938), and finally in *On the Protracted War* (1938).

Mao deals in one way or another with one central problem in all these works of his. The problem is one of combining dispersion with concentration. Local insurrection corps "armed with spears and fowling pieces",[24] the "special feature",[25] of revolution in agricultural China, had to be combined with the use of the regular Chinese Red Army. The local corps, by being dispersed, were to disperse the enemy. The army was to defeat said enemy in detail. There is nothing new certainly in this

[23] *Selected Works*, "On the Protracted War", vol. 2, pp. 223, 224.

[24] *Selected Works*, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", vol. 1, p. 84.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 100.

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concept. What Mao did, however, was to set the concept in the context of time. In doing so, he plotted the course of war, as Marx had plotted the pattern of history, as thesis, antithesis, and victorious synthesis.

Mao, according to his own lights, has taken the "if" out of warfare. War, always given adequate space, has not only a predictable outcome, but clearly defined phases. In this sense, Mao has used Marxism-Leninism as a "telescope or microscope in matters political and military."[26] The "laws of China's revolutionary war—this is a problem which anyone directing China's revolutionary war must study and solve", he writes.[27]

To Mao, that is to say, the pattern of the future has the same relentless inevitability as the pattern of the past. A protracted war—the point is made dogmatically—*must* pass through three stages to victory. The first of the three stages is one in which the enemy is on the strategic offensive, and Mao is on what he calls the "strategic defensive". The second is a stalemate stage in which the Communists prepare to seize the initiative. In the third stage there is a shift to the strategic offensive on the Communists' part, forcing the enemy onto the strategic defensive, and eventually out of the war altogether.[28]

There are certain assumptions that Mao makes regarding the first stage. The first is that the loss of the means of production to the enemy does not mean the loss of the war. The second is that the enemy is committed to a quick war, and will strike with the totality of power possible. During this period Mao expects fighting, but primarily he also expects to retreat. "Is it not self-contradictory to fight heroically first and abandon territory afterwards?" he asks rhetorically. Rhetorically he answers with another question: "One eats first and then relieves oneself; does one eat in vain?"[29]

The first stage is said to slip into the second for two inter-

[26] *Selected Works*, "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War", vol. 1, p. 222. See also Gartoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 253 *et seq.*

[27] *Selected Works*, "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War", vol. 1, p. 175.

[28] *Selected Works*, "On the Protracted War", vol. 2, pp. 184 *et seq.*

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 235.

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dependent reasons. In that the war is seen not to be over, a sense of futility creeps up both among the opponents' troops and on their home front where there is a "change for the worse" because of casualties, expense, and so forth.[30] Communist morale by this very token begins to rise. When the see-saw of war reaches a state of equilibrium, the strategic stalemate, or stage two, has been reached.

An increase in guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile warfare fought by increasing numbers of regular Communist troops will then—despite defeatism, economic difficulties and "collaborators' subversive activities"—turn stage two into stage three. Finally, as this stage moves toward its culmination, guerrilla warfare becomes supplementary, and more regular forms of warfare become once more the order of the day.

Mao pursued the three stages of warfare outlined in his *On the Protracted War* throughout the Sino-Japanese conflict. The first stage, the strategic defensive, was marked by a broad Japanese offensive in North and Central China in which, as Mao himself pointed out, the Chinese "retreated in space but advanced in time." This phase was concluded with the fall of the Wuhan cities (China's "Chicago") on October 25, 1938. In October 1939, the Chinese Communists announced officially that the second phase of the war, the stalemate phase, had finally arrived. The Red high command was not unduly optimistic, for shortly thereafter the Japanese offensive reached its climax in the foothills of Western China. The Japanese advance averaged only five miles a day in 1938. By the following year it had fallen to two miles a day, and finally it shrank to but a single mile in 1940.[31]

Reflecting on Chinese Communist strategy during this period, General Nieh Jung-chen recently stated: "What deserves particular attention is that such an extensive as well as protracted guerrilla warfare is something of a novelty in man's entire military history and this state of affairs is inseparable from the

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 189.

[31] *K'ang-chan chung-ti chung-kuo chun-shih* (*Chinese Military Operations During the War of Resistance*) (K'ang-chan shu-tien, n.p., n.d.), p. 66. One notable exception to this patter was the large-scale Japanese assault against Chinese–U. S. air bases in 1943–44.

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fact that times have progressed from the 'thirties to the 'forties in the twentieth century."[32]

The Japanese sued for peace before the Chinese Communists could embark upon the strategic offensive, the third and final stage in Mao's strategy. The question as to whether the Chinese Communists could ever have defeated the Japanese by using Mao's blueprint is largely an academic one, for it appears that Pearl Harbor required that both the Communists and Nationalists alike revise their war plans. There is indeed sound evidence to support the contention that, following the entry of the United States into the war, both these political groups decided, independently of course, that the United States would insure the eventual defeat of Japan and that military operations against the Japanese—aside from purely defensive measures—were now of secondary importance. A new but unannounced strategy was in the offing, i.e., jockeying for position in North and Central China with both sides attempting to reach a status of strength and influence in order to insure their own control over the China mainland once the war was brought to a close.

Because their commitments to the Allies were less demanding, and because of the expertness of their guerrilla operations, the Chinese Communists found this new strategy easy indeed to implement. In fact, after 1941, Red commanders concentrated more on political indoctrination, building up their forces, and expanding their mass base than on conducting aggressive military operations against the enemy.

This strategy paid off; for, following the Japanese surrender, the Nationalists found themselves in much the same position that the Japanese had been. Their forces reoccupied areas that remained hostile despite the new-found peace. In fact, much of North and Central China remained essentially enemy territory—land dominated by Communist-led guerrilla and mass organizations—land where the people regarded the Nationalists with something less than trust, friendship and loyalty.

The outbreak of the civil war between the Communists and

[32] Nieh Jung-chen, "How the Chinese People Defeated the Japanese Fascist Aggressors", *People's China*, July 1, 1951, p. 29.

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Nationalists in 1946 was a logical development of Mao's strategic plan. In fact, there was no essential shift or change in Communist strategy. This was a point which the Nationalists regrettably failed to grasp. Because the nature of the enemy had changed, the Communists reverted to Mao's first phase, i.e., to the strategic defensive. Nationalist advances were, territory-wise, nothing short of spectacular during the first year of the war. But, whether they knew it or not, they were fighting a war dictated by Communist military doctrine.

Mao was trading space for time and cities for men. In his "rear base", Manchuria, he was organizing, training and arming a strong force that was to remain uncommitted until the second phase, the stalemate, could be realized. Meanwhile, Chinese Communist military commanders in North China continued their policies of attrition of the enemy, capitalizing upon Chiang Kai-shek's habit of giving his commanders certain definite time limits for achieving their objectives. The "European-style" war fought by the Nationalists played into the hands of the Red strategists.

The all-out assault on the Communist capital at Yenan in 1947 is a case in point. The Nationalists lost many men, used up valuable time, drew off divisions that could well have been used more advantageously elsewhere, and overextended their lines of communications and supply in order to take the Red capital. Ch'en Yi, the Communist military commander in the area, summed up the campaign at the time when he told reporters:

> According to orthodox military policies the Communists should deploy their best troops in defense of their capital city. We should be considering how best to defend Yenan and how long we can hold it. Actually, we are not taking any of these measures. Instead, we are only concerned with how many of Chiang's troops we can annihilate.[33]

Maoist strategy paid off in late 1947 and early 1948 with the arrival of the military stalemate. The second phase was a brief one, largely because the Communists had laid their plans

[33] Cited in Gene Z. Hanrahan, "Red China's Top Field Commanders", *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 1952, p. 61.

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well. The war after 1948 was almost preordained. The Communists took full advantage of the overextended Nationalist armies, now wallowing deep in the Red-controlled areas. The Nationalists found themselves unable to take advantage out of either time or space—both were now on the side of Mao.

The third and final stage was at hand when General Lin Piao led his Manchurian forces in the initial counter-offensive against the enemy. Pivoting from the Manchurian provinces, the Communist armies swept through the key Shanhai pass and into the vast North China plain. Joining up with other Red forces the Communist armies found little difficulty in breaking the back of the main Nationalist armies and eventually in completing the conquest of the China mainland. The civil war was a classic in Maoist strategy—a strategy clearly outlined over ten years previously, in 1938. The fact that neither the Nationalists nor the West took heed of the pronouncements of this prophetic strategist is attested to by the failure of the Nationalists and of the West to counter the advances made by Communist China since 1946.[33a]

The Korean conflict was a different type of war—with different objectives and conditions. And yet, we can see that much of Mao's doctrine obtained even there. Red military operations were largely those laid down by Mao in his study of the *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War*—this despite the fact that China was engaged in its first "modern war" against the West.[34] Mao's concept of time was aptly demonstrated in the protracted stalemate period when the Communists, seemingly indifferent to losses, conducted what appeared to United Nations observers as wasted military operations.

[33a] This is not to imply that it was Communist strategy alone which won the civil war. Certainly such factors as Nationalist morale and leadership, American indecision, Russian protection in Manchuria, etc., played their part. However, it is believed that Communist strategy—so important to the outcome of this struggle—has been little appreciated by students of Chinese affairs as of this writing.

[34] A competent analysis of this is given in Lt. Col. F. B. Nihart, "Mao's Strategic Defensive", *Marine Corps Gazette*, November 1952, pp. 51–59. See also Gene Z. Hanrahan, "The Chinese Red Army and Guerrilla Warfare", *Combat Forces Journal*, February 1951.

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But the Red high command had two very important reasons in mind. First, it was argued that the side which continued to be aggressive and held the initiative—despite the fact that peace was imminent and the truce lines were drawn—could be considered, at least propaganda-wise, the victor. In this way the Communists showed no aversion toward utilizing their men to gain a political or psychological victory through military action; even though in so doing they might take heavy losses. Such a means could never even be considered by United Nations forces. Secondly, the Communists hoped to learn more about positional (or trench) warfare at this time. Captured enemy documents reveal that the Red military leaders were willing to expend their manpower in learning this "Western-style" warfare. The Communists were preparing for the next war in the closing phases of the Korean conflict.

But the Communist high command knew that the campaign would be written as a whole, and not in terms of any one of its parts. Time and, indeed, setbacks were not only secondary, but could in fact be turned to the ultimate advantage of the Communists. In Maoist strategy, military victory in the field is valuable only in so far as it pertains to ultimate political success. And this latter is the only true criterion of victory in the Communist sense.

It need hardly be underlined that the war in North Vietnam likewise followed Mao's formula: stage one—1945–1948; stage two—1948–1950; stage three—1950–1954. Conditions were, of course, virtually perfect from the Communist point of view.[35] Because of a combination of jungle, mountain and swamp, the degree of mobility enjoyed by the armed forces depended directly on the degree to which they were *not* mechanized and motorized. Furthermore, radio communication in areas in which other means of communication were lacking gave partisans an opportunity to coördinate their activities so that concentration of local forces could be used to create diversion. It was almost as if the peninsula were being torn by groups of men dropped from an unseen plane to carry out a given mission of destruction, and

[35] For details see Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., "Indo-China: A Military-Political Appreciation", *World Politics*, vol. IV, No. 2 (January 1952), pp. 186–222.

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then disappear. And politically, of course, the situation was as favorable to the Communists as it was geographically, for each defeat of the Franco-Vietnamese forces further disrupted their common front. Indeed, in retrospect, one of the more macabre aspects of that macabre war was the fact that each military defeat was in a sense a political victory for a fraction of the defeated. For, when Franco-Vietnamese forces were defeated, it gave the Vietnamese politicians an opportunity to press the more firmly for those political rights which the French granted only on the morrow of defeat.

It would seem undeniable that Mao's strategy, wherever applied, has been remarkably and tragically successful.

V

Indo-China was a graveyard for the reputations of fine and valiant French generals—for Valluy, Leclerc, Carpentier, Salan, Navarre. Each arrived on the field with a prophecy of victory, and left with words of despair. In Malaya such highly respected leaders as Sir Edward Gent, Major General Charles Boucher and Lt. Gen. Sir Harold Briggs have been something less than brilliantly successful. The United States Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, admitted with his usual candor that the war in Indo-China was a failure not of arms but of strategy. The outcome of the war in Indo-China would not have been any different had the United States Army been "twice as big as it is, if the Navy had [had] twice as many ships afloat, and the Air Force had [had] 200 wings", he said.[36] The fact of past failure is amply documented.

Mao has always maintained that his is the last just war, the war to end wars, after which will emerge a historically unprecedented new era for mankind in which there will "no longer be any wars".[37] There is, however, no indication that this war for a "new world of permanent peace and permanent light"[38] will end before the world is made safe for communism. He believes

[36] *New York Times*, July 20, 1954.

[37] *Selected Works*, "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War", vol. 1, p. 179.

[38] *Selected Works*, "On the Protracted War", vol. 2, p. 199.

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that the willingness to compromise has a class basis, and that therefore compromise by its very origin cannot be successful.[39] Nor can there be any question as to his views on means. Referring to the courtesy of an ancient nobleman who turned over, in courtly fashion, the initiative to the enemy, he remarked: "We are not Duke Hsiang of Sung and have no use for his stupid scruples about benevolence, righteousness and morality in war."[40] This would appear to be the way of the future.

But Mao's theory of war is based, as is any theory, on a set of postulates. And his structure is no stronger than its foundations. The first and most important of Mao's premises is that he and those who think like him have a monopoly on patience. This monopoly is comfortably cushioned, moreover, by the flexibility built into Mao's doctrine of the inevitability of ultimate victory. For the shift from one stage of war to the next is not always progressive. There may be setbacks depending on what in another society would be called "acts of God". (In his view, for example, there is presently a shift back to the strategic defensive in the Philippines.) Euphonically this is called the "Revolutionary Flow". As Mao puts it: ". . . although our chart may not coincide with, but will be amended by, future developments, it is still necessary in formulating the strategic plan for carrying on a protracted war firmly and purposefully."[41]

Indeed, it is the faith of the Communists in Southeast Asia in their monopoly on patience that has made Mao's the ubiquitous gospel it is. In Malaya the Communists argue that the "anti-British national revolutionary war will be protracted, uphill and violent", and that Mao Tse-tung's "concepts . . . are imperatives in the course of the struggle."[42] In the Philippines, the Huk leaders recently reported that "the war continues in revolutionary stages and cannot be counted by the day or

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 175.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 217.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 184. The same insistence on planning runs throughout all his writing. See *Selected Works*, "Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War", vol. 2, p. 131.

[42] Translated Malayan Communist party documents which appear in Hanrahan, *The Communist Struggle in Malaya*, pp. 103 and 117.

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month."[43] For the partially defeated, there could scarcely be a more comforting analysis.

The second premise, perhaps a corollary of the first, is that the anti-Communist front is committed to quick victory, and therefore cannot, and will not, underwrite a long-drawn-out war. The effects of the stalemate in Korea on public opinion in the United States and of the long-drawn-out war in Indo-China on the French serve as illustrations of what Mao had in mind when writing, back in the 1930's, with particular reference to Japan.

It is in this connection that he believes that initial tactical self-sacrifice in the first stage of war is the necessary price of eventual victory. But the yeast of this process is, in the Communist view, the maintenance of the initiative after and even during the expected initial setbacks. In operational terms this means that local victories must be cheap and continuous. Moreover, the lesson of the war in China and Indo-China is that in such a war military initiative has very little to do with technological superiority.

This leads to the third postulate: that the Communists can maintain the initiative from both a military and a political standpoint—if one can make the distinction. They reason that they can, largely because they know that a "people's war", operating under strict party discipline, has an enormously flexible arsenal. Communists understand, what is frequently forgotten, that it is not simply the weapons one has in one's arsenal that give one flexibility, but the willingness and ability to use them. Assassination, sabotage, ambush, "spontaneous uprisings", or mass attacks in fanatical waves, the more typical form of revolutionary warfare, are all a part of this arsenal.

VI

Perhaps one should—indeed, one must—conclude with a word of caution. None of Mao's recent remarks seem to contradict the impression given by his older works—that in the atomic age his views may be quite unrealistic. Mao's mind may still envision

[43] Memorandum of the Secretariat of the Philippine Communist Party, *supra*, note 5.

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catastrophe, like victory, as a cumulative effect. He may, therefore, fail to appreciate the dangers of atomic war, the war of massive and instantaneous destruction. It is a dismal fact that Mao has a psychological immunity to what he considers to be temporary suffering. His values are in a different balance from those of the Western world. The threat of atomic warfare may be no deterrent to his plans.

Similarly, the very concept that assisted so much in winning the Chinese revolution may, today, be more of a drawback than an asset to the Chinese Communists. Guerrilla warfare has its place, but it cannot be effective at all times and under all conditions. It was this idea of "guerrillaism" that worried the Soviet high command following the civil war in Russia. In the 'twenties, everything possible was done by the Russians to stamp out the remaining vestiges of this in their own armed forces.

In China, almost every leader—be he essentially in the military or political sphere—has had decades of guerrilla experience behind him. The question whether these men—and this includes Mao Tse-tung himself—can now divorce themselves from their deeply ingrained backgrounds is an important one and worthy of serious consideration by us. We do know that Mao, even today, does not rate our technical advancements as highly as the Russians do, and that he still thinks at least partly in terms of the revolution and the wars he knew in the 'thirties. We can only conjecture as to how much this clouds his and his associates' thinking on more contemporary matters.

In the Korean conflict, for example, the Chinese insisted on making strong efforts to raise guerrilla forces, operating out of rear bases, in South Korea. P'eng Te-huai, the Communist commander there (and currently head of the Department of Defense in the Chinese Communist government), is known to have argued strongly for a combined guerrilla–regular force strategy in the Korean conflict. This did not work and the Communists lost much, in terms of both troop strength and material, in this program. Whether the Communists themselves have realized their own faults on this matter we do not know. But it is difficult indeed to rid oneself of thirty years of training

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and experience—especially if it is that experience which gained so much for one in the past. The problem of "guerrillaism"—whether it be in leaders or basic concepts—may remain one of the great intangibles to plague the Communist Chinese for some time to come.

There is also room for another word of optimism here. From the war in Malaya, from the war in the Philippines, and from the failure in Indo-China, there is now available tactical doctrine for a war against the Maoists. Like any tactical doctrine, it is rooted in a general strategic concept. And like any strategy it makes demands. Over the years, with tough professional troops, whose job everyone, including themselves, knows to be fighting, and with the promise of free political participation, the desirable may come within the range of possibility without total commitment. Putting first things first, the logical first step remains what is has always been: the breaking of Mao's monopoly on patience. This would seem primarily a problem in self-education.

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OUR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS:

In Defense of the Traditional System

ACCORDING to the traditional party system in the United States, official party central committees give support in the general election to all nominees of official party conventions and primaries. The test of who is a Republican and who is a Democrat lies exclusively in the constituencies themselves, not in the party committees. The right to run for the national House or Senate has never been determined by the national committee or by any other national party agency; nor have national party agencies ever had any veto, direct or indirect, over congressional nominations.

In recent years there has been increasing agitation to give some voice in determining party orthodoxy to the party committees, particularly to give the national committee or a proposed party council some part in screening congressional candidates and withholding national support and financial aid from those candidates who depart too widely from some supposedly accepted national norm of what constitutes a loyal Republican or a loyal Democrat.[1] It is maintained that such devices are necessary to allow the voter some real choice in the general election, to make the voter's verdict meaningful in terms of policy, to render parties responsible. These proposals to alter the traditional system have been more popular with Leftists than with Rightists, more popular with political scientists than with historians.

It is my belief that attempts to centralize American political parties by these methods will not integrate the parties but

[1] For the implications of the proposed party centralization measures on congressional nominations and nominees—some of these implications merely hinted at—see "A Report of the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association", *The American Political Science Review*, vol. XLIV, No. 3, Part 2, September 1950, particularly pp. 21–24, 43 (on conspicuous departures from general party decisions), p. 52 (on the supremacy of the national party platform), and pp. 56–57 (on the binding nature of party platforms and the primacy of external factors over internal congressional organization in making for a higher degree of party responsibility in Congress).

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disrupt them; that such attempts are likely to lead, not to the British system of two clearly differentiated and centralized parties, but to the French system of multiple parties; that the present system of factionalism in Congress would be made still more splintered and more overt and would be extended to the presidential elections themselves. Under our constitutional requirement of a majority in the electoral college to elect a President (and in the event of no such majority, election by the House of Representatives, each state, regardless of population, having but one vote), multiple parties would be a more serious matter in this country than in France.

What we call the American party system is in fact an intricate complex of consistencies, varieties, diversities, contradictions and inconsistencies within each of the major parties. Our tenuous two-party system, under the circumstances of America's wide range of conditions, is a delicate mechanism which operates awkwardly at all times, but least awkwardly during presidential elections, because of the necessity of winning a majority in the electoral college. In fact, we have in Congress, in the state legislatures, and in the constituencies a virtual multiple-party system working within two parties in most of the states or within one party in some of the states (as in Mississippi and Vermont) or within virtually one party in some other states (as in Kansas and Maine). Actually, the orientation of the Democratic party differs from state to state and from constituency to constituency in the same state, as does that of the Republican party.

The diversity within America's parties is a reflection of the amazing diversity of American life and culture, of the diversity of geography, of racial and national origin of the population, of religion, of occupation, of economic interest. The American society is the most diverse that has ever existed. An individual *state* like Massachusetts or New York or Pennsylvania or Ohio or Michigan or Illinois or Texas or California has a wider variety in the racial and national origin of its population, in its religious composition, and in its economic activities than can be found today in most of the individual *countries* of Europe. As manufacturing and industry increasingly move into the agrarian and extractive states, these states, too, become more diverse in their economic and social composition. But even our underdeveloped

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states with simpler economic and social structures show no end of conflict of economic interest: oil men are divided into big and little, organized and independent, orthodox and wildcat; ranchers are divided into cattlemen and sheep raisers; farmers into those who get just enough rainfall and those who do not get quite enough; corngrowers into those who raise corn for the cash-grain market and those who raise corn to produce hogs. (In 1948 the Iowa cash-grain growers were for Truman, the corn-hog producers for Dewey.) A person who fully realizes the implications of this immense social and economic pluralism for American politics is likely to understand more about American politics than the person who knows everything else about American politics but shuts his eyes to this.

America's political unity and the precarious unity of our two parties depend upon a frank recognition and tolerance of diversity. It was not for nothing that *E Pluribus Unum* was taken as the motto of this country. Without an awareness of the *pluribus* there can be no *unum*. Because of this vast diversity, centralizing party machinery is likely to lead not to integrating the two parties but to disrupting them.

It is often said that "the bosses", the pressure groups, and separation of powers stand in the way of centralization. These are not the real barriers to centralization. The boss is largely a myth, a left-over bogey from the muckraking days of the turn of the century. Most of America's localities have party organizations but not machines; those that have machines are not always boss-ridden; where machines and bosses exist they are more flexible and short-lived than is usually supposed; wherever they exist they are likely to represent a balancing of many important local groups, forces and interests. The attempt to conjure them away by calling them "bosses" does not get rid of local interests. Again, to emphasize pressure groups is to belittle the difficulty. American diversity is far wider than the pressure groups; much of it is still unorganized; and it existed before the highly organized pressure groups of today. Finally, even to emphasize separation of powers is to minimize the difficulty. What really stand in the way of centralization are the social realities—the vast complexity and diversity of American life.

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The lack of ideological differences and the lack of a polemical tradition in American politics have blinded us to the wide pluralism of American life. We are not divided by opposing systems. We do not have feudal, aristocratic, monarchical, communal-village, guild, and mercantilistic left-overs from the past. We do not have movements of social revolutionary protest. There is a consensus on the essentials of the capitalistic, middle-class, democratic system as the way to the good life under American conditions. We do not even bother to make elaborate rationalizations of what differences we do have. But on all immediate and practical questions, on all applied problems, on all issues which involve the distributing and the sharing of the fruits of the American economy among individuals, groups, sections and localities, the American consensus ends and we split apart in consequence of the wide diversity of our outlooks and interests.[2]

Since about 1938 the coalition of the Republicans and Southern conservative Democrats has made better known the existence of a virtual multiple-party system in Congress. This system did not begin in 1938. It has always existed. It comes out of the wide diversity of group and sectional interests.

In the 1920's the Republican party in Congress was made up of many "parties": the "sons-of-the-wild-jackasses" progressives; the more "respectable" liberals like Lenroot and Kenyon; and the Old Guard. The Democrats in Congress likewise fell into many "parties": the Underwood conservatives; the McAdoo, dry liberals; the Al Smith, wet liberals.

In the 1870's and 1880's the Republicans were divided into mugwumps, Half-breeds, and Stalwarts on political issues. On the currency issue they were divided into the inflationists (like Morton and Teller), the anti-inflationists (like Hayes and Tom

[2] Since these lines were written, Louis Hartz has published his *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York, 1955), which makes an analysis, long overdue, of America's "monolithic liberalism". This underscores the futility of expecting ideological parties in the United States. However, since Hartz writes from the point of view of political theory, not practical politics, he has neglected an equally important truth—the pluralism of America's practical life and politics. The domestic battles of Americans in practical politics are not sham battles. It is necessary to combine America's monolithism about values and America's pluralism in practical politics to understand political realities in America.

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Reed), and the various shadings in between (like Sherman and Harrison and McKinley). The Democrats were divided into Northerners and Southerners; and into tariff liberals who were also inflationist (like Bland), tariff liberals who were anti-inflationist (like William L. Wilson), and conservatives who were both anti-inflationist and high tariff (like Samuel J. Randall, who at one time was Democratic Speaker of the House and whose following prevented the Cleveland Administration from effecting any real revision of the tariff downward).

In the 1850's the number of organized parties and of "parties" within parties in Congress was so great as to produce a near bedlam. There were Nebraska Democrats and anti-Nebraska Democrats; Lecompton Democrats and anti-Lecompton Democrats; old-line Whigs; Free Soilers; Know Nothings (Americans); North Americans; South Americans; and Republicans. So great was the confusion by 1859 that the House for weeks was deadlocked in attempting to elect a Speaker.

In the Jackson-Van Buren era the Whig opposition was notoriously piebald. Its three main wings—the National Republicans, the Anti-Masons, and the States-Rights Southerners—never jelled as a party. At the same time Democrats in Congress were divided into nullifiers and anti-nullifiers; states-righters and consolidationists; pro-United States Bank, anti-United States Bank but pro-state banks, anti-United States Bank and anti-state banks; pro-Independent Treasury and anti-Independent Treasury; and Locofocos, who were anti-United States Bank, anti-state banks, and pro-Independent Treasury.

During Madison's administration the party in power (the Republican, that is the Democratic) was divided into the pro-administration party; the doctrinaire, states-rights "pure" Republicans like Randolph and Taylor; the War Hawks; and the Cabal, those practical place-hunters who on patronage matters kept up a running and vicious fight on the Administration. (Giles of Virginia, the Smiths of Maryland, and Leib of Pennsylvania were leaders of this last-named group.)

The foregoing examples are merely to illustrate the important but frequently glossed-over fact that we have always had in Congress a virtual multiple-party system. What I have done

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above for some periods in American history could be done for every single year of the existence of the American Congress. And of course the divisions for any given period are much more numerous than I have indicated and the crisscrosses on important legislation devious and complex.

Charles A. Beard used to say that American political scientists know too little history. If anything, American political scientists today know less history than they did in Beard's day. The separation of political science from history departments has not in all matters operated to the enrichment of political science. But even American historians have not written the history of American political parties in sufficiently realistic terms. Most historians of parties concentrate on presidential elections, when the two-party system works with less friction than at any other time. Even Wilfred E. Binkley, who called his little classic on parties *American Political Parties: Their Natural History*, might more truthfully have entitled what he had actually done: "American Political Parties During Presidential Elections, with More Emphasis Than Usual on Their Natural History, That Is, on Group Conflict and Group Compromise, but with Still Much Continuing Emphasis on the Customary Personal and Episodical Explanations".[3] There is a desperate need for a comprehensive history of political parties written not merely in terms of presidential elections but in terms of how parties actually have operated at other times and in other elections. Such a history should be uncompromising in its emphasis on the conflicts and compromises of the functional groups not only during presidential elections but in Congress, in the state legislatures, and in the constituencies.

In addition to more realistic histories of parties we need more studies in the sociology of the contemporary parties. V. O. Key's *Southern Politics* is a brilliant beginning, but it is only a beginning; it suffers from the limitations of the regional approach, and it too strongly suggests to unwary minds that our problems of party responsibility will be solved by merely developing a two-party system in the states where today it does not exist.[4]

[3] Wilfred E. Binkley, *American Political Parties: Their Natural History* (New York, 1947).

[4] V. O. Key, *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York, 1949).

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Questions on the sociology of politics are legion. Why are party lines much more fluid in some two-party states than in other two-party states? Why is the voting record of Alabama senators on many domestic issues during the past quarter of a century closer to that of Minnesota's senators and congressmen than it is to that of Mississippi's or Georgia's or South Carolina's or Virginia's? Why are the politics of Kansas and Nebraska as atomized and personalized as the politics of Florida and Arkansas? Why are the voting records of senators and congressmen of one-party states like Alabama and Vermont more liberal than the voting records of senators and congressmen from vigorous two-party states like Indiana and New Jersey? What causes at times the development of something akin to a two-party structure within a one-party setup (for instance, in Louisiana, Long versus anti-Long; in Texas today the well-organized conflict of conservative versus national Democrats)? How permanent is this, and why do not other one-party states develop such organized conflicts? What makes the politics of a virtual one-party state like North Dakota, where the divisions within the Republican party are as marked and as organized as the divisions between the two parties in some two-party states, so different from the politics of neighboring virtual one-party states like South Dakota, Nebraska and Kansas? Why does the Democratic party of Maine and New Hampshire tend to be more liberal on economic matters than the Republican, more conservative on social matters? What makes the Democratic party of southern California so different from the Democratic party of northern California? Why is the Republican party of Minnesota more liberal than the Democratic party of Nebraska? (The Democratic gubernatorial candidate in Nebraska in 1954 was even to the right of Nebraska's Right-wing Republicans, who are about as far right as any responsible political group in America!) Why is a Democrat of eastern Washington (Spokane) likely to be more conservative than a Republican of western Washington (Seattle)?

When we have more realistic histories of our parties and more realistic sociologies of our contemporary parties we shall better understand the complex pluralism of our political life. We shall be less naïve about attempting to devise a national norm

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for determining a loyal Democrat or a loyal Republican, and we shall be even less ready than we are now to leave the determination of such a palpably difficult question to such organizations as our national committees, which have little prestige anyway and which are themselves compounded of the same diversities as our Congress. Nor is changing the structures of the national committees, to give them admixtures of congressmen and state chairmen and representatives of Young Democrats or Young Republicans, likely to enhance the prestige or the wisdom or the national outlook of our national committees. New creations like a party cabinet or a party council, made up of various suggested combinations of designated national committeemen, congressmen, state chairmen, and representatives of various local grass-roots groups, will hardly do any better as determiners of a national party norm. These are mere gimmicks.

What issue or combinations of issues can today be made the test of party orthodoxy? For the Republicans to make opposition to the Bricker amendment or a favorable vote on foreign aid a test would be to wreck their party. For them to make the Eisenhower program with respect to federal electric power projects a test would be to spread rebellion in many arid and semi-arid districts of the West, particularly of the Pacific Northwest. For the Republicans to make support of the Benson farm program a test would be to read out of their party many farm-belt congressmen. For the Democrats to make opposition to the Benson farm program a test would be to alienate many Democratic congressmen from the urban areas and all Democratic candidates in the Mormon areas of Utah and Idaho, where the program of Benson is overwhelmingly popular because of his high position in the Mormon church. For the Republicans to make support of the three-year extension of reciprocal trade agreements or opposition to the Simpson tariff-raising bill, which the Administration opposed, tests of party loyalty would be to cast out of the party more Republicans than remained in it. For the Democrats to make a general overhauling of the tariff downward a test of party loyalty would be to drive out of the party congressmen and congressional candidates from the vegetable and fruit-growing areas of Florida, from the sugar-

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producing areas of Louisiana, and from the hardware manufacturing areas of Connecticut.

The interference in 1954 by National Democratic Chairman Mitchell in local Democratic contests against former Senator Glen Taylor in Idaho and James Roosevelt and Representative Condon in California shows how explosively emotional and disruptive such interference can be. These cases are especially significant because they involved intervention by the centralized agency against so-called liberal candidates, and the push for centralization of party structure has come more from liberals than conservatives, probably because liberals have hoped it would offer a short-cut opportunity to advance their program. In each of these cases Mitchell interfered in the face of local party trends as demonstrated in popular primaries. His intervention against Roosevelt was open to the unfortunate construction that certain elements in the party were striking at Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., in New York through his brother in California. This probably was not true, but it shows to what manipulative purposes centralized machinery can be used or thought to be used, with damaging results to party morale in either case. Mitchell's intervention against Roosevelt, Condon and Taylor was open to the construction that a centralized agency was being subjected to pressure by a religious group. This, too, was probably not true, but again it reveals the explosive possibilities of using centralized agencies in delicate local situations. Finally, the Mitchell intervention can with truth be construed as reflecting oversensitivity to the so-called Communist issue in politics. Actually the result of the primaries in all three cases showed that this issue was far more of a bugbear to those removed from the constituencies than it was in the constituencies themselves. The diversity and autonomy of our constituencies help prevent an unhealthy stereotyping of public opinion or an unhealthy surrender to what is erroneously supposed to be public opinion.

On the other hand, President Eisenhower, after much public and I believe simulated hesitation, invariably came out in support of the official nominee chosen by the Republican constituency. Now, Sherman Adams and James C. Hagerty knew full

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well that a Styles Bridges of New Hampshire or a Joe Meek of Illinois would not contribute much in Congress to the Eisenhower legislative program; indeed, they knew that a Bridges and a Meek would in Congress oppose much of that program. But that is not the point. Helping a Bridges in New Hampshire or a Meek in Illinois, while a calculated risk, is not too great a price to pay for bolstering the party, discouraging overt disunity in the localities, and thus making it easier for the party to win presidential elections. And in the end it is presidential elections that are decisive even for legislative programs; for the presidential podium is unrivaled for the initiation and popularization of legislative programs. Presidential speeches and messages and increasingly presidential commissions have an influence through the years, far beyond a presidential term, molding opinion and legislation. Here, too, lies the greatest effective difference in the two national parties: a Republican administration *initiates* a different kind of legislative program from a Democratic administration, a Democratic administration *initiates* a different kind of legislative program from a Republican administration.

In this respect the Democrats are usually more fortunate than the Republicans. By tolerating a great deal of dissent from the South and by accepting the verdicts of Southern constituencies on Democratic congressional nominations, the Democrats usually start with the vast unearned increment of the Southern electoral vote in the bag. True, they risk defeat of a part of their program in Congress by Southern congressional votes (it is difficult to see how this could be prevented anyway), but they gain a vast legislative advantage when they win the presidency, for, let me repeat, the presidency is now unmatched anywhere in the American system as a formulator and a propagandizer of a legislative program.

The pluralism of the American party system necessarily makes positive action and a coherent legislative program difficult. This difficulty too often has been ascribed primarily to structure —to the American system of separation of powers and checks and balances—rather than to the main cause: the pluralism of the American party system which is but a reflection of the wide diversity of America's social and economic life. Our many groups neutralize one another to the point where action is slowed

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or arrested. So tardy is the American system to adjust legislative programs to changing conditions that, as the whole of American history shows, accumulated maladjustments usually must erupt into a crisis before an extensive and a coherent program of change can be legislated. But when this at last happens, then the new program is enacted almost by consensus, and both parties largely contribute to it, although one of them takes the initiative. The Lincoln program for railroads, banks, currency, tariff, and business had pervasive support from Douglas Democrats and War Democrats. Wilson's New Freedom was widely supported by Bull Moose Progressives and by progressive and middle-of-the-road Republicans. The New Deal in its first years had widespread Republican support. And just as our great achievements come largely by consensus, so also our great failures are failures that include all parties. Americans, in attempting to lead the Western world through the international crisis of today, have lost much of the initiative to their allies. This is not because Americans lack a clearly differentiated and integrated liberal party, though of course they do, but because America's mores, traditions, history, and limited international experience prevent most Americans—of all parties—from seeing (as London, Paris, Ottawa, and New Delhi see) the possibilities of exploiting nationalism to split the international Communist front and of using wise social politics as a flank attack on communism.[5] But great achievements and great failures aside, on run-of-the-mill legislation of ordinary times (and that is most of the time), Americans split not into two camps but into many—on taxes, appropriations, tariff, currency, irrigation, public power, farm relief, labor legislation, social security, and so forth.

All of this is not to say that there is no substantive difference between the parties. When the attitudes of all the Democratic constituencies in the United States are added together, the Democrats ordinarily come out just a little left of center; when the attitudes of all the Republican constituencies are added

[5] Since the judgments of Americans in international affairs are derived not from the pluralism of their practical politics at home but from their monolithic values, it is difficult for Americans of all parties to understand the wide variety and diversity of values, systems and ideologies abroad.

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together, the Republicans ordinarily come out just a little right of center. (There is more rationality in the parties, too, than is often admitted. For instance, most Southerners are Democrats today for the same reason that most Southerners were Democrats before the Civil War and Reconstruction: because they have more poor people than the rest of the country.) As stated earlier, a Republican administration *initiates* a different kind of legislative program from a Democratic administration, and vice versa. A national administration represents the unifying tendency of presidential elections, the Congress represents the decentralizing practice of congressional elections. One who concentrates his attention merely on the voting records of the parties in Congress and how the party members crisscross in lawmaking is likely to exaggerate the pluralism of American politics. One who concentrates on the distinctly different kind of legislative program submitted for congressional consideration by a Democratic administration and by a Republican administration is likely to exaggerate the integration of American politics. Both the presidential integration and the congressional pluralism are indigenous characteristics of the American system.

We make a serious error when we think we can get the same kind of party integration in Congress that we have in the Administration. Attempts to get such congressional party integration, if pressed too far, are likely to produce even less of it in Congress and to jeopardize the precarious party unity we now have in the election of the President. They might lead to pluralizing the election of the President just as we now pluralize the making of legislation. We would be likely to have every four years farm-belt revolts against the Republicans, like that of LaFollette in 1924, and Dixiecrat revolts against the Democrats, like that of 1948, and to have them simultaneously. If the habit of proliferation took hold, it would grow. The result might be chaos in the electoral college and even more chaos in the election of the President in the House of Representatives. Perhaps the ultimate result would be a frankly multiple-party system and popular election of the President by a mere plurality of the popular vote. I do not believe this is the purpose of those who advocate the centralizing of congressional elections, but this reasonably might be the result of centralization.

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Also, there is no doubt that there is a real tendency for the parties to realign in a more consistent way, for progressive Republicans in the farm belt to go into the Democratic party, for conservative Southern Democrats to go into the Republican party. But even if this realignment were to go much farther than it has up to now, there still would be vast differences from constituency to constituency inside the Democratic party and inside the Republican party, differences too sensitive to be reconciled by a national congressional loyalty test administered by some national party agency. Moreover, this substantive realignment is taking place so slowly that by the time it is accomplished, if it ever is accomplished, there very likely will have emerged new contradictions within the parties.

Those groups which believe that by centralized imposition they can win short-cut victories for their programs are mistaken. Victories must be won the hard way—in the constituencies. The way to help presidential leadership, too, is not by forced contrivances but by winning popular victories—in the constituencies. Remember, too, that a two-party system helps party integration but that there is no magic in that system. Even in two-party states the fight for effective national leadership is a perpetual one. Today President Eisenhower is getting loyal support from Republicans in a one-party state like Vermont and in a virtual one-party state like Maine, but he is getting much opposition from Republicans in Indiana and Illinois, which are among the seven or eight old and genuine two-party states in the nation.

There is no reason why a member of Congress out of step with the majority of his party on important legislation should be advanced to important committees or to important chairmanships. Nor is there any inherent reason why a President should not use administrative favors and patronage to reward his followers in Congress and to punish his critics. However, an injudicious withholding of patronage as a punitive device may disrupt more than it unifies.

There is no infallible rule which would prevent a President from going down into the constituencies and seeking to defeat for renomination a frequent party critic. It is always, as in the cases of committee assignments, chairmanships, and patronage,

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a question of expediency and tactics. Will such action integrate the party, or will it disrupt more than it integrates? Undoubtedly President Buchanan's attempted purge of Stephen A. Douglas and his followers hastened the disruption of the Democratic party and thereby hastened the Civil War. The attempted purge by President Taft of the Midwest Republican progressives certainly contributed to the split in the Republican party in 1912. This split did not lead ultimately to more integrated parties because most Bull Moosers went back into the Republican party, although they had less influence within that party than they had had before the split. The purges of Woodrow Wilson actually operated contrary to the way integration is supposed to operate because they made the Democratic party more conservative, not more liberal. They increased the influence of the Southern conservatives. Their victims were the neo-Populists of the South, men like Dent and Kitchin and McLemore and Hardwick and Vardaman. These men, like so many Midwestern progressives, were isolationists in international affairs but liberals in domestic affairs. The purges of Franklin D. Roosevelt may have bolstered the New Deal in the border states but hastened and intensified the Southern revolt. In short, the presidential purge to date has probably been more disruptive than integrative. Moreover, in almost every case it failed in its *immediate* objective: Buchanan did not get the Lecompton Constitution, Taft lost the election, Wilson was unable to win the League of Nations, and Roosevelt failed to put new life into the New Deal.

However, the presidential purge is not flagrantly contrary to the traditional system, for, even when it is used, it is the local constituency and not some centralized agency which determines party loyalty and the party nomination. If the local constituency votes against the President and for his congressional critic, that congressional critic is still a member of the party and entitled to its aid and support in the campaign. The party constituency is not left permanently disgruntled, as it would be if its chosen nominee were vetoed, with no place to go politically except into a third or fourth party. For it is important to remember that when a constituency revolts from its national party leadership and backs a congressional critic of that party

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leadership, it does not always or usually follow that its historical sentiments or its economic interests propel it to the other major party. That is frequently one of the assumptions of those who would integrate our parties by way of national agencies, and it is usually a false assumption. The constituency which sustains a party critic usually wants to remain inside its traditional party but to remain inside with a difference. To repeat, forced attempts at nationally integrated parties will likely lead not to two unified parties but to many diverse parties.

Those who actually bolt their own party (there are usually few of these) are admittedly in a different class from those who frequently vote against their party leadership in Congress but who want to remain within the party (there are always many of these). A centralizing party body might be within its rights to read actual bolters out of the party. But here again, it is usually not a question of rights but of expediency. The Republicans in Congress, after some abortive attempts to punish the LaFollette rebels of 1924, finally found it to their interest to let by-gones be by-gones. The Democrats have found or are finding it to their interest not to punish too severely the Dixiecrats of 1948 and the Eisenhower Democrats of 1952. The Republicans even tolerate so flagrant a rebel as Senator Langer, for to punish Langer would be to risk driving many of the old Nonpartisan Leaguers out of the Republican party. Here again, the parties in the constituencies themselves are the best judges. If they absolve the rebels, then it is well for the national leadership to do so. Very often the constituencies themselves retire bolters, for bolting by the leaders is seldom regarded lightly by the rank and file. Bull Moosers, like Henry J. Allen and Albert J. Beveridge, had a difficult time winning nominations and elections after 1912. Eventually even Senator Norris paid the penalty for his long party apostasy by being defeated in Nebraska. The Southerners, voting in Democratic primaries, retired most of the Hoovercrats of 1928. Currently in many Southern states Eisenhower Democrats in large numbers have been retired from the party committees and loyal Stevenson Democrats elected in their places. Party-apostate Governor Shivers recently had a narrow call in Texas and expended almost his last ounce of political capital in his reëlection campaign, and

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Governor Kennon is regarded in Louisiana as a "dead duck". Sometimes the bolters take care of themselves by going over to the other party. This may be what is happening in the case of Shivers. It is certainly what is happening in the case of Senator Wayne Morse. As Morse moves to the Democratic party, he undoubtedly will carry other liberal Oregon Republicans into the Democratic party. This is the way parties realign in the United States. This is the natural and substantive way and not the mechanical and contrived way.

The creation of additional centralized party machinery might even weaken the one integrating agency our system has evolved —the presidency. It might in actual practice work less centralization and more decentralization. A Theodore Roosevelt, a Woodrow Wilson, or a Franklin D. Roosevelt surrounded by a party cabinet or council, made up of selected national committeemen, state chairmen, congressmen, and representatives of grass-roots organizations like the Young Democrats or the Young Republicans, would find his problem of national and party leadership more difficult. Such party bodies would represent the localism and the pluralism Congress represents, and they could be used to curb presidential leadership. A President so surrounded might find it difficult to use the patronage and purge as punitive devices; at least in their use he would probably have to go counter to the advice of such bodies even in cases where he thought punitive devices would strengthen his leadership. Back in the 1860's Representatives George H. Pendleton and James A. Garfield of Ohio proposed that the members of the President's Cabinet be given seats in Congress to strengthen presidential leadership there. This proposal was revived off and on for several decades. However, after repeated reflection, it became clear that the Cabinet members would be more apt to play up to Congress and actually weaken presidential leadership. So it is with the current proposals to centralize party machinery. Presidential leadership, the one national and centralizing force evolved historically within the American system, should be cautiously preserved from all contrivances that might weaken it, even when those contrivances come in the guise of methods to strengthen it.

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In my opinion recent suggestions, that a centralized party body—the national committee or a proposed national party council—be given an important voice in the nominating of congressional candidates or in the vetoing of such nominations or in the screening of candidates for such nominations or the power to determine whether congressional nominees shall or shall not have financial and other support from the national party, are mischievous. They run counter to the traditional system which makes the local party constituency the judge of who is a Republican and who is a Democrat and to the still-existing realities which evolved that system—the vast variety and diversity of American life. If adopted, they likely would lead not to the integrating of the two parties but to their flying apart in many different directions.[6]

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[6] Maurice Duverger, in his brilliantly suggestive *Political Parties* (English language edition, London and New York, 1954), page 396, makes the obvious and very pertinent comment, curiously neglected by American political scientists, that if American political parties were as centralized and hierarchical as British parties, the separation between President and Congress in those times in which one party controls the presidency and the other party controls Congress would bring about almost complete paralysis of the government. America's traditional political system is pluralistic enough in Congress to prevent what Duverger fears, and at the same time it is integrated enough around the presidency to provide some direction and cohesion. Care should be taken that the presidential integration we do have is not jeopardized by artificial and forced attempts at party integration in Congress and in the constituencies. The extent and methods of party integration in the United States involve many more intricate and delicate questions than usually realized.

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THE SCOTTISH SEPARATIST MOVEMENT: A PRESENT ASSESSMENT

OUR present concern with the necessity for building up larger agglomerations of power in order to contain Soviet expansion has largely obscured for us the evident fact that demands for national independence are by no means confined to Asia and Africa. Even so apparently stable a political system as that of Great Britain has produced its own dissident nationalist movements, which, though at the moment very far from overturning the existing British political structure, are nonetheless clear proof that the old ethnic and territorial divisions of Europe have retained much of their vital distinctiveness. The effective strength of such movements is easy to exaggerate. One cannot deny, however, the fact of their existence. As recently as the summer of 1954 a British Royal Commission issued a report on the "deterioration that is widely held to have occurred" in the relations between England and Scotland.[1] This, coupled with the rather remarkable Scottish economic resurgence of the past few years, may have some significance for the future of Great Britain. Certainly each of these developments in context is of more than passing interest to Americans.

The significance of the Royal Commission, which began to meet in October 1952 and issued its report in July 1954, lies in the fact that it should have existed at all. Such an investigatory body, generally made up of distinguished persons appointed on a nonpartisan basis, is usually called into existence to deal with matters of extraordinary public concern; and thus the royal summons constituting this one in June 1952 amounted to quasi-official recognition of the fact that all was not well with the ancient Union between the nations, at least so far as Scotland was concerned. The phenomenal prosperity of Scotland at that time as well as the generally prosperous condition of the whole of Britain during 1954–1955 may supply a ready

[1] *Report of the Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs, 1952-54* (Cmd. 9212), Presented to Parliament July 1954, p. 2.

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answer to queries about the reasons for growing dissatisfaction with government administrative policies in certain Scottish quarters since the end of the First World War. If, as has been alleged by some observers, the causes of dissatisfaction are purely economic and became most marked with the depression of Scottish industry during the twenties and thirties, then we should expect to see nationalist or "home rule" fervor melt away in the sunshine of economic well-being. If, on the other hand, Scottish national sentiment is a result of something more complex than economic dissatisfaction, then a prosperous Scottish economy might, in fact, very much intensify such feeling. There are portents pointing both ways but in order to give them full weight we must first examine certain aspects of the rather small but quite vocal Scottish home rule and nationalist movements as these have developed since the end of the Second World War.

First of all, both home rulers and nationalists share one major purpose in common. Each would like to see a fairly drastic revision of the existing arrangements—still largely determined by the Treaty of Union negotiated between the two countries in 1707—through which both nations function in organic unity as the Kingdom of Great Britain. Adherents of home rule, whose organization is known as the Scottish Covenant Association headed by J. M. MacCormick of Glasgow, are, as might be expected, far less extreme in their demands than are the supporters of the Scottish Nationalist party. The former have continually stated that they "have no desire to impair the essential unity of the United Kingdom" but feel that the "needs and wishes of the Scottish people cannot be satisfied with less than the creation of a Scottish Parliament and Government with adequate financial powers to deal with Scottish domestic affairs."[2] Home rulers, then, wish something closely analagous to the existing system by which the government of Northern Ireland retains its status as a part of the United Kingdom. Scotland, they feel, must have her own separate parliament restored, as it existed before 1707, in order to deal with Scottish affairs on the basis of Scottish interests, which home rulers

[2] *Blue Print for Scotland: Practical Proposals for Scottish Self-Government*, The Scottish Covenant Association (Glasgow, n. d.).

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and nationalists alike feel have been neglected by London. This, for the moment at least, the Covenant Association regards as a satisfactory limit to its demands for revision—time will reveal what other adjustments may be necessary.

The Scottish Nationalist party wants to begin roughly about where the home rule supporters leave off. Exactly how far the various nationalist groups would like to go is not easy to determine from either their public or private statements. There are some among them who talk nostalgically of the Stuarts and the half-forgotten risings of 1715 and 1745. Others appear to have in mind some sort of dominion status, while still others prefer to follow the lead of the Irish Republic in pulling out of the British Commonwealth altogether. There is even a Scottish Republican Army, which, on an admittedly lesser scale, seeks to emulate some of the violent tactics of its Irish counterpart—fortunately without a great deal of success up to this point. Whatever diversity of opinion may exist among nationalists, there is no doubting their desire to see the power to make all political decisions for Scotland removed from London and transferred to Edinburgh. Officially, the aim of the Scottish Nationalist party is to see established "Full Self-Government for Scotland as an equal within the Commonwealth of Nations; the restoration of Scottish National sovereignty by the establishment of a democratic Scottish Government whose authority will be limited only by such agreements as will be freely entered into with other nations in order to further international co-operation and world peace."[3]

It is the purpose of the nationalist to increase and spread this desire among his fellow Scots by constantly reminding them of their former independence and the fact that their country is one of the oldest European states. To this end the nationalist makes full use of Scotland's history and its symbols, not even hesitating where necessary to breathe into them a meaning that comes closer to suiting present needs than it does to giving accurate historical description. For this purpose the Nationalist party badge is a combination of the cross of St. Andrew and the

[3] *Policy of the Scottish National Party* (Stirling, n. d.), p. 2.

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red lion rampant, both of which evoke memories of a Scotland whose independence was maintained through centuries of adversity. The symbolic document is the Declaration of Arbroath made by the "community of the Scots nation" in 1320, wherein is set forth in words that transcend mere propaganda medieval Scotland's will to be free of English overlordship. In the iconography of national heroes William Wallace, as a truly popular or "democratic" leader, has come to overshadow the figure of King Robert the Bruce. Like most national movements, this one too has had its literary revival, though on nothing like the same scale as that of Ireland during the last decade of the nineteenth century. Unfortunately, the Scots nationalist must divide his literary loyalties as no Irishman ever had to, simply because Scotland has produced two native literary traditions. One of these is purely Gaelic and is closely identified with the Scottish Highlands and the folkways of the clan; the other is a product of that fusion of Gaelic and English influences which created the speech of the Lowlands. Both mark the permanence of a cleavage that existed during many centuries of Scotland's independence. Neither may be excluded from the totality of the Scottish national inheritance.

Symbolism apart, there remain certain important questions to be asked about these two movements. Is there present justification for demands that the Union be changed or given up entirely? To what degree is this dissatisfaction shared by most Scotsmen and is it increasing or decreasing? Like most questions having to do with matters political, neither of these can be answered precisely. To both of them the Royal Commission Report has supplied some tentative answers. It has concluded, first of all, that the profound political and social changes of the past forty years have led to an increasing amount of governmental interference in the affairs of the individual and that this interference by what Scotsmen, rightly or wrongly, all too frequently look upon as an "English" government has become increasingly resented north of Tweed. To anyone aware of the complexities of present-day public administration this may not seem surprising. The problem is a familiar one in every Western nation, though demands for the devolution of

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administrative authority do not necessarily coincide with the kind of secessionism that many Scottish nationalists seem to wish. Devolutionism, as Nicholas Mansergh pointed out some years ago in the case of Northern Ireland, is not simply an alternate solution to the problem of nationalism. The dilemma has deeper roots than that, although irritation at control from London is undoubtedly very real in Scotland.

The essence of the difficulty lies in something we might call the recency of historical memory. Scotsmen are only 250 years removed from their Treaty of Union with England and this, by the standards of Europe, is a relatively short span in the life of a nation. Dissatisfaction with the mistakes of a central bureaucracy could hardly develop by itself into a full-fledged nationalist or home rule movement. It seems obvious that some few at least of those other elements that help to create a consciousness of national identity would have to be present before such movements could succeed. To a quite surprising degree the very success of the Union of 1707 in preserving much that was distinctively Scottish may at some future time prove to have been its undoing if either nationalists or home rulers achieve their aims. The reason for this is not far to seek. Despite the disappearance of Scotland's parliament in 1707, the Treaty did preserve two other important national institutions, one in the form of its established church, which is traditionally presbyterian in its government, and the other in its legal system, which, though greatly influenced by English law since the eighteenth century, is nevertheless very different in its origins. The sense of separate identity among Scots is readily noticed by anyone visiting Scotland for even the briefest period. In language, both written and spoken, in customs, and in outlook, there are evident differences between the north and south of Britain. The persistence of the belief that something called Scotland and not simply the northern region of Great Britain exists and has existed through the two and a half centuries since 1707 makes it plain that the "Scottishness" of the Scots was and is a tenacious thing that has outlasted the almost overwhelming absorptive powers of Scotland's larger and wealthier partner.

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In very large measure, however—and surely there is a twist of historical fate in this—the preservation of Scotland's identity has been in part the work of Englishmen. The romanticizing of things Scottish that began with Sir Walter Scott was nowhere received with greater enthusiasm than in England. Since the days when that amiable debauchee, George IV, first wrapped his fat legs in a kilt and thus stimulated the nineteenth-century's interest in the Scottish Highlander and his customs, the caricature Scot, unlike his eighteenth-century ancestor, has been treated with humorous respect below the border. Not only has he been admired for his solid (and often stolid) virtues, but this admiration has had some peculiar effects: thus today a Scottish accent, unless possibly derived from Glasgow, is generally accepted at all social levels in an England where one's inflection still betrays one's origins. In short, the Scot has had little to feel inferior about and much to be proud of in his dealings with Englishmen—so much so, in fact, that present-day nationalists and home rulers find it difficult to convince many Scotsmen that they are truly second-class citizens in the United Kingdom. As one Scotsman has more than half-jokingly remarked, "What our nationalists really need is to have the English shoot a few of us. Until then no one will quite believe they have a cause."

On these grounds the Scottish nationalists would appear to have reason for dejection. One gains the widespread impression that most Scots are not convinced that England is exploiting or oppressing her smaller neighbor in any overt way at least. There are still too many common memories of shared adversity and success that would have to be obliterated before many Scots would be willing to see the Union overturned. Scotland is still identified with Great Britain, and Great Britain, despite her altered position after two world wars, is still a Great Power. Scotland and Scotsmen outside the British framework would be something less in the eyes of the world. Furthermore, the possible dissolution of British unity must also strike a blow at the unity of Western Europe. For that reason alone the consequences of their aims must be thought out carefully by both home rulers and nationalists looking to the outside world for a sympathetic hearing. The Communist Council (Scotland)

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has already given its rather noisy approval to the separatist movement; and though its support has been vigorously rejected by the Scottish Nationalist party, which is avowedly anti-totalitarian in its outlook, the fact that such support is freely given is in itself indicative of the way in which the Communists view Scottish nationalism.

Despite these difficulties, the nationalists and home rulers of Scotland have raised some rather unpleasant questions about the nature of the existing union; and there is little doubt but that many Scotsmen are listening to them, even though it may be with only one ear. The major complaints involve both economic and political considerations, which ultimately reduce to two questions: first, is Scotland receiving as great a share of the national expenditure of Great Britain as she puts into it? and, second, is Scotland capable of economic self-sufficiency? Let us look briefly at each in turn.

Home rulers and nationalists have charged for more than twenty years that the gross annual revenue contributed by Scotland to the British exchequer far exceeds the sum disbursed by the treasury for specifically Scottish purposes and that this surplus is used for the benefit of England and Wales. The most recent government response to this charge is summed up in three publications, the first of which is the *Report of the Committee on Scottish Financial and Trade Statistics under the Chairmanship of Lord Catto* (Cmd. 8609), published in July 1952.[4] The Catto Committee's *Report* concluded, first of all, that any attempt to disentangle Scottish from general British finances is virtually impossible because of the close economic unity of the two countries but that, in so far as such an attempt is possible, it seems plain that Scotland's relative position both as contributor and beneficiary remains approximately what it was twenty years ago.[5] The answer of James A. A. Porteous, official economic adviser to the Scottish Covenant Association, charges that the figures are misleading because they cover up under the category of "General Expenditure" all

[4] The others are the *Return of Revenue and Expenditure (England and Wales and Scotland), 1952–53* (Cmd. 9051), published in January 1954, and the *Report of the Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs, 1952–1954*, mentioned previously.

[5] See the tables reproduced in the Catto Committee *Report*, p. 24.

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the benefits that England and Wales receive at the expense of Scotland. He asks:

> But where is the greater part of this 61.06 per cent. [of General Expenditure] actually expended? And what country benefits the most from the cumulative purchasing power, investment, employment, and, incidentally, sources of revenue which this vast expenditure represents? This is the crux.
>
> We challenge the bland assumption that Scotland benefits equally with England from General Expenditure, and declare that assumption to be wholly untenable.[6]

There, for the moment at least, the argument rests.

Intimately bound up with the question of Scotland's contribution to the income of the British government is the equally important question of Scottish economic self-sufficiency. Actually it is impossible to consider the two apart because proof of one amounts to proof of the other. Supporters of the Union argue not only that it is impossible to isolate Scotland from the economic complex of the United Kingdom but that it is doubtful whether Scotland could actually support herself if cut free from the English connection. For this reason the argument over Scotland's contribution to the common expenses of British government amounts to something more than a simple demand for justice to the Scottish taxpayer. If those desiring a revision or repeal of the Treaty of Union could show conclusively that Scotland pays into the central finances of Britain more than she receives, then, it is felt, this would be evidence that home rule or independence would be not only practically possible but distinctly advantageous into the bargain. In their efforts to prove that this is actually the case, the opponents of the Union assert that Scotland's economic position compares favorably with that of other small European states. Only Sweden, Holland and Belgium, they point out, have larger total revenues, while on a per capita basis the comparisons are even more favorable: that of Sweden is the only one which is larger.[7]

[6] James A. A. Porteous, "Money from Scotland", *News Letter Supplement of the Scottish Covenant Association* (Edinburgh, August 1954), pp. 4–5.

[7] For a comparison of Scottish revenue and expenditure with those of seven other small European states see *ibid.*, p. 3.

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It is plain to see just what the home rulers and nationalists are getting at with all of this. They are painting a tempting picture of the economic advantages to be enjoyed if only the ties binding Scotland to England can be cut or at least relaxed. On the surface the statistical justification for their demands seems clear and simple. Scotland with a little more than one-ninth (5.1 millions) the population of England and Wales (43.75 millions) has a land area of about 30,000 square miles as against one of about 58,000 square miles for the latter. Even granting the infertility of very large areas like the Highlands, home rulers and nationalists argue that the proportion of arable land to population is impressively high, higher indeed than that of many other countries which enjoy both independence and a relatively high standard of living.[8] At the same time it is also contended that Scotland has an equally great advantage in its export trade with dollar areas and that the Union has had the effect of forcing the Scottish economy to serve the needs of overpopulated England.[9]

How seriously are these arguments being taken by Scotsmen? Short of a Scottish general election on the issue of either home rule or independence, it is impossible to say. The official numerical strength of the Scottish Covenant Association as reported to the Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs is 35,000; the Scottish Nationalist party refused to reveal the size of its membership. Both groups, however, call attention to the two million signatures which, they say, have at one time or another been appended to the Scottish Covenant as an indication of the strength of popular sentiment in favor of altering the Union. One cannot deny, as I have already noted, that many Scotsmen, whether they wish anything so drastic as either home rule or independence, are listening to these arguments with one ear at least. A large number appear to feel that some

[8] *Cf.* the claims set forth in A. Lamont, *Scotland—the Wealthy Nation* (Glasgow, 1952), chap. ii, where the relative resources of Scotland and Norway are compared.

[9] See Arthur Donaldson, *Exports: Opportunity or Menace?* (Glasgow, 1949), in which it is argued that Scotland not only has a favorable export position with areas outside the United Kingdom but is being exploited domestically because of it, since Scottish foodstuffs sent to England are being paid for by cheap English manufactured products and taxes levied in Scotland.

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devolution of central power may well be a good thing; although, strange to relate, many Scotsmen are often surprised to learn how much administrative authority has already been transferred from London to Edinburgh. For others the economic argument is persuasive simply because a Britain shorn of a large part of her imperial authority and faced with the need to export or die no longer offers the opportunities enjoyed by Scotsmen in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

It is possible that, as of the moment at least, the economic complaints against the Union are not quite so vigorous as they were during the years of austerity following World War II. Britain's economy remains a delicately balanced mechanism, however, and should Scotland find herself, as a result of the exigencies of the British world trade position, facing a new depression like that of the thirties or another era of austerity, then the volume of discontent might rise once again. Possibly, too, the continuing expansion of the Scottish economy marked by the increasing industrial diversification of the country and the inflow of substantial amounts of foreign capital may also help to allay discontent. It might, on the other hand, also serve to create new problems of its own. Scotland's great immediate need is for a young and skilled labor force to keep up the accelerated pace of expansion. Whether it will be possible to stanch the customary flow of emigrants from Scotland southward sufficiently to keep the expansion rolling and enable the region to raise the standard of living so that young Scots will no longer be tempted to leave is a question only time can answer. Time, too, will be required to discover whether an expanded Scottish economy may not increase the desire to loosen the Union by giving Scotland the economic strength necessary to stand alone. There are home rulers and nationalists who hope that this will be the end result. Whatever the final issue, it is to be hoped that the traditional social disciplines of Scottish society will suffice to keep Scotland from becoming a new focal point of tension on the international scene.

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PROBLEMS AND TENSIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

TO the average citizen the racial tensions in the Union of South Africa are typified by the enforced removal of Native Africans from one suburban township of Johannesburg to houses on government land several miles further away. The situation is variously interpreted as a defense of the last citadel of white supremacy or as the death throes of a nineteenth-century agrarian culture and the birth pangs of twentieth-century industrialism. It is all these things but much more. Essentially the tensions and problems of South Africa arise from the effort of one cultural group to dominate all the groups which make up the Union's varied population and to deflect or change the social and economic trends which interfere with the attainment of this objective. This article attempts an analysis of the current situation within this unhappy member of the Commonwealth of Nations.[1]

Five groups are the actors in the drama now unfolding in the Union of South Africa. Numerically most important are the Native Africans, about nine million strong, divided among numerous tribes, most of which are of the Bantu group. The smallest group is the Indian, located in the Union's eastern province of Natal which has five sixths of the 375,000 members of this group. A third group is the Colored, perhaps a million strong, the product of mixed marriages, now forbidden, and of miscegenation. The Colored are found largely in the Cape Province. Finally there are about three million Europeans divided between the Afrikaners, descendants of the original Dutch or Boer settlers, and those of English stock in about a 60–40 ratio.

Consider first the well-known policy of the Union with reference

[1] Professor Brunner was in the Union of South Africa from the end of January to July 31, 1954 as consultant to assist in the organization of an interdisciplinary Institute for Research in the Social Sciences for the Union located at the University of Natal, Durban. He traveled extensively, conferred with members of the social science departments of all the Union's universities, civil servants engaged in research, native affairs administrators in the principal cities, and African and Indian leaders.—ED.

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to native peoples—"apartheid". This is a term not easily defined. To the philosophers of the movement it means the eventual complete separation of the races. Some of the government ministers, and others who are more or less conscious of the difficulties of fully implementing such a policy, appear ready to compromise, though how far and in what ways they do not make clear.

Americans critical of apartheid should realize that the philosophers of the movement are sincere men. They defend their views in terms of the highest idealism. To them apartheid is not a means for the control, exploitation and oppression of the Africans but rather of giving them justice. No race must oppress another, they aver. White and black have different destinies and individualities, and their separation dates from the times of Genesis. According to the Bible they should never mix. (The texts to support this view are exclusively from the Old Testament.) Their association in the Union grows out of unfortunate historical accidents. The remedy is eventual separation, for the time being under white tutelage. In time, however, the Natives will be able to stand alone, furnishing the labor, skilled and unskilled, for their own industries and manning the services they require, including those of the professions. The whites will have to manage without Native labor; white immigrants must take up the burden. Such complete separation or segregation must be followed by independence in separate African states, some would say in a loose federation with a white South Africa. One step toward this goal should be the gradual extension of home rule to the Natives in the areas they now occupy, namely the Reserves, or, as some say, "The Bantu Fatherland". Admittedly this process will take a long time.

The aged Dr. Malan, until November 1954 Nationalist Prime Minister, admits that this is an ideal but impractical solution. He points out that the Nationalist Party platform has never gone so far. Whites and Africans "must to a certain extent live together." Natives ought to be prevented from coming into European areas, but this policy must not be carried to the point that "it harms the need for labor in the European areas."

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How does this vague pronouncement work out in practice? What has been the effect and what are the social costs of the steps thus far taken in the direction of the government's somewhat limited apartheid?

South Africa has experienced a tremendous industrial expansion since the end of World War II. Main highways leading into most of the principal cities, especially Durban, are lined for miles with fine, modern factories. The industrial labor force increased from 559,000 in 1946 to 619,000 in 1950, or about 11 per cent, largely in secondary industries. Extractive industries contributed a steadily decreasing proportion of the total production and are no longer in first place. But in this period the number of white male industrial workers declined 3.4 per cent, while the non-Europeans in industry, largely Africans, gained 17 per cent. Between the end of 1951 and March 1954, according to the government Bureau of Census and Statistics, white workers in secondary industries have further decreased by 6.2 per cent, while Africans have continued to gain. The *rate* of white decline is therefore accelerating. In mining the Africans are, as they always have been, a vast majority of the workers. In agriculture the story is the same, except that the rate of decline among white farm laborers is much more rapid, between 5 and 6 per cent a year. Every day South Africa becomes more dependent on the Natives for its food and manufactured products than it was the day before.

The government is beginning to recognize these trends and has reacted characteristically if press reports are accurate. In March 1955, the Minister in charge of industrial and commercial matters, in a public address, stated that if South African whites did not avail themselves of the existing opportunities in the productive industries the government would have to assign them to the necessary tasks.

Moreover, the Union cannot meet its needs for Native labor from its own population. It is already scraping the bottom of its manpower barrel. In visiting the Native Reserves one is struck by the absence of men. It is women and children whom one sees in the fields, at the stores and in the kraals. This is true of the rural Colored communities also. The writer

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visited one beautiful, historic but run-down community over one hundred miles from Cape Town. Its population, numbering 3,400, is exclusively Cape-Colored. The minister, storekeeper, school principal, and government representative all agreed that in nine tenths of the homes the numerous children were living with grandparents, while their parents were working in Cape Town. The press announced in February 1954 that in the Orange Free State alone there were 80,000 employed Africans imported from neighboring British and Portuguese territories. A proposal to rescind their work permits and send them home brought strong protest from farmers, housewives, and mining interests, despite the fact that this province is the most Afrikaner of the Union's four, and the most enthusiastic for apartheid.

One reason for the acute shortage of skilled labor is that many occupations are closed to Africans, in the main with the approval of white labor leaders. For example, Africans are excluded from the building trades, except that in one city after training they may now erect houses in Native locations, provided that skilled white labor does the four corners of the box-like huts. In another city they may complete the whole house but may not work on any structure for a European. The white engineer in charge of Native housing in this second city speaks in the highest terms of the skill and efficiency of his labor force.

This policy is a drag on the economic progress of the Union. It puts a premium on using brawn instead of machines. Other jobs are downgraded in classification to permit the use of African labor. According to two highly placed engineers in American automobile assembly plants, one a South African, the other an American, the cost of cars in the Union could be reduced materially if there were no racial restrictions on employment. In one operation Cape-Colored substantially outproduced their white counterparts but could receive only about three-fifths as much pay. In another plant Native Africans, for a while "bootlegged" into one operation, learned quickly, produced as well if not a bit better than the whites, but could receive less than half as much pay. Representatives of these companies, so far as the writer could learn, believed in the removal of all or most restrictions and in equal pay for equal work, a condition

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that obtains in the bordering Portuguese colony of Mozambique.[2] Incidentally, these wage differentials hold throughout. In Natal, Indian school teachers get about two-thirds of the salaries given their white colleagues, Natives about two-fifths. These proportions are set by the government.

A program of building industries along the boundaries of the Reserves, such as is seriously proposed by the Nationalist government, would encounter several very real difficulties.

1. It would denude existing industries of their labor force upon which they are increasingly dependent. It is easy to say that this void would be met by inducing immigration to the Union. Practically it would not be easy. The English are not enthusiastic about moving there. In fact India attracts more English immigrants than South Africa at present. The Nationalists have little enthusiasm for immigrants from Holland, since, according to press reports, there is some evidence that when naturalized these Hollanders vote for the opposition party. Some Italians have been brought in but this has aroused the violent opposition of the Dutch Reformed Church, which is deeply concerned about Roman Catholicism. It must be remembered that the Dutch Reformed Church furnishes strong religious support to the apartheid policy. The former Prime Minister is an ordained clergyman of this denomination. Government figures show a very small net gain in population from immigration. Almost as many people now leave as stay. Everywhere the writer went he was asked by business men, teachers, even some civil servants and artisans what the chances were of successfully relocating in the United States. Only restrictions on moving liquid resources prevent many from leaving the Union.

[2] The justification for these restrictions on jobs for the Africans and the wage differentials is their lack of ability. This is denied by many whites who have supervised groups of Natives.

There is at least one bit of significant evidence on the potentialities of the Africans. The final examination papers of the various hospital training schools are graded in Pretoria and no grader can identify the school or individual responsible for any paper. For several years the average score of the graduating class of African nurses of the American Board of Missions, McCord Zulu Hospital in Durban, have been the highest in the Union. The course of study and examinations are identical for all training schools. Yet on the apartheid assumption of African inferiority an attempt is now being made to downgrade the curriculum at the training school for African nurses.

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2. A second problem is to find the capital for these proposed industries. This not only involves their actual construction and equipment. It means also building the roads and/or railway lines to get raw materials in and finished products out. The Reserves are for the most part considerable distances from railways and good highways. The mountainous terrain would not make for cheap construction even with Native labor. Most important, capital is in short supply relative to both demand and need in South Africa. It is not likely that foreign loans would be granted for such a doubtful proposition unless there were very powerful political considerations. Some persons in the government hope to meet this problem by offering inducements and exerting pressures upon new industries to locate near the Reserves. The inducements would have to be very high to insure a fair return on the investment. Inevitably also private enterprise would strive for efficiency to reduce costs. This would collide with the limitations upon the use of Africans in many skilled and semiskilled occupations.

3. A population increase sufficient to carry out the scheme of building new industries at the Reserves without crippling existing industries, even if spread over ten to twenty years, would raise serious difficulties of food supply. The Native Reserves, like our Indian reservations, have been located in less desirable areas. Not even in China has the writer seen such terrible erosion as in one huge area which supports (*sic*) about one sixth of the Native population. It is also bad elsewhere, in part because of the thinness of the soil. The tribal or communal control of the land—the fact that Natives as individuals, with a few exceptions too detailed to discuss here, are not allowed to hold title to their land—militates against initiative and thus against the adoption of the techniques of scientific agriculture. This has been clearly demonstrated in studies at Rhodes University. The Union recognizes this problem. There is an agricultural extension service staffed by Natives under white supervision, but it is woefully undermanned, poorly supported, and not too well trained.

While the writer saw a few places where good local leadership and heroic work had produced reasonably good farms, it is not wholly unfair to indicate the level of agriculture in the Re-

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serves by giving the record of milk production of one herd of cows located in a community where the staff of a deservedly famous health center had for many years tried to improve agriculture in order to improve health. In 1952 in the summer quarter, the highest of the year, daily production of milk per cow was 4.9 pints. In 1942 it had been 3.2. Corn is a basic crop, but yields as low as 3 to 4 bushels per acre in the Reserves are not at all unusual.

According to the classical economists man can be depended upon to seek his economic advantage. The policies of the South African government would seem to provide a complete exception to this rule.

The government has had for almost a year a still unpublished report of its own Commission of Enquiry into socio-economic conditions in the Reserves. Rumor has it that the Commission has called for expenditures of millions of pounds to rehabilitate the Reserves *simply to enable them to carry their present population.* Certainly the University of Natal's study of the Zulu Reserves in its province, which should be published by the time this article appears, supports such a conclusion.

Apartheid applies also to housing under the recently enacted Group Areas Act by which areas of residence are fixed for each racial group. No Colored or Asiatic family may live in a white or African neighborhood. The only exception is that house servants may live in separate quarters on the property of the people who employ them. Thus in present housing schemes townships or other areas are built for just one race.

Housing is in short supply for all groups. In part this scarcity is due to the fact that new houses were not built during the war, while industrial expansion brought tens of thousands of persons of all races flocking into the cities. South Africa's well-publicized slums are certainly among the worst in the world, especially for non-Europeans, but the war is partly to blame. The various cities have been erecting tens of thousands of houses since 1946. Many of these are quite good. Some have small plots of ground around them. The few for better-paid workers average as good as the best houses in American textile or other industrial villages. In a few Native locations there is adequate provision for good schools, health centers, stores and churches. Most of

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these developments are government-subsidized by loans at an interest rate of ¾ of 1 per cent. These are called sub-economic housing. Rents in such Native areas are very low. In one development they are about one dollar a week for a two-bedroom house with a dining room–kitchen, living room and bath. Electricity when available costs one dollar a month. These rents are soon to be raised. This situation is by no means common, however. In Johannesburg, for example, few locations have water, sewage, electricity, or anything approaching adequate transportation, though some are as much as twenty-odd miles from the city, where the men work.

In Pretoria these locations radiate out from the city like the spokes of a wheel. One spoke may be assigned to Native Africans, the next to industry, the next to Asiatics, then one to industry, and so on. In all of these Native centers there is an elected advisory council to deal with the authorities.

No one can object seriously to this arrangement. People of the various racial groups prefer to live among their own kind. Socio-tribal ties of the Africans mean nothing to a Hindu, nor can an African look upon a temple or mosque as his center. Unfortunately, of late the government is charged by the local municipalities with clamping down on housing grants, with holding up approval of plans, and in other ways seriously impeding the rapid and desperately needed progress made during recent years. One city claims it could abolish its slums in two more years if the grants continued. The Johannesburg area, on the other hand, still needs close to 75,000 more units.

The real problem caused by the Group Areas Act relates to existing housing. The Department of Sociology of Cape Town University has delimited some 600 neighborhoods in that city. In close to 400 of these the population is racially mixed. The situation in Durban is somewhat similar, though not quite as complicated. It is usually the professional and more successful business people of the Colored and Asiatic groups who live in these mixed European and non-Europoean areas, many of them people of wealth, culture and charm. Under the Act the government is actually attempting to fix areas of racial residence. A commission "proclaims" an area for white or African or Asiatic. Thereafter property can be sold only to members of the race for

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whom the area is set aside. If there is no sale, compensation is to be at the assessed value, or, under certain conditions, 10 per cent more. Assessments are well under true value in South Africa. The change-over must be made within ten years after an area is proclaimed.

One mile across the hill from the writer's former office at the University of Natal is one of Durban's worst slums, the scene of the tragic riots of 1949. Though no white person now lives in the area, it has been proclaimed for white residence. No white person would live in the shacks that mar these pleasant hillsides. They represent nonetheless an investment locally estimated in excess of $2,000,000, which must be sacrificed. Where the 50,000 inhabitants of this slum are to go, whence the capital will come to erect new houses for the whites and the displaced if there is inadequate compensation for the previous homes, are questions often asked but to which the government has deigned no reply.

This is but one case. Clearly the implementation of the Group Areas Act will call for heavy capital expenditure in a country where, to repeat, capital is far from plentiful and where the railroads, which have not kept pace with the nation's development and are always but a step or less from a complete breakdown, need millions for modernization. If they fail to get it the whole economic health of the country will be impaired. In fact it is impaired already. In the winter of 1954 many industries had to go on part time or close for lack of coal, and many commercial fishing boats were tied up for days for the same reason. The trouble was wholly a matter of inability of the railroads to transport the coal from the mines. Obviously, also, the Group Areas Act will cause loss and suffering to many human beings, chiefly non-whites. This consideration is not stressed here because the ideology of the government party is that such people will in the long run benefit spiritually, socially and economically by the changes the Act will force. In other words, it is for their own good.

Space permits mention of only one other matter with respect to the Africans, the Bantu Educational Act and educational policy as a whole. The education of the children of South Africa's races has always been on a segregated basis. On the

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higher level two universities, Cape Town and Witwatersrand, at Johannesburg, have had no color bar. Natal has a separate "non-European" college and operates the only medical school in the Union for this group. The four Afrikaans-medium universities exclude all non-whites. The government has now declared that all university education must be segregated and a commission has just finished an inquiry as to ways and means of bringing this about. Apparently there is to be a non-European University for the Union, in addition to or as a considerable expansion of the present Fort Hare University College, which is attached to, but over 100 miles from, Rhodes University. It is admitted that this will be a costly enterprise but, true to their ideology, the apartheid advocates recognize that if their dream of self-sufficient Native Reserves, wholly divorced from white South Africa, is to be realized the Africans will need trained professional and technical personnel and leadership.

Here, in passing, note one of the many puzzling contradictions in South Africa. The present meagre expenditure on non-white social utilities is explained and defended on the ground that two million whites "are carrying nine million non-whites on their backs." This argument ignores the fact that it is through the labor of the non-whites that white South Africa has attained its high standard of living and also the fact that 20,000 Africans and a proportionately higher percentage of Asiatics and Colored pay income taxes. But granting the argument, it appears that present policies if implemented will put a still heavier burden on the backs of the whites.

With respect to Native education, the government has now transferred this from the Ministry of Education to that of Native Affairs and also transferred the administration and control of Native education from the provinces to the Union government. Moreover, this year it is taking over all primary and high schools operated by Christian missions. It was already granting heavy subsidies to these schools. The missions must accept the government's terms or suffer a crippling reduction in their subsidy. Educators estimate that only about one third of the African children are in school and that about two thirds of these are in mission schools. The new education act provides for three classes of schools:

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(a) Private schools under mission or other auspices which presumably will accept reduction in subsidy rather than yield control.

(b) Bantu, Native Community Schools established by a Native Council, a tribe, or community. These would operate under the immediate supervision of a Native committee or board. They would be subsidized either partly or wholly, but, as with the first class, the Minister is given the power to suspend, reduce, or withdraw financial aid at his sole discretion. Schools of these two types must be registered.

(c) Schools established and financed by the Minister of Native Affairs which may be closed whenever the Minister deems it expedient to do so.

It is hoped that within ten years there will be four primary grades available for all Native children. There are elaborate specifications as to teacher training, media of instruction, discipline for teachers, clinics, and so on. The plan envisages a higher primary school for four years above the four grades mentioned, high and technical schools and university education. Tuition will be charged. Unlike the students in white schools, all pupils have to buy their own textbooks. The curriculum is designed to fit the Native African into the type of life the apartheid ideology sees him perforce living, and tailored to his assumed abilities. Education is not indivisible in South Africa. There will be a white education and a Bantu (Native) education.

The reaction of the religious bodies to this edict has been one of strong and unanimous opposition, but the government has been unyielding. The Church of England as of this writing has determined to close its schools. The Roman Catholics have decided to operate their nearly 2,000 schools regardless of the sharply reduced subsidy. They are erecting a theological seminary in Basutoland and may move their teacher training college there. The American Mission Board of the Congregational–Christian Church has also decided to continue to operate some of its schools, especially two historic secondary schools in Natal.

Is there any explanation for this apartheid policy which handi-

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caps the economic development of the nation, threatens to saddle the white population with even higher taxation, engenders ever increasing resentment among the Africans, and compels all races to live in an unhappy society where more than anywhere else in the free world aggressive prejudice is an accepted way of life?

The many explanations offered are interrelated beyond any unscrambling. The terms in which they are offered depend on the viewpoint of the analyst. Religious justifications have already been noted. For the short run there is the economic fact that the European has achieved a very comfortable standard of living by utilizing low-paid Native labor, and sees this threatened if the African is upgraded. He does not want to face competition from blacks. The anthropologist points out that there are deep cultural differences, and that every race, no matter how backward it may be in Western terms, holds the customs and values it lives by superior to those of any other group. Another basic element in the South African situation is fear. Whites are outnumbered more than three to one by Africans. (A South African friend who was offered an important post in England remarked: "My choice is whether I want my wife and children murdered in their beds by Natives in Africa or wiped out by an H-bomb in England.") Finally, the apartheid policy grows in part out of a broader objective—the relentless determination of the Nationalist Party to remake the Union into a society resembling that of the Boer republics of the nineteenth century, preferably outside the Commonwealth of Nations.

The Union of South Africa presents a spectacle, unique outside the Iron and Bamboo Curtain countries, of a cultural group not content simply to preserve its culture and live cooperatively with other cultural groups, the English, the Colored, the Asiatic and the African, but determined as a religious duty to dominate the nation and dictate its cultural forms. To this end it is attempting both to control and to alter the process of social change. By the Act of Union, in 1910, South Africa was recognized as a bilingual country. In many other ways the Afrikaner (Boer) was accorded the freedom to develop his own life. Neither he nor his children were forced to use English

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either at home, in business, in courts, or in legislative bodies. Afrikaans is, for instance, the medium of instruction in half the Union's eight universities. Switzerland has shown that a nation can live happily and develop with three official languages. But the Afrikaner is not satisfied with any such arrangement. He must rule supreme.

The inquiring American is told, "You cannot understand us because you won your war for independence; we lost ours." Drawing attention to the loyalty of the American South to the United States makes no impression. Afrikaners allude to the English as "the enemy"—and this half a century after the Boer War! A Nationalist candidate for the provincial legislature in Natal in 1954 declared, unrebuked by his party, "the Afrikaners must fight the enemy not only on the political field but in every possible terrain . . . they should attack our enemy on the field of commerce . . . . Buy . . . not from the enemy but from your own shop." The chairman of a national organization, the *Afrikaance Handelsinstituut*, declared that Afrikaners should only employ or seek employment from Afrikaners. Their savings should be deposited only in Afrikaner-controlled banks. The executive secretary proposed that "scouts" be appointed "to report on un-Afrikans attitudes of businessmen or where the Afrikaans language was neglected," with a view to "the necessary attention and steps." Similarly one of the leading Dutch Reformed clergymen has declared: "An Englishman I will not tolerate in my church, in my school or in my home." He opposes mixed marriages, though he himself is the product of such a marriage.

If one may judge by government actions, these remarks do not represent any "lunatic fringe". Prospective Native school teachers must learn Afrikaans to qualify even in the most English province of Natal where less than one fourth of the white people are Afrikaners, and a very high proportion of these are bilingual according to the 1951 census. Railway employees must pass examinations in Afrikaans or face dismissal or demotion. Some of the top-ranking men in the technical engineering work suffered on this account in 1954 and were supplanted by less well-trained men if not political appointees. This was at a time when the understaffed, underdeveloped railways had placed

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a 50 per cent embargo on freight because the railways were unable to cope with the normal amount. This is a periodic occurrence.

When one compares Natal's share of the allotment of government funds for railways and harbor capital improvements with those of the other three provinces, it is clear that proportionally Natal, this most English province, is deliberately discriminated against, though its chief port, Durban, handles more traffic by far than any other in the Union. Similarly, compared with the other universities in the Union, as to both enrollment and needs, the University of Natal receives an utterly inadequate subsidy from the national government. Except in Natal, children of English-speaking parents are now compulsorily segregated from Afrikaans-speaking children in separate schools. Yet there is next to no scientific literature in Afrikaans, nor very much of any other type. Even in the Afrikaans-medium university libraries the bulk of the volumes are in English, as are necessarily many of the textbooks used in classes. The handicap thus imposed on children of Afrikans parentage is obvious. So is the handicap to a nation which is dangerously short of trained personnel in both the natural and the social sciences.

Early in 1954 Prime Minister Malan indicated to the British government that the Union desired a number of British protectorates turned over to it. These included Basutoland which lies wholly within the Union, Swaziland which adjoins it on the northeast, and Bechuanaland which borders it on the north. Since Africans outnumber Europeans better than 200 to 1 in these areas, the announcement was received with consternation by African leaders in the territories named. Rhodesia, now part of the Central African Federation, promptly announced that if there were any change in the status of Bechuanaland her claims to it must be considered. Later in the year South Africa's Minister of Defense and several other officials visiting England requested that the British naval base at Simonstown be turned over to the Union. At the same time they made certain demands upon Britain to assume a greater share in the defense program of the Union. This was during the election campaign for provincial legislatures, when more than one Nationalist speaker was advocating separation of the Union from

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the Commonwealth of Nations. Little has been reported in South Africa as to the outcome of these conferences. The writer was in England shortly afterwards and can say that these proposals were received with something less than enthusiasm.

The reason for demanding this British territory is obvious. The present Reserves comprise barely 10 per cent of the Union's territory, and are the residence of perhaps two thirds of its African and half its total population. The three British protectorates would add 70,000 square miles but less than 900,000 population. Annexation would increase the Union's African population by 10 per cent or less but the area available for them almost 150 per cent. If to this be added South-West Africa, which the world holds to be a United Nations–mandated territory but which South Africa claims and whose few whites are liberally represented in the Union Parliament, the Union would add almost 318,000 square miles but less than 350,000 population. Close to half the total area could then be used for the 10 million Africans. This would make the apartheid dream of a "Bantu Fatherland" much easier of attainment. There are those who believe that if Britain yielded its three protectorates Prime Minister Strijdom would give up his objective of turning South Africa into a republic outside the Commonwealth of Nations.

It is interesting and pertinent, in this connection, to note how the Nationalists came into power. As a result of a gerrymandering of election districts which gives disproportionate weight to the rural vote, they achieved their first parliamentary majority in 1948 on 39 per cent of the popular vote. They were also far from a majority in the next national election in 1953. This campaign and that for provincial offices in 1954 were conducted on the basis of stimulating fear of the blacks, who, it was alleged, only the Nationalists could keep in their place. They were aided by a divided opposition and weak, confused leadership in the United Party which has never found a successor to the great General Smuts. Now that they are in power the Nationalist government is in a position by legislative enactment to exert great pressure on any opposition. An individual who carries his opposition too far may be disposed of by having the Minister of Justice "name" him a Communist. Thereafter he is not allowed to be present in any group of more than three people.

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He may not even attend religious services. He loses his vote, and his movements within the Union are restricted. There is no appeal to the courts from such a decision, nor need the person "named" be in fact a Communist.

No action has yet been taken against the new Liberal Party but two members of the Criminal Investigation Department attended all meetings of the party in the last election campaign. While there is as yet no press censorship one of the cabinet has recently stated that newspapers "misrepresenting" the position of the government in editorial comment will have to be attended to if this continues. Since South Africa still has import controls and is not self-sufficient in newsprint the meaning of this threat is clear. So is the reason for the government's attitude, given its cultural objectives, since the newspapers of the English far outsell the Afrikaans-medium press, despite the fact that they are a minority of the European group. Obviously, many Afrikaners subscribe to the English-medium papers. Even in the capital, Pretoria, it is estimated that better than two thirds of the readers of the English *Pretoria News* are Nationalists. The new Prime Minister, Mr. Strijdom, is said to regard the "struggle on the newspaper front" as important as that on the political front.

The influence of the Afrikaner *Broederbund* must not be overlooked. This is a highly select, highly disciplined, semi-secret organization of perhaps 3,000 to 3,500 members, to which every member of the cabinet is said to belong. One of its purposes is to get its own members or fellow travelers into the most strategic civil service positions, university chairs, and administrative posts on all levels of education. It believes that at all costs the Afrikaner must be insulated from outside influences. Thus they believe the *Boerenasie* will be built up. A few years ago leaders of the *Broederbund* in their capacity as members of the Executive of a related organization, the *Instituut vir Christelik-nasionale Onderways*, issued a document in which their policy for a Christlike National Society was outlined.

At that time a loyal and distinguished South African civil servant of Afrikaner descent courageously circulated a letter, a copy of which was given to the writer. Commenting on the document he said:

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> It is an appalling document—appalling in the sense of frightening. In spite of its name, the policy is neither Christian nor National. It is not *Christian*, because it deliberately sets up a framework in which prejudices will be cultivated and hatred between man and man will be engendered.
>
> It is not *National*, for such sections of our population as do not subscribe to the narrow religious and cultural tenets of this self-chosen "Godsvolk"—die Boerenasie—are automatically excluded. The idea of cultivating a South African nationhood is repudiated by them as being not only impossible but also undesirable and in conflict with "Godswil."

The same general point of view on the whole situation is outlined in a South African equivalent of Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, entitled *When Smuts Goes*, by Professor Keppel-Jones. Written about a decade ago practically everything he foretold up to 1954 has occurred.

To us in the United States South Africa seems a long way off. There are 7,000 miles of ocean between New York and Cape Town. Most of us doubtless feel that South African problems not wholly domestic are the responsibility of the British Commonwealth. Unfortunately, the world of 1955 being what it is, we cannot avoid being concerned. For one thing, South Africa has considerable deposits of uranium. Contracts for procuring it are already in existence. American capital is involved. What happens may concern us vitally.

At the moment the efforts of one cultural group to make its values, culture, and way of life supreme have riven the nation. People are Afrikaners, English, Colored, African. They are not South Africans. The advantage, or for non-Afrikaners the protection, of their own group has become the sole objective for most of them. The nation and its welfare, which should be the paramount loyalty of every citizen, have been forgotten save that the dominant cultural group views its own complete supremacy as the only good for the nation.

What of the future? There are important business men who say privately that complete political and economic integration is the only solution for the Union's problems, but they do not know how to bring it about. They hesitate to advocate it openly lest reprisals hurt the stockholders to whom they are

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responsible. The Liberal Party which advocates such integration is new and weak. Some but not all African and Indian leaders believe it has come into the picture ten years too late. There are signs of a more liberal and positive attitude among younger members of the United Party. It is possible but not likely that it will move toward a more positive policy and speak once more with the voice of Smuts. Certainly some, including members of Parliament, will advocate this. The Afrikaners themselves are not all Nationalists. Between 100,000 and 300,000 vote for the United Party and a few are leaders in the Liberal Party. But at present the most extreme and intolerant faction of the Nationalist Party has gained control and thus made the solution of the highly difficult problems of the Union almost impossible. Nor under present arrangements and with the Afrikaner birth rate significantly higher than that of the English stock is it likely that this faction can be dislodged, unless the power of social and economic forces becomes so strong that moderates like Dr. Theophilus Donges, present Minister of the Interior, break with the Strijdom-Verwoerd wing of the Nationalist Party. There are Nationalists cognizant of these trends, some important business leaders, who hope and expect that Strijdom and his alter ego, the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr. Verwoerd, "will make a mess of things" soon enough for a new combination to save the Union from disaster.

On the other hand, South Africa is blessed with a disproportionate number of dedicated individuals who at great personal sacrifice are working to build bridges between the races, especially in health, education, and social service. The support they get is none too generous save in times of catastrophe, but it proves that the spark of conscience, though feeble, still burns. If the Union commits the incredible folly of leaving the Commonwealth of Nations, its best customer and still to a considerable degree its protector, Natal may secede, or attempt to. In the election of June 1954 about 25,000 Natalians voted for the party which advocates secession if necessary.

On this question, however, hear a liberal South African, an Afrikaner and former Senator, Dr. Edgar Brookes, who addressed the students of the University of Natal on the future of South

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Africa on September 16, 1954. As reported by the Afrikaner-English newspaper, *The Blomfontein Friend*, Senator Brookes declared that English-speaking South Africans had striven earnestly to merge themselves in a larger South Africanism but were now excluded from government and political power unless they accept the Afrikaner ideology. "The great vision of Botha and Smuts is thus derided."

> To those who had followed the vision of these two truly great men, Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking, this is a great tragedy.
>
> To say that we believe in separation as a solution of our racial difficulties, while we know that we cannot get the land to carry it out and will not dispense with the labour of those who are to be separated, is dishonesty.
>
> If we are conscious of the facts and deceive others about them, it is bad enough; but it is far worse if, half-conscious or unconscious of the fact, we go on deceiving ourselves.
>
> That is the last high treason, the last disloyalty to the personality that we should revere above all other personalities—our own. And this self-deceit is, in my judgment, at the back of all our race and colour policies.
>
> . . . .
>
> The remedies, if they are not one day to be remedies obtained through blood and tears, will have to be largely unpolitical.
>
> Those who cannot accept the present set-up of life in South Africa, will have to find new ways of making their vision effective, ways in which Afrikaans-speaking, English-speaking, and non-European will, in their own way, each man true to the best that was in him, have a share.

The brave, lonely, dedicated men and women mentioned above are working with that hope. So are most of the social scientists whose facts as assembled more and more convince those not prisoners of an ideology that in the long run the Union cannot turn back the swift-flowing current of social trends. But the foreign visitor who has studied this beautiful land can only hope and join in the moving prayer that is both the theme and title of the African "national" anthem, "God Save Africa".

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NOTES ON THE FORMATION OF STATE-MUNICIPAL FISCAL POLICY: CHICAGO AND NEW YORK

THE scope and intensity of political conflict between Chicago and Illinois and between New York City and New York State have broadened and deepened in the post-war years as the demand for increased municipal revenue has become a persistent issue. Solutions for fiscal problems may emerge and have emerged, as Stephen Bailey has put it, "full blown and crystal clear from the minds of college professors, lobbyists and public officials";[1] considerably less attention has been paid to determining the conditions under which such plans can be transformed into public policy. With increasing frequency, Chicago and New York officials have petitioned their state legislatures for increased state aid, for added permissive taxing powers, and for an end to mandatory expenditures. It appears, however, that persistence has not brought the desired reward. Sessions of the Illinois and New York legislatures end with city politicians feeling mangled, and state politicians sounding pious. Political scientists, economists, and management consultants who have contributed to a voluminous record of state and city revenue, expenditure, and management surveys must admit to a feeling of dismay incident to the shunting aside of so much "practical" research work.[2] Consequently, the pro-

[1] *Congress Makes a Law* (New York, 1950), p. viii.

[2] The principal published works of the various committees established by the governments involved include: Robert Haig and Carl Shoup, *The Financial Problem of the City of New York* (New York, Mayor's Committee on Management Survey, 1952); *Modern Management for the City of New York*, Report of the Mayor's Committee (New York, 1953); *Four Steps to Better Government of New York City*, Report of the Temporary State Commission to Study the Organizational Structure of the Government of the City of New York (New York, 1953), and *Final Report* (1954); Temporary State Commission on Fiscal Affairs of the New York State Government, *Report* (Albany, 1955), volume III; *Report of the Chicago Mayor's Commission on Revenue* (Chicago, 1952); *Proposals for Improvement in the Business Methods of the City of Chicago*, Summary Report and Thirty-three Survey Reports of the Chicago Committee on City Expenditures (Chicago, 1952); Jack F. Isakoff and Gilbert Steiner, *Illinois Municipal Revenue*, Staff Memoranda of the Legislative

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fessional political scientist would be remiss if he did not attempt to formulate some tentative generalizations dealing with the political determinants of public policy in this field. This paper attempts to meet that challenge by considering some data that may help explain how state-local fiscal policy is formed.

General Frame of Reference

When formal negotiations are entered into on the terms of state legislation dealing with municipal revenue, the spokesmen are representatives of the dominant political groups within the respective geographical units. Neither cities nor states contain monolithic political forces and negotiation is used by participants on both sides as a way of locating and measuring group support for various positions.[3] Preëxisting group conflict, however, makes a special technique available to state spokesmen, in that they can impose a short-run program on city leaders through the legal mechanism of state control of local units. State leaders negotiate despite this apparent advantage because utilizing the legal technique would involve new activity that could result in a change of the political equilibrium.

The implications of this observation are important because they suggest that agreement may be contingent on the ability of city politicians to present a program in such a way that state politicians can acquiesce without losing actual strength or forsaking potential political benefit. Manifestly, the particulars of a program are significant in determining reaction on the state level. On the other hand, substantive programs that could be enacted may be offered by city officials and lost because of faulty technique. The remainder of this paper is an effort to

Commission on Municipal Revenue (Urbana, 1953); *Chicago's Government*, Report of the Chicago Home Rule Commission (Chicago, 1954).

[3] For the purposes of this discussion, it is especially important to note that neither a city nor a state is a solid unit. Although it is possible to take the mass "New York City" and separate it from the mass "New York State", the problems being considered here do not involve groups so conveniently separated. Whenever there is a reference in this paper to "the city" or "the state", it should be understood as a kind of shorthand to designate spokesmen for the group that is legally in control of the governmental machinery of the unit. Support for the interest espoused by this group may be forthcoming from groups within or without the same unit. See Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Bloomington, 1953), p. 203.

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systematize consideration of interest patterns that are critical to the determination of substantive issues.[4]

Data bearing on this subject are frequently not matters of accessible public record. At the state-local level, not only does all of the usual unrecorded political maneuvering go on, but published hearings are relatively uncommon, and verbatim legislative reports are virtually unknown. However, for policy decisions taken in the last two or three years, there is an unusually informative record including, for New York, not only staff memoranda on various proposals, but also several statements by the New York City Board of Estimate members collectively, by Mayors Impellitteri and Wagner and other members of the Board individually, and by Governors Dewey and Harriman and the majority and minority leaders of the state legislature. For Illinois, published hearings before a state legislative commission, at which Chicago officials representing various interests testified, are suggestive of some important factors for analysis.

The author is able to augment the record in important respects

[4] The literature on the relative merits of various forms of municipal revenue is extensive. For an argument favoring curtailment of local permissive taxing powers in favor of state aid programs that "cement the bonds of common purpose that exist between governments" see Morton Grodzins, "State-Municipal Fiscal Relations: A Critical Commentary", *National Tax Journal*, vol. III, No. 1 (March 1950). The contrary position is taken by Rowland Egger who argues that grants should be a last resort restricted to equalization purposes, and that state-local tolerances will not increase until the fiscal capacity of local governments is increased: "In One Consent", *Public Administration Review*, vol. X, No. 4 (Autumn 1950). At the August 1952 meetings of the American Political Science Association in Buffalo, New York, Egger reaffirmed his contention that the determination of policy and standards will not become local matters unless financial responsibility is returned to the local level. His paper was complemented by one entitled "Local Government Without Subsidy", by George Mitchell, who argued that financial responsibility and independence are essential characteristics of local government but that local independence is not lost when local governments eschew participation in those functions in which benefits and costs are nearly completely divorced, e.g., public health and public welfare. The Egger paper, somewhat revised, appeared as "Nature over Art: No More Local Finance", *American Political Science Review*, vol. 47, No. 2 (June 1953).

Some of the political conditions that have influenced state-municipal fiscal relationships in Michigan and New Jersey, respectively, are hinted at in Denzel Cline, "Cities Win More State Funds", *National Municipal Review*, vol. 41, No. 2 (February 1952), and Samuel Bodine, "A Senator Discusses the Tax Situation", *New Jersey Municipalities*, vol. 30, No. 2 (February 1953).

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out of his experiences and observations from 1951 to 1953 as a staff participant in both public and executive sessions of an Illinois interim Legislative Commission on Municipal Revenue; as staff member of a legislative subcommittee which supplemented its study of the New York situation with a series of interviews with technical experts and political leaders in both Albany and New York City; as staff aide, during the 1953 Illinois legislative session, to legislative sponsors of the revenue program supported by the Mayor and a majority of the Chicago City Council; and, in 1954–1955, as staff director of the Chicago Home Rule Commission, an *ad hoc* commission created by city ordinance to recommend structural changes and a home rule program for Chicago. None of the hypotheses, assertions or interpretations are the responsibility of public officials in either New York or Illinois, but the methodology employed here would not have been possible without these opportunities for intimate observation.

Characteristics of the Environment

The political milieux of New York City and Chicago are sufficiently similar to justify an effort toward hypotheses useful in either of the city-state relationships. An initial step in this direction is to identify background elements that are not susceptible to short-range manipulation. A few of the general conditions that have long prevailed and are so well established in both places as to be part of the environment relate to populations, representation, political organization, and the constitutional status of cities.[5]

1. Population. The populations of New York and Chicago are, respectively, thirteen and thirty-three times as great as

[5] Some of the environmental factors not considered in this problem, but which would be important where other cities are involved, include governmental form, nature of the municipal economy, and vigilance of the press, to name only a few. For example, a search for the political determinants of fiscal powers granted council-manager cities in Maine would take the popularity of manager government in Maine and the one-party politics of the state as environmental factors. Similarly, in considering the same problem in Florida, the attractiveness of its cities as resort centers would obviously be part of the environment in this sense. See A. M. Hillhouse and Muriel Magelssen, *Where Cities Get Their Money* (Chicago, 1945), pp. 203–207, for a discussion of "Tailoring the Revenue System".

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those of the next largest city in each state. Size immediately distinguishes these metropolitan centers from other incorporated places, and size of such proportions carries with it, in these cases, wealth and an unduplicated complex of social and economic problems. By means of the population standard as a basis for classification, disguised special or local laws pertaining only to New York or Chicago are easily enacted by the state legislatures. The size and wealth of these cities also mean that their governing officials occupy positions of prestige, and that mayoralty candidates are always abundant.[6]

2. Representation. Neither Chicago nor New York has control of either house of its state legislature. With a population that is about two fifths of the state's total, Chicago holds about one third of the seats in the Illinois General Assembly, a situation that will not be changed by a current reapportionment.[7] New York City, with 53 per cent of the state's population, has only a little more than 40 per cent of the total number of legislators. This means that even if the city representation can be solidified—which would require a triumph of geography over party that is unusual in controversial matters—some extraordinary logrolling would be necessary to enact a municipal program, because the kinds of issues that can produce unanimity among the city legislators would very likely produce equally solid opposition from members representing other districts.

[6] In recent years, there have been so many candidates in New York's administration that one City Comptroller, himself "available", suggested to the State Commission to Study the Organizational Structure of the New York City Government that the mayor be made ineligible for reëlection after a single five-year term because "any Mayor who seeks re-election will inevitably be tempted to adopt the course which is most popular, rather than that which is designed for the greatest good to the greatest number. It is only by making the Mayor ineligible for re-election that the city can obtain the best type of administration." *New York Times*, July 15, 1953, p. 1. No suggestion was forthcoming as to how to make certain that the potential heirs to the mayor's job would withstand the lure of the "course which is most popular".

[7] Under the terms of a constitutional amendment ratified in November 1954, the Illinois House of Representatives is to be apportioned on a population basis, effective in 1957, and until 1963 Chicago will have 23 of 59 districts. The Senate is apportioned according to area, but Chicago gets 18 of 58 districts with no subsequent reapportionment provided for.

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3. Political organization. Two phenomena fall under the general head of political organization. First, within each city, the most evident aspect of political organization is the strength of the Democratic machine as compared to that of the Republicans. Democratic superiority of numbers must be considered one of the facts of life, and if it is to be overcome, or even minimized, the opposition must upset the existing interest complex. This means that when the state administration is Republican, intergovernmental relations will be affected by an effort to aid the minority party in the city through an appeal for the favor of politically transient groups. And even with an Adlai Stevenson or an Averell Harriman in the governor's mansion, both chambers of the Illinois and of the New York legislatures are likely to be Republican-controlled. Consequently, there is almost always some attempt to use the mechanism of state government to change the political equilibrium in the city. This was illustrated in recent months by the efforts made by Governor Stratton and Illinois legislative leaders to aid the candidacy of Robert E. Merriam in the Chicago mayoral campaign. At one point in that campaign, the Democratic-controlled Chicago City Council refused to hold public hearings on an alleged link between crime and politics. The State Senate's Judiciary Committee promptly found an excuse to hold the hearings at the state level, and arranged for unprecedented television coverage.

Second, a word should be said about partisanship in the legislatures. Robert Luce's finding that only in New York is partisanship really strong has been given present-day validity by an investigation conducted under the auspices of the Committee on American Legislatures of the American Political Science Association.[8] New York's "vigorous" two-party system in the legislature contrasts with the Illinois picture where relatively little legislation is moved forward by party voting,[9] a

[8] O. Douglas Weeks, "Politics in the Legislatures", *National Municipal Review*, vol. 42, No. 2 (February 1952).

[9] William Keefe, "Party Government and Lawmaking in the Illinois General Assembly", *Northwestern University Law Review*, vol. 47, No. 1 (March–April 1952). Also see Samuel Gove and Gilbert Steiner, *The Illinois Legislative Process* (Urbana, 1954).

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circumstance that one recent Illinois Governor has characterized as "heartening evidence of mature recognition that at the state level there is little to divide us on public policy and that political differences are seldom ideological."[10] However, when party perpetuation or aggrandizement is concerned, party government in the Illinois legislature can be very firm. This was exemplified recently when the Democrats feared that a proposal to give the governor power to appoint judges would virtually bar the bench to Democrats.[11] Only one Democrat in the Illinois Senate and only 13 of 66 House Democrats voted for the resolution despite almost solid state-wide newspaper support, intense and persistent bar association activity, and strong support for the plan from the League of Women Voters and similar groups. Party caucuses are frequent, and only the floor leader is authorized to permit a defection. Actually, some Illinois legislative leaders have found the informal caucus to be more effectively binding than the formal caucus. In New York, partisanship in the legislature is kinetic; in Illinois, it is potential; but in both states there is a two-party system.

4. Constitutional status of cities. Neither Illinois nor New York provides for constitutional municipal home rule, although the New York Constitution includes a section popularly termed the home rule amendment, and the Illinois Constitution makes a special provision for local laws affecting Chicago. The Illinois stipulation, in part, is that "No law based upon this amendment to the constitution, affecting the municipal government of the city of Chicago, shall take effect until such law shall be consented to by a majority of the legal voters of said city voting on the question at any election, general, municipal or special."[12]

[10] Adlai E. Stevenson, "Biennial Message to the Illinois General Assembly", *Journal of the House of Representatives of the 68th Illinois General Assembly* (January 7, 1953), p. 21.

[11] Illinois has elected only four Democrats as governor since the Civil War: John Peter Altgeld in 1892; Edward F. Dunne in 1912; Henry Horner in 1932; and Adlai Stevenson in 1948.

[12] Illinois Constitution of 1870, Article IV, section 34. On this subject, see Barnet Hodes, "The Illinois Constitution and Home Rule for Chicago", *University of Chicago Law Review*, vol. 15, No. 1 (Autumn 1947); Robert E. Merriam and Norman Elkin, "Home Rule for Chicago", *Northwestern University Law Review*,

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In fact, local laws affecting the city of Chicago are regularly enacted under the guise of general laws presumably pertaining to all cities over 500,000 population. Following legislative rejection of its 1953 tax program, the city established a home rule commission to determine "all possible ways and means of securing the best measure of home rule for the government of Chicago." The Commission rejected constitutional home rule as a solution to the city's problem, characterizing it as "a paradoxical enigma, attractive and appealing, yet unattainable to any significant degree."[13]

The constitutional authority of the New York State legislature to govern the financial affairs of New York City stems, almost paradoxically, from what is supposed to be a home rule amendment to the New York Constitution. The key provisions of the appropriate sections stipulate that

> Every city shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the state relating to its property, affairs or government.
>
> It shall be the duty of the legislature . . . subject to the provisions of this constitution, to restrict the power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning the credit of such municipal corporations, so as to prevent abuses in taxation and assessments and in contracting debt by such municipal corporations . . . .[14]

The net result of this constitutional invitation to judicial interpretation has been to leave New York City with minimum home rule powers. The constitutional convention of 1938 argued the home rule question, but the outcome was only clarification of language, not enlargement of municipal power. The key, plainly, is in the reserve power of the state to step into any situation, and act whenever it considers it wise or expedient to do so. In this respect, what has been called "negative" home rule—limiting the power of the state legislature to act—is not sufficiently negative to make home rule real; on the other

vol. 48, No. 3 (July–August 1953); *Chicago's Government*, Report of the Chicago Home Rule Commission (1954), *passim*.

[13] *Chicago's Government*, p. 316.

[14] New York Constitution of 1938, Article IX, sections 12, 9.

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hand, the positive grant to cities (including New York City) is inadequate and hedged.[15]

II

Fiscal relationships between states and cities can be described as functions of the interplay of fluid group interests, the comparative potency of these interests at any point in time determining the form by which the state-municipal relationship is manifested. Whether any particular state-municipal relationship is characterized by a grant-in-aid program, by extensive permissive taxing powers, or by home rule depends on the way group strength is distributed among the major interests that are involved. Some of the obvious interests are easily identified. For example, the existence of a state aid program is explicable in terms of groups finding such considerations as equalization, convenience, and administrative efficiency more attractive than municipal independence and local responsibility. For different groups, each of the five enumerated interests has a different weight. Some of these interests will, if dominant, result in the creation of a state aid policy, some will lead away from such policy. If an attempt is being made to describe a public policy with maximum precision, the description will identify a maximum number of recognizable elements of the interest complex. Similarly, if an attempt is being made to manipulate a public policy, the manipulation will be successful to the extent that it readjusts the existing interest complex. If an existing state aid policy is to be reversed, some of the groups adhering to that policy must be weaned away, or new groups must adhere to the contrary interests, i.e., a new arrangement of the political groups must take place.

Consider the endless dispute over the ability of different units to administer a particular tax efficiently. A demonstration that a local unit can more economically administer a tax than can the state may weaken state aid because adherence to economy becomes adherence to an anti-state aid interest. For

[15] See New York State Constitutional Convention Committee (1938), *Reports*, vol. V, *New York City Government Functions and Problems*, pp. 21 *et seq.*; Warren Moscow, *Politics in the Empire State* (New York, 1948), p. 222, quoting Reuben A. Lazarus, Consultant on Municipal Affairs of the New York State Assembly.

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the student of policy and policy manipulation, the important factor is not a "thing" like state aid, but rather the adherence of groups to those values that result in state aid.

In these terms, the majority of the New York City Board of Estimate has been attempting, in recent years, to modify an existing public policy which manifested itself in the form of state aid and generally liberal permissive taxing powers. Chicago officials have tried to revolutionize public policy in Illinois by creating a state aid policy where there had been none, and by dramatically increasing the scope of permissive taxing powers.

Substantive Elements of a Fiscal Program

For present purposes, the economic details of the plans submitted by Chicago and New York spokesmen to recent sessions of their state legislatures need only be outlined in broad relief. Basically, Chicago's corporate fund, in order to finance current plans has been short at least $25,000,000 annually and the city administration has proposed that the money be raised by: (1) an increase in the state sales tax by ½ per cent with return of the added ½ per cent to all cities on a population basis; (2) authority for Chicago to levy a tax on transient use of hotel rooms; (3) and an added city tax on cigarettes of 1 cent per package. When it became evident that any increased state sales tax would not be shared, Chicago officials supported legislation to permit a city sales tax. They suggested that a city sales tax would make possible a property tax rate decline of 5 cents per $100 assessed valuation, although they opposed writing a mandatory reduction into the sales tax bill. This program, developed by an *ad hoc* Commission on Revenue, has remained virtually unchanged since 1953, except that a consumers' utility tax has been substituted for the hotel tax.

New York City's Mayor and a majority of the Board of Estimate claim a need for immediate added revenues of $120,000,000 and have most recently urged: (1) legislation increasing the real estate tax; (2) legislation authorizing the city to fund certain expenditures; (3) additional state aid for education and welfare purposes; (4) restoration of a 5 per cent pari-mutuel tax, the proceeds of which have been lost to the city by an

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automatic 1 per cent annual reduction in the rate. To fill out the so-called short-run program, Mayor Wagner has asked "stand-by" power to increase the business gross receipts tax if other revenue sources are denied. Tax accretions are expected to cover almost one third of the annual short-run need.

There has been a persistent demand from the state administration for a long-range New York City program, and two such long-range plans have been offered in the last three years. Mayor Wagner's plan, offered coincident with his inauguration and subsequently unchanged, would raise $95,000,000 in addition to the $120,000,000 short-run return. The added $95,000,000 would be obtained by a five-point program: (1) New York's five counties would share in the state-collected motor vehicle fees and gasoline tax revenues; (2) New York City would be given the nonresident income tax collected by the state from New Jersey and Connecticut residents working in the city; (3) revenues from the state stock transfer tax, for which the city furnishes all services, would be diverted to the city; (4) the state would assume the cost of supporting the city colleges; (5) the per capita state grants to the city would be increased.[16]

The largest single element in the plans submitted by each city administration has consistently been the item of increased state aid, but justification for this request has differed significantly as between New York and Chicago. New York chose to make it a question of equity, arguing that the state had an obligation to return to the city an amount consistent with the total tax collections by the state in the city. To support this idea, statistics have been presented to show that the state collects 57 per cent of its tax revenue within New York City, but returns to the city a lesser percentage of the total amount allotted to local assistance.[17] The implied principle that every city should get as large a percentage of total assistance grants

[16] The text of the Mayor's outline of a long-range financial program may be found in the *New York Times*, December 30, 1953, p. 14. For the program previously submitted by Mayor Impellitteri, see *ibid.*, January 7, 1953, p. 20.

[17] See, for example, City of New York, Bureau of Accountancy, "Summary of Total Taxes and Revenues Collected by the State of New York and Distribution of Taxes and Revenues to the City of New York", September 17, 1952 (typewritten).

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as it contributes in total taxes, if consistently carried out, has to carry with it a rejection of the state's rôle as an equalizing agent. Moreover, if equalization is rejected, the group interests on which the whole existing state aid policy rests are seriously weakened. Thus, raising the question of strict percentage equity left the city in the anomalous position of objecting to an equalization interest, while supporting the state aid principle which is partly dependent on a dominant equalization interest. When Mayor Wagner offered a plan calling for increased state aid to the city for education, the state's rejection capitalized on the equalization argument first advanced by the city:

> Since 1941, state aid for public education in New York City has increased 119 per cent per pupil, while the city's contribution has risen only 80 per cent. The city, with 54 per cent of the population of the state, has only 42 per cent of the pupils and 40 per cent of the teachers.[18]

By supporting percentage equity, New York City can, at best, gain support from its own taxpayers. However, it simultaneously invites opposition from municipal officials representing all other cities of the state, and from taxpayers' groups around the state who fear that an increase in aid to New York will mean a decrease in aid elsewhere, and a consequent need for additional local taxes. Injecting the percentage equity question into the state aid argument serves to activate the opposition of all groups adhering to the equalization interest. New York City has claimed that it needs more state money, but in going after this adjustment it provokes a readjustment of the group-interest pattern that can frustrate its aim.

The Chicago problem has been of a substantially different character because a minor adjustment in the degree to which

[18] *New York Times*, December 31, 1953, p. 20. For earlier attacks on the city's percentage equity argument, see the joint statement on New York City finances by the chairmen of the State Senate Finance Committee and the Assembly Ways and Means Committee, *ibid.*, January 11, 1953, p. 54; Dewey's speech on New York City finances to the Hotel Association of New York, *ibid.*, February 5, 1953, p. 14; "Memorandum by the Staffs of the Lieutenant-Governor and State Controller", *ibid.*, February 23, 1953, pp. 16–17; "Statement by Lieutenant Governor Frank Moore and State Controller Raymond McGovern", *ibid.*, March 9, 1953, p. 19; "Statement by Governor Dewey on the New York City Financial Situation", *ibid.*, March 10, 1953, p. 22.

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existing fiscal policy was being implemented would not satisfy that city's demands. Chicago has been hopeful of overturning a public policy based on "the Illinois tradition that municipal government must, to the fullest extent possible, be dependent upon its own resources for support and that the state government should neither subsidize nor control local government. . . ."[19] If this "tradition" is to be overturned, and a state aid policy or a liberal permissive tax policy substituted, it is apparent that more than a minor readjustment of group interests is required, that no small variations in group loyalty can be depended on to effect the change. To overturn the interest complex that determines basic policy is far more formidable a job than manipulating isolated groups so as to change the details of policy.

In discussing "Group Decision and Social Change", Kurt Lewin observed that "To break open the shell of complacency and self-righteousness, it is sometimes necessary to bring about deliberately an emotional stir-up."[20] The "emotional stir-up" necessary to activate the kind of change involved here will come about when state aid or liberal permissive powers are identified with an irresistible interest or interests: maintenance of law and order in the city; preservation of the physical plant of the city; elimination of pestilence or plague. These are the kinds of interests that produce change in stubborn equilibria. In recent years, Chicago spokesmen won some adjustments—some changes in tension—when a crime wave had raised doubt about continued law and order, and when the city's leaders refused to guarantee the future of its plant and facilities without additional revenue. The substantial upheaval in public policy, however, will not come until the interest alignment is reshaped—an event most likely to be a consequence of real or near catastrophe.

In New York, only one important change has occurred in the interest complex that governs the state-city fiscal system. State

[19] Illinois Legislative Commission on Municipal Revenue, *Report* (Springfield, February 1953), p. 8. Actually, the state does not subsidize but it does control by its persistent unwillingness to increase the permissive taxing power of local government.

[20] Theodore M. Newcomb and Eugene L. Hartley (eds.), *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York, 1947), p. 344.

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aid has remained substantially unchanged, but the city's attack on equalization may have set in motion a reverse consequence that will act to change policy in the near future. Permissive tax powers remain liberal, although the adjustments desired by the city have been rejected in favor of adjustments preferred by the state. However, the financing of the New York City subway system, heretofore based on the supremacy of the low fare, has been changed by the emergence of self-support as the dominant interest. It is significant for the analysis that this revolution in an interest complex that determined public policy was explicitly tied to what has here been called an irresistible interest. In the Governor's special message to the legislature on the subject of the subways, the prospect of decay was emphasized:

> Under city operation the subways have continuously deteriorated in recent years. They are both dirty, run down and overcrowded. This condition cannot be allowed to continue. Yet there is no prospect of its improvement in the hands of a debt-ridden city with no money to improve service or buy badly needed equipment. It seems to me that the only hope of a subway system worthy of New York City is in new, completely independent, highly competent management on a sound financial basis.[21]

The separation of the transit system from the city was not itself the subject of conflict anywhere along the line. The city first proposed creation of an independent Transit Authority to take over—with the stipulation that the Authority be mandated to retain the 10 cent fare. It is unlikely that the equilibrium of interests would have been disturbed over the issue of city ownership and operation versus transit authority ownership and operation if the change had not involved the fare level. Indeed, tentative moves in the 1955 legislative session toward revision of the law to increase city control over the transit system, without disturbing the fare question, were abandoned when it became apparent that the conflict was still self-support versus low fare. The low-fare interest was not willing to be stirred up over any subsidiary question like ownership.

[21] *New York Times*, March 11, 1953, p. 33.

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Origins and Timing of a Fiscal Program

In their public remarks, officials at both the city and state levels agree that a municipal revenue plan, including specific suggestions for legislation, should originate with the city. State officials in Illinois and New York have emphasized and re-emphasized the presumed responsibility of Chicago and New York City leaders for the development of a satisfactory plan. City leaders, unwilling to refuse to suggest a program, offered proposals for state consideration, and, more frequently than not, were rebuffed. This kind of situation is likely to be repeated consistently until substantial consideration is given to the origins of municipal revenue programs.

In order for a municipally developed program to be acceptable to the state, it is necessary for the city to include state interests in the foundation on which the details of the program are made to rest. A program that does not take state interests into account ignores the environment of state legal control over the affairs of the city, and, whatever its intrinsic merits or its fate in a different environment, the seed simply will not flourish in this one. In order for a city program to take state interests into account, however, state and city interests should tend to coalesce. No such situation is common in Chicago or in New York. In fact, a second environmental situation deals with the frequency of opposing party control of city and state. Consequently, it can be expected that a major state interest in intergovernmental negotiations will be municipal political change, and a major city interest will be maintenance of the political *status quo*.

It is plainly inconceivable that a city body will devise a program calculated to weaken its political strength, and it is similarly inconceivable that a state body will accept a program that is calculated to strengthen an opposition party. The difference between the two, however, is that the state may legally impose a program on the city but the city may not impose a program on the state. Therefore, as long as the city continues to initiate programs which do not reflect an inclination toward political suicide, it cannot really hope for total success, except in those periods when city and state are dominated by the same party.

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On the other hand, the state cannot expect any program it develops to be received with enthusiasm unless that program will act to support the existing municipal political organization.

The presumption that city-state political differences will color the reception given municipal revenue programs is important in terms of its implications for policy enactments. Since city officials are constantly pressed to originate a program, there should be awareness on both sides that the city program will usually reflect a political interest contrary to that of the state, and that adoption of the city program depends on the formation of an interest complex composed of pro-city groups able to overcome contrary state interests, including the political interest. To maximize the chance for success, therefore, the city will delay introducing fundamental changes in the state-city fiscal picture until the political interest is neutralized by the existence of one-party control of both city and state.

Even beyond this, the city will have clearest sailing during the later years of a friendly state administration when there is no "inherited budget". Mayor Wagner showed awareness of this situation when he said, in 1955, just after the inauguration of Harriman: "We'll get better [fiscal] treatment this year and still better treatment next year."[22] It may also follow that the importance and strength of the political interest increase with the approach of a municipal election, and recede immediately after an election. City officials, as a consequence, can take advantage of this relative weakness, even if it is not feasible to wait for one-party control. Chicago officials recognized this fact in 1955, and withheld revenue proposals that would surely have been rejected by a state administration intent on pushing the mayoral candidacy of Republican Robert E. Merriam. Contrariwise, perhaps the most moderate comments Governor Dewey ever made on a New York City program were forthcoming from him just after Wagner's election. If New York and Chicago officials are going to continue to originate programs, they will benefit from considering the ebb and flow of the strength of the opposition. Offering the most important and critical plans at a time when opposition strength is maxi-

[22] *New York Times*, January 27, 1955, p. 14.

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mized makes no better sense than trying only insignificant aspects of a program when opposition strength is minimized. Knowing when to give an intentional base on balls, and when to "hit 'em where they ain't", should be part of the body of knowledge of all New York and Chicago politicians.

"Unwrapping" a Program

One verbalized cause of intergovernmental irritation has been the apparent unwillingness or inability of Chicago and New York officials to decide on a fiscal program for state consideration until the very last minute. At a series of public hearings, the chairman and members of the Illinois Legislative Commission on Municipal Revenue voiced their dissatisfaction with the city's leisureliness. The most solemn assurances were offered that the city would have its program ready in thirty days, and then in another thirty days, and then "at the earliest possible moment." One public hearing was scheduled particularly to permit the city to set forth its program, and instead the leader of the City Council appeared and stated that the program was still being prepared. At a second hearing for Chicago, the Mayor appeared, but the city's program did not. The Chicago problem is complicated by the fact that municipal general elections fall in the midst of every second legislative session. Consequently, city officials can make no commitments, indeed can make no plans, until the mayor and council are elected in April. A striking illustration of this situation is the 1955 campaign when the Democratic organization, in a bitter primary, "dumped" the incumbent Mayor Martin Kennelly in favor of Richard J. Daley who then entered a very hard campaign against Merriam, a former Democrat. A municipal revenue program with which to go to Springfield could hardly be developed in that atmosphere.

In New York, Governor Dewey took pains to point out similar municipal procrastination, although Governor Harriman, as yet, has had no complaints. In a state of the state message, Dewey noted that "within the past twenty-four hours and after this message had been printed, a city program was presented." An important problem for determination, then, is whether "un-

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wrapping" a fiscal program later rather than sooner has any significant bearing on the disposition of the program.

Any attempt to convince municipal officials to hasten public presentation of a proposed fiscal program must be based on evidence that such a procedure would add to city strength in bargaining, that a longer period of consideration would lead to a stronger pro-city interest complex or a weaker pro-state interest complex. The claim of many state leaders that city proposals come in overdue only makes many municipal leaders chary, however. If an earlier date of submission could somehow be expected to add group strength to the city interest, local leaders deem it doubtful that the suggestion would come from the state. But the unwrapping question is susceptible of more useful analysis.

It is all to the advantage of city officials to be able to pick their own "unwrapping" time because they can adjust that time to the program they are offering. If the program requires a major deviation from the *status quo*, maximum time must be allowed to separate sticky groups from traditional interests, to demonstrate and document deterioration and gross impairment of service. Contrariwise, if the program involves only what has here been termed an adjustment in the existing policy, a relatively brief period should be adequate in which to effect the necessary group reshuffle. Extending the time for discussion results only in broadening the possibility of an upheaval in the interest complex. Now, at the extreme, a city that has no program to present will make no move to disturb the *status quo*, and no time will elapse between the unwrapping date and the date for policy action, because neither exists. In recent years, however, cities of the importance of New York and Chicago have had legislative goals in this field, goals somewhere between the *status quo* and total fiscal independence. City officials have lumped their goals, and finally unwrapped their programs without regard to the fact that adoption of the proposals would have upset commitments by state officials regarding state tax and spending plans—in short, that adoption would have set in motion a change in a pattern that state officials were anxious to leave undisturbed. This suggests that city success rests

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partly on evaluating the extent of the policy modification desired and picking an earlier or a later date for first action depending on whether the modification is a greater or a lesser one.

Unfortunately, the tendency is to the contrary, a tendency that is explained by the usual need for maximum time to work out technical details and develop internal agreement on a major proposal, while comparatively simple adjustments are worked out quickly. The result is that in the normal order of business, cities have unwrapped complex programs comparatively late—in the case of Chicago, for example, as late as only sixty days before the end of the biennial legislative session—and simple programs comparatively early. This approach does not maximize the chances for success.

Internal Agreement

Literate and vocal minorities in the New York City Board of Estimate and the Chicago City Council have been consistent critics of their respective city administrations.[23] Mismanagement, inefficiency, and needless extravagance are frequently charged. Because attempts to pacify these blocs may influence the presentation of a city program, and because the state units involved have made reference to the charges of the minority, it is important to consider whether a "solid" city administration is more likely to meet with success in enacting a program than is an administration that must contend with an articulate minority bloc that is "respectable" and frequently well briefed.

A significant observation about this internal opposition is that in neither New York nor Chicago does it resist the proposals of the city administration or accept the state proposals. In New York, at the time of the submission and rejection of the city's first long-range revenue program, the bloc leader continued to oppose the state-imposed revenue plan after most city officials had "reluctantly acquiesced". No alternative plan was offered by the bloc as a substitute for that of the city admin-

[23] These minorities are not necessarily indicative of party division. In fact, the minority leadership in both cities is often composed of members of the majority political party. These minority blocs, frequently called "reformers" by their council colleagues, are not only bipartisan or tripartisan (as in New York where the Liberal party is sometimes important), they are "unpartisan".

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istration, and the internal opposition has made state aid a permanent long-range goal in a manner that has been avoided by the majority of the Board of Estimate. Moreover, while the Board of Estimate has split time after time on the questions of adoption of the city proposals in the first place, and of final acceptance of the state program, at no point in recent years has a minority-bloc member challenged or denied the need for revenue or the desirability of increased state aid.

The Chicago situation is similar in that the bloc fully supports the demands of that city's administration for additional revenue. The leader of the Chicago "economy" bloc has consistently taken a position that could not bring aid and comfort to the state. Instead, he has made fiscal proposals that were even more unacceptable to the state than were the proposals of the city administration. The state legislature, for example, was urged to turn the city loose with permissive taxing powers, to give "rather broad revenue powers to the city in such a way that the city could then make its determinations as to which of the authorizations it might best utilize."[24]

For purposes of state-municipal fiscal relations, a minority element of a city council must adhere either to a pro-city interest or to a pro-state interest, or else suffer from a kind of paralyzing indecision. Whatever the interest espoused by such a group, its activity must assume one of these characteristics. If there is reasonable expectation that the adherence will be to some kind of pro-city interest—even if that interest is not identical with that of the majority of the city administration—then the minority bloc can, in effect, be ignored by the city administration. No bloc that urges policy changes at least as undesirable from the state's point of view as those urged by the city itself need be accommodated by the city. The city, to maximize its strength, must accommodate groups that would otherwise adhere to interests contrary to those of the city. If it can be demonstrated that the kinds of minority blocs that frequently exist in New York and Chicago will invariably adhere to some kind of anti-state interest, then the city can confidently accelerate

[24] Illinois Legislative Commission on Municipal Revenue, *Hearings*, vol. V (September 23, 1952), pp. 126 *et seq.*

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the development of its program, virtually ignore the minority bloc, unwrap complex proposals at a relatively early date, and gain the tactical advantages of the earlier date.[25] The particulars of recent experiences—when minority blocs were especially strong and well led—suggest that minority "economy" blocs may behave in this manner. Broad considerations of their structure and institutional setting suggest that a tentative generalization that they do behave in this manner would be justifiable.

The minority blocs in Chicago and New York usually represent a kind of combination economy-reform interest. While they specialize in uncovering instances of waste, these instances are related to political activity, frequently involving patronage. At the same time, the economy-reform interest will stand for extension and improvement of municipal services. Now, if a city is seeking the *status quo* or only minor adjustments in its fiscal relations with the state, this minority group is unlikely to intrude at all. A *status quo* program means that the economy-reform interest will manifest itself in demands for internal municipal improvements—for example, elimination of municipal court bailiffs who appear in municipal court only to fix tickets, and diversion of the savings to street maintenance.

If the city administration determines on a "revolutionary" program—new state aid and new, broad-based, permissive taxing power—the minority members can oppose the program only at the risk of bearing some measure of responsibility for the possibly disastrous consequences. Adherence to economy-reform under these conditions carries with it only dangerous possibilities. The city administration will blame the minority if the fiscal program is lost, and the minority is unable to effect the reforms that presumably might have made the program unnecessary. Similarly, simple approval of the majority's program implies approval of the administration that the minority constantly criticizes.

[25] It is appropriate to emphasize at this point that ignoring the minority may have unhappy consequences for other issues. The concern here is only to propound a tentative explanation of how state-municipal *fiscal* policy is formed, and how it can be killed or modified.

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It can be hypothesized, therefore, that a minority economy bloc structured like those recently evident on the Chicago Council and the New York Board of Estimate will at least not oppose attempts to overturn an existing interest complex governing state-local fiscal relations, and will not itself attempt to effect such overhaul when the majority has adopted a *status quo* program. If this much is true, a city can formulate its program with some confidence that its minority bloc will not be part of an anti-city complex, and that the bloc need be neither accommodated nor neutralized.

Summary and Conclusions

State-municipal fiscal relationships in the cases of Chicago and New York should be considered against the background of underrepresentation of the cities in their state legislatures, the absence of home rule, Republican weakness in the cities and Democratic weakness at the state levels. These factors, however, do not in themselves explain how policy is formed or how policy can be manipulated. Some tentative generalizations that may help explain how state-municipal fiscal policy is formed can be advanced by systematizing observable data and making deductions therefrom. To develop these hypotheses, it is helpful to consider state-municipal relations in terms of the group interests involved, and to think of public policy as a manifestation of the ways these interests interact.

Within such a framework, the following modest hypotheses are offered in the nature of conclusions to this paper. They represent an effort toward a more systematic approach than that of trial and error in understanding the politics of intergovernmental fiscal relations. The hypotheses, even if all valid, do not constitute a theoretical explanation of state-municipal fiscal policy formation, but, it is hoped, do make preliminary advances in that direction. They should be considered as interdependent rather than as self-contained units:

1. A proposal to "revolutionize" state-municipal fiscal relations by establishing a state aid policy where none had existed, or by expanding significantly the permissive taxing powers of the city, is more likely to be adopted if deterioration or decay

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of the municipal physical plant or interruption or termination of regular municipal services is demonstrably imminent, and less likely to be adopted if no such irresistible interest is involved.

2. A proposal to adjust existing policy by changing the formula of a grant system or making relatively minor additions to permissive taxing powers is more likely to be adopted if the city does not simultaneously oppose one of the major interests on which the existing policy is based, and may set off a reverse consequence if the existing interest structure is attacked.

3. If city and state are controlled by opposing political parties, a municipal fiscal program is more likely to be adopted in the period after a city election and less likely to be adopted in the period before a city election.

4. To effect the adoption of a proposal involving a new program of grants or taxing powers, extensive changes in the interest complex are required. Consequently, such proposals are more likely of enactment if they are advanced early enough to facilitate the separation of numerous groups from the interests to which they had previously adhered.

5. The advantage to be derived from "unwrapping" major fiscal proposals at an early date will not be affected by any unwillingness on the part of an "economy" bloc in the city government to subscribe to the program. Such blocs do not oppose city proposals, but rather tend to advance proposals even more unappealing to the state than those advanced by the majority.

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PAST LIMITATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN JAPAN

IN any analysis of the growth of democracy in modern times in Japan, it is important to remember that in the years immediately following the restoration of power to the Emperor Meiji in January 1868 the new leaders devoted their main strength and effort to the solution of their country's economic dilemma. The problems which absorbed their time and energy were practical ones; political problems began to demand their dominant attention only after many of the basic economic issues had been settled. The new Imperial government had been established in 1868 by some of the most powerful feudal barons and their warrior-advisors, who had rallied around the youthful Emperor.

These men formed a small group of oligarchs who were the *de facto* rulers as Councillors and State Ministers. They improvised a national governmental structure and operated within a framework of broad policies proclaimed by the Emperor. They promised to establish a public assembly and to lay great stress on public discussion. In reality, however, these oligarchs were more interested in stifling public discussion than in encouraging it. By 1881, they laid down the broad principles for the Constitution which were incorporated in that document.[1]

The Constitution, which had been drafted in secret by the oligarchs, was promulgated on February 11, 1889 by Emperor Meiji who proclaimed it as the immutable, fundamental law for his subjects and their descendants. For fifty-eight years, from that day until May 3, 1947, when the post-World War II Constitution went into force, not a single change was made in the document or in the central concept that the Emperor be the center, the axis, of constitutional monarchy. It established the Emperor as sacred and inviolable. It gave legal sanction to the wide powers previously exercised for him by his ministers. It

[1] For an elaboration of the manner in which the oligarchs assured the continuance of their control, see Hugh Borton, *Japan's Modern Century* (New York, 1955).

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granted extensive authority to the executive branch of the government and limited the legislative and judicial branches. The extra-legal institutions such as the Elder Statesmen (*Genrō*) who acted as Imperial advisers only increased the powers of the Emperor as the chief executive. As Veblen has pointed out, the whole process of modernization from feudalism to a limited constitutional monarchy was similar in many respects to that of Germany. The concept of the state as an overriding entity prevailed. The government rested on the suzerainty of the crown, not on the discretion of a parliamentary body.[2]

Thus numerous limitations on democratization were incorporated in the Constitution and in other basic laws from the time of their promulgation. Furthermore, the chief ministers were basically interested in preserving the prerogatives of the Emperor and in restraining the freedom of the people. Practically all of the prime ministers and cabinet members from 1890 to the formation of the first "party cabinet" in 1918 were members of the original group of oligarchs or their protégés. National policies were formulated, wars were fought, treaties were signed in disregard of the wishes of the people. The concept of an absolute state in which the individual's highest purpose was to serve that state more effectively formed the basis of the nation's educational system. Obedience, conformity and collective action were praised while individuality, initiative and nonconformity were anathema to the ideal state. Exponents of ultra-nationalism and racial supremacy were extolled and the political assassins who acted in the name of patriotism were the willing accomplices of military aggression.

Even during the eight years from 1924 to 1932, when the president of the leading party in the House of Representatives was selected as prime minister, democracy made little progress. In fact, the world depression, other aspects of the international scene, and the weaknesses in the constitutional structure enabled the Japanese Army in Manchuria to force a showdown at home, to discredit the politicians, and to win support for their direct action. As the Army became more involved on the Asiatic

[2] Thorstein Veblen, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution* (New York, 1915), and "The Opportunity of Japan", Leon Ardzrooni, ed., *Essays in Our Changing Order* (New York, 1934), pp. 248–66.

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continent, and in the absence of any other group coming forth with an acceptable plan, a new nationalism and mission to control all of Asia were enthusiastically championed by the people. After the outbreak of hostilities against China on July 7, 1937, greater demands were made on them. Such limited freedom and liberties as had existed were supplanted by national mobilization and steadily increasing preparations for total war.

Thus, from the restoration to power of Emperor Meiji in 1868 to the surrender by the representatives of his grandson to General MacArthur on September 2, 1945, conservatism, absolutism and a strong, centralized autocracy were the guiding political principles of Japan. The Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, on which the surrender was based, had stated that the occupation of Japan would continue until "there has been established, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully inclined and responsible government."[3] In other words, two of the basic objectives of the United States and its allies for post-war Japan were the creation of conditions which would prevent Japan from becoming a military menace and which would assure, to the extent that it was possible to do so, the creation of democratic institutions in Japan.

Many of the directives issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), especially those during the first two years of the occupation, were directed at achieving this democratization. In other words, certain essential reforms were undertaken to create an atmosphere in which democracy would prosper. While demobilization of the Japanese Army and Navy was being effected, human rights were protected by order of the Supreme Commander. Restrictions on freedom of the press and radio, except on material critical of the occupation, were removed. Bans were lifted on political, civil and religious liberties. Discrimination was forbidden on grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinion. Political prisoners were released and the national police were stripped of their authoritarian powers.

But if democracy was to have a chance for permanent sur-

[3] Department of State, *Japan Policy and Progress*, 1947, p. 55.

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vival, it was necessary for Japan to have a new constitution based on democratic principles. For the first five months of the occupation, desultory attempts at constitutional revision were undertaken by the conservative political leaders. Early in February 1946, however, officials of General MacArthur's headquarters prepared a draft for a new constitution which stripped the Emperor of governmental powers and strengthened the legislative and judicial branches of the government. Civil rights were guaranteed; the Cabinet was made collectively responsible to the Diet. The latter was made the sole law-making body and had complete control over the budget. On the insistence of General MacArthur, the document also contained a provision which abolished war as a sovereign right of the nation. The final draft for the new Constitution, which contained all of these provisions of the MacArthur draft, was accepted by the Japanese Cabinet in March 1946. After the addition of a few changes which strengthened the democratic aspects of the document, it was approved by the Diet on November 3, 1946.[4] When it was implemented by new legislation strengthening the new freedom and liberty of the Japanese people, the formal framework, at least, was at hand for Japan's democratization.

Other reforms encouraged or initiated by the occupation also contributed toward the possibility that Japan would not revert to its old conservative autocratic ways. For example, encouragement was given to the rise of a strong labor movement. After the passage of legislation which legalized collective bargaining and trade unions, union membership jumped in twelve months from about 125,000 to 4,500,000. By the early months of 1947, under the leadership of the leftist National Congress of Industrial Unions, unions had participated directly in political activities and a general strike was prevented only by the last-minute, personal intervention of General MacArthur. During the next year, the labor movement was largely successful in resisting Communist infiltration and a Labor Ministry was established as a new and important branch of the national government.

[4] Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, *Political Reorientation of Japan* (Washington, 1949), vol. I, pp. 102 *et seq.*

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Many other occupation-inspired reforms, such as the abolition of absentee landownership, the purge of ultra-nationalist leaders in the political and economic field, and the deconcentration of economic and financial power, were directed against past autocratic practices. Two changes, of special significance, occurred in the police system and in national education. Since the Japanese police, who had been controlled by the Home Minister and had wide powers, had been one of the important elements in forming a pre-surrender dictatorial government, their overhaul was imperative. After temporary objections by the Japanese Cabinet to a proposal from General MacArthur's headquarters for complete decentralization of police powers, a new police law was finally enacted on December 17, 1947. This law adopted the principle of decentralization by dividing the police into local municipal police and national rural police. The former were to be controlled by local police boards, the latter by a National Public Safety Commission. Other functions formerly exercised by the police were transferred to either the local or national governments. Police, customs and patrol duties in Japanese territorial waters were assumed by a Maritime Safety Authority. Thus, one of the strongest agencies of Japanese totalitarianism was transformed to make it as difficult as possible to use it for the establishment of a police state.

As for educational reform, in pre-war days, the Ministry of Education in Tokyo exercised autocratic control over the entire educational system, from primary school to university, and the schools became important outlets for the transmission of nationalist dogma and militarism. The whole system was designed to discourage individual initiative and independent thinking and to foster conformity and absolute obedience. If the obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese were to be removed, as provided in the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, an educational system and philosophy diametrically opposed to that which existed before surrender would have to be evolved.

The first important step in educational reforms came in October 1945 when the schools were opened, but militaristic and nationalistic subjects were not permitted to be taught and a program of screening teachers and revising the textbooks was

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undertaken. The 1946 New Year's Day statement of the Emperor was another important event in educational reform. It denied his divinity and the superiority of the Japanese over other people and urged that wisdom and knowledge be sought abroad. By the time the new Constitution went into effect in May 1947, the entire educational system had been completely reformed to the extent that this could be achieved by legislation. New laws stressed the importance of individual initiative and inquiry and guaranteed academic freedom. Education was made compulsory for nine years. The most significant administrative change was in the decentralization of control through the formation of local, elective school boards responsible to the local community. Theoretically, at least, the Minister of Education in Tokyo could no longer act as a dictator over the whole system or be subject to the dictates of the party or group in power.[5]

But helpful as these and many other reforms might be to facilitate Japan's democratization, they had two basic weaknesses. In the first place, the innovations were carried out during a military occupation. Though they were formally implemented by the Japanese Diet and Cabinet, the initiative had come from the various staff officers of General MacArthur's headquarters. Though many leading Japanese had been consulted in formulating these new policies, General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander could always exercise a direct or indirect veto on actions which he did not approve, or order the Japanese government to carry out policies which he considered urgent. In other words, even though the reforms were accepted formally, there was no assurance that they had been wholeheartedly accepted by the Japanese people. The test would come only after the occupation ceased.

The second weakness of these reforms was the fact that in Japanese history the men who control the government and their ideas have been far more important than the formal structure through which they operated. The Meiji Constitution of 1889 was made to fit the beliefs, ambitions and desires of the Meiji leaders. They made the various government officers work for

[5] See SCAP, G. H. Q., Civil Information and Education Section, *Education in the New Japan* (Tokyo, 1948).

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them; they were in no sense bound by "the will of the people." Consequently, if we are to evaluate correctly the future possibilities of the democratization of Japan, we must conclude our analysis with a brief account of the governments which operated in post-war Japan and of the trend which has developed particularly after April 28, 1952, when the Peace Treaty came into effect.

As for Japan's post-war political development, while there have been various changes in party names and in political alignments, there are three general groups. On the right are the two largest parties, the Liberal and Democratic parties, which, despite their official names, are basically conservative. In the center and left of center is the Socialist party or Social Democrats who have split into a Right and Left wing. On the left are the Communists, theoretical Marxists and fellow travellers.

From the surrender of Japan on September 2, 1945 to the elections of February 1955, there have been ten cabinets and five general elections for the House of Representatives. Five of these cabinets have been headed by Shigeru Yoshida for a total of seven out of ten years. For about half of the time that he was Premier, his Liberal party had an absolute majority in the House of Representatives. After the elections in April 1953, he retained control of the government through a shaky coalition but was finally forced to resign in December 1954. He was succeeded by Ichiro Hatoyama, President of the Democratic party. In the elections in February 1955, the Democrats won the largest number of seats in the House of Representatives and Hatoyama was subsequently confirmed as Prime Minister.

A significant aspect of Japan's modern political trend is the fact that the electorate has always preferred conservative candidates. Although the Liberal and Progressive parties may not have agreed on the question of who should control the parties, they are both conservative and together have possessed more than half of the votes in the House of Representatives. Even in the election of April 1947, after which Tetsu Katayama, a Social Democrat, formed a cabinet, the Socialists controlled less than one third of the seats. Furthermore, after the unexpectedly heavy Communist vote in the elections in January 1949, when they polled nearly 10 per cent of the total and returned

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thirty-five members to Parliament, their support has rapidly declined. For example, in February 1955, the Communists elected only two representatives to Parliament. Apparently many former supporters of the Communists shifted to the Left-wing Socialists who increased their strength by one fifth. Together with the Right-wing Socialists they control one third of the seats in the House of Representatives. But the combined seats of the two conservative parties equal nearly two thirds of the total.

In view of this basic conservative political atmosphere in post-war Japan, therefore, it is not surprising to find signs of a shift in the direction the nation is headed. In fact, there is general support, stimulated by a new nationalism which has arisen since the Peace Treaty went into effect in April 1952, for shelving many of the reforms established under the occupation. To verify this generalization, we need only glance at what has been happening to the reforms mentioned above. In the first place, the basic civil rights inaugurated by General MacArthur and guaranteed by the Constitution have been severely threatened by two parallel developments, namely, the passage of an anti-subversive activity law and the return to centralized police control. As for the former, Premier Yoshida pressed for the passage of a law which would control the terroristic activities of extremists, especially the Communists and Communist-inspired organizations. The proposed law was so worded, however, as to be applicable to labor unions and political parties which "incited or agitated" political action. Consequently, it was strenuously opposed by organized labor and by many of Yoshida's political opponents who feared that a rigid enforcement of the law would threaten individual freedoms. On the basis of a new fear of communism aroused by the May Day riots in 1952 and a promise from the Attorney General that care would be taken in applying the law, however, Yoshida obtained approval of the law in July 1952.

An even greater threat to Japan's democratization has been the basic alteration in the reforms of the police system. The chief purpose of the SCAP-inspired reforms was to prevent the police from continuing to be an enforcement agency directly under the Cabinet which could use them for its own ends.

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Prime Minister Yoshida, in the face of Communist disturbances and protracted strikes, maintained that the dual system of municipal and national rural police was inefficient and incapable of dealing with internal peace and security. He proposed, therefore, that many of the changes inaugurated during the occupation be abandoned and that a national police system under the supervision of a Central Police Board responsible directly to the Prime Minister be established. He also recommended that police chiefs in the various prefectures be named by the Chairman of the Police Board and that they be national government employees. In February 1953, Parliament refused to consider the national budget unless Yoshida withdrew his proposal. Finally, in June 1954, after the Socialists had boycotted the Lower House, the conservative majority approved the new bill. Consequently, the police in small communities and the five largest cities in the country lost their autonomy and were again placed in a position to enforce the will of the government and to threaten democratization.

The movement to revise or reconsider the Constitution, which has notably gained momentum during the past few months, is more complicated than the other issues which are demanding current reconsideration. The main question of revision centers on the question of rearmament and is complicated by the reversal of the American position on that issue. Most Japanese realize that it was General MacArthur who insisted in February 1946 that the Constitution contain a provision (Article IX) prohibiting Japan from maintaining armed forces. They also know that there has been an increased tendency on the part of American officials to emphasize the rôle Japan could play in the defense against communism. For example, Vice-President Nixon stated in December 1953 that the United States was mistaken in its earlier policy and that the Japanese National Safety forces, which were planned at over 110,000 men, were not enough.

In the meantime, the question whether the Constitution should be amended has been made a political issue. The Progressives, and their successors, the Democrats, urged such action and the formation of regular armed forces. Premier Yoshida argued that since the proposed forces were to be defensive they were not unconstitutional. Another aspect of

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revision of the Constitution is the position taken by some of the old nationalists who were influential members of the Manchuria clique. For example, Shinosuke Kishi, one of the former directors of the General Affairs Bureau of Manchukuo, recently declared that "the time is here for a wholesale scrutiny of the Constitution." His remarks become even more ominous for the future of democracy in Japan when it is realized that he served as Minister of Commerce and Industry under Tojo's Cabinet during the war and that in November 1954 he acted as chief mediator between the dissident Yoshida followers and the organizers of the new conservative Democratic party.[8]

Finally, a reversion to pre-war educational policies is a further indication of the present trend away from democratization in Japan. While Prime Minister, Yoshida sponsored this reversal of Allied policy and a shift toward centralization for financial and political reasons. The war damage repairs and replacement of school buildings were too great a burden for local communities to bear. At the same time, the central government sought ways to control the Left-wing-dominated Teachers Union. Previous efforts to restrict the political activity of this important union had failed, so a bill was proposed to place teachers on the payroll of the national government. As government employees, they would be prohibited from political activity and the Teachers Union could be controlled. Moreover, the law provided that the power of appointment of teachers should revert to the Ministry of Education. The Yoshida government was severely attacked by the teachers and the press for consciously attempting to destroy the liberalizing effect of the occupational policies. As the *Asahi*, one of Tokyo's leading papers editorialized, "Passage of these laws will have a more far-reaching effect on the freedom of education and perhaps on other freedoms now enjoyed by the people than any other legislation since the war." Consequently, when these new laws were approved early in 1954, centralized control of the entire educational system was possible.

[8] In view of the opposition of both wings of the Socialist party to constitutional revision, and of the fact that they obtained enough seats in the 1955 election to defeat a constitutional amendment, there is little chance of amendment in the near future.

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Under the premiership of Hatoyama, the trend away from the Allied policies which aimed at assisting the process of democratization and toward authoritarian control is likely to continue. The by-products of this trend also cannot be overlooked. A rearmament movement and the revitalization of the armed forces give ample opportunity for the old militarists or their protégés to reassert themselves as a significant nationalist influence. The reëmergence of the large financial combines (the *zaibatsu*) and the rationalization of industry facilitate a close alliance between the government and the leading financiers. The concentration of police power and educational policies within the Cabinet make regimentation possible if not probable.

But over against this discouraging prognosis are arrayed new forces which will retard the trend toward totalitarian control and may even reverse it. First, the labor movement has come of age and the unions have tasted the giddying effect of political power. They and their members will not easily give up their freedom of action. Secondly, the agrarian reforms, which affected a large portion of the population, has lifted a heavy debt burden from many farm families. As a result, they are reluctant to see a return to pre-war conditions for fear that they may lose what they have already gained. In the third place, the equality of the sexes, guaranteed by the Constitution, has released an entirely new force. Women are coming into their own. They are equal before the law, vote, work, and have greater educational opportunities than ever before. No politician will dare to deprive them of their rights. Finally, the bitter pill of defeat confronted many Japanese, particularly the youth, with a new political philosophy to guide them; those who have found it in democracy do not intend to give it up.

On balance, therefore, prospects for democratization are not as bright as they appeared to be before the Treaty of Peace was signed, but it is unlikely that authoritarianism will be able to negate the advances already made. The reactions against the occupation-inspired reforms are natural ones and in the end Japan may settle down to a moderate form of democracy well to the right of center.

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ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS OF GERMAN DEMOCRACY

TEN years are a small span of time for the appraisal of historic trends and accomplishments, and it is even more audacious to talk about "prospects" of future developments. Historians are not in the business of crystal gazing. Students of history, however, ought to place the events of the last ten years in the broad stream of history, attempt to recognize the forces of the past which seem to roll on as before, though perhaps with diminished strength, and distinguish them from the new elements, as far as these have become active and visible. We can at least hope to diagnose how well- or ill-equipped present-day Germany appears to be for the building of democracy and some of the road tests it will have to meet in such an effort.

Only two modern nations can look back to a relatively unbroken evolution from medieval to modern representative government, namely, England and by way of affiliation the United States. Practically all the continental states went through a period of absolutism. France overthrew despotism in the great Revolution, which, however, did not end the struggle between old and new forces in that country. Still, the example of England and the United States, and France, led in most of Western Europe to the acceptance of liberal and democratic political forms. There were moments when it seemed certain that Central Europe would follow the West without much delay. But actually authoritarian government survived in Central Europe, and in the case of Germany authoritarianism even gained new strength from modern ideas and forces. The Second German Empire was a realization of the modern national principle and was capable of developing a modern industrial organization of extraordinary strength. If we want to understand what is implied in the problem of German democratization we must try to grasp the causes for the different social and political development of Germany during the last century.

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The state of Frederick the Great embodied the principle of absolutistic rule in its boldest form and carried the development of military power to far greater length than any other European country. The military monarchy rested on the coöperation of the king and the agrarian nobility, and though Prussia went through a period of drastic reforms between 1807 and 1819 the control of the state remained essentially in those hands. The reformers failed to open the way toward constitutionalism, and the revolution of 1848–1849 proved vain. Prussian absolutism was powerful in the face of a weak German bourgeoisie. As late as 1850 four fifths of the German people lived from agriculture. The mass of the lower middle classes consisted of handicraftsmen. They were capable of radicalism, as the spring of 1848 showed, but they were ready to live under a paternalistic government if it looked after their general welfare. Before industrialization the bulk of the higher middle classes was formed not by independent manufacturers and merchants but by what the Germans call the "academic" class, which means people with academic degrees, to wit, the higher government officials and church ministers, teachers at the advanced schools, members of the closely supervised free professions. Among this class a liberal movement arose, but their dearest ideal was the reform of the authoritarian government, the *Obrigkeitsstaat*, into a *Rechtsstaat*, the rule of law, and a *Kulturstaat*, a state animated by national culture. Of law and culture they felt themselves to be the best interpreters, a sentiment which cautioned them against advocating the grant of political rights to those who in their opinion were not sufficiently mature or expert to be guardians of such ideals. Moreover, conversant at least with the execution though not with the formulation of state policies, they were inclined to accept power as a necessary element of politics and to tolerate accommodations of liberty to might or, as the problem appeared at this time, to cherish national unity over and above liberty.

When between 1850 and 1878 the industrial revolution in Germany took place, large new wealthy groups came suddenly into existence and they naturally adopted much of the pattern of life and thinking of the old upper classes. Among the early

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German industrialists there were a good many noblemen but even more artisans, while the academic groups were strongly represented in industrial and financial management. Although, under the impact of rapid industrialization, the liberal movement gained great strength, Bismarck was able to confound it by demonstrating that the old authoritarian and military Prussia could bring about national unity, for which liberalism had striven in vain. He was at the same time willing to realize virtually all the aims of the *Rechtsstaat* and even give the new order all the outward trappings of constitutional government without jeopardizing the political control of the crown over the army and thereby over the government.

The Prussian constitution of 1850 was modeled closely after the Belgian constitution of 1831. But, while the Belgian constitution did not hamper the evolution of a liberal democracy, the Prussian constitution served as a convenient cover for the continued existence of the old monarchical authoritarianism. The issue was not completely settled in 1871 because German liberalism still hoped for the eventual introduction of parliamentary government. But its strength was broken by the temptations which Bismarck held out to the industralists by his tariffs of 1879. German heavy industry joined with the big landowners in accepting protective tariffs. The alliance of iron and grain was the capstone of the political unification through blood and iron. Therefore, the big industrialists, former supporters of the liberal cause, saw their advantage in coöperation with the government which granted them great favors. Tariffs were only the first important action. Other examples were the friendly official attitude toward the cartelization of industries and the conservative labor policy of the government. The reaction of the bourgeoisie of the 1870's to the rise of a militant labor movement was, however, more general. The bourgeoisie, which still lived in a society with a pre-capitalistic—or in certain respects feudal—structure, became doubly uncertain about liberal political aims. A strong government seemed the best safeguard of the *Rechtsstaat* and the national *Kulturstaat*. Thus the majority of the German liberals resigned themselves with alacrity to the pseudo-constitutional system of the Second Empire.

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The successful integration of the upper classes into an authoritarian German monarchy was furthered by additional social measures. Great efforts were made to induce the high bourgeoisie to adopt the style and the values of life of the nobility. Grants of titles, patents of nobility and reserve commissions in the army, and the selection of civil servants from the right fraternities, were a few elements of the process which led to what has often been called the "re-feudalization" of German society. The authoritarian government endeavored to keep the bourgeoisie in a friendly disposition toward the imperial system or, as Bismarck put it, to promote its *Reichsfreudigkeit*. Beyond all the concessions already mentioned this led to a foreign policy which would capture the fancy of these groups. Although the conduct of foreign policy was declared to be the exclusive privilege of the crown, the most important moves of modern German imperialism were launched in order to arouse national sentiment. Bismarck's acquisition of colonies, William II's naval policy, and the Bagdad railroad were entirely or largely conceived in this spirit.

What was left of political liberalism in Germany was more an irritant than a political force. A different attitude was displayed by the majority of German Catholics, who were organized in the Center Party. They were in full agreement with the liberals on the *Rechtsstaat*, but as a religious minority were much more conscious of their vulnerability to authoritarian arbitrariness. Moreover, they were profoundly opposed, not to the concept of *Kulturstaat* as such, but to the cultural ideals of the liberals with a Protestant background. The Center Party was, as a consequence, more deeply interested in popular representation and the rôle of parliament. No less significant was the fact that the Center Party was the only German political party drawing strength not from a single social class but from virtually every social group. But its democratic and liberal potential was arrested, after the *Kulturkampf* came to an end, by the general balance of social forces in Germany. The Center's wish to strengthen the position of the German parliament was stultified when it passed naval bills in the fear that the imperial government would otherwise proceed without parliamentary approval. The Center also became accommodating to the pre-

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vailing social climate. On the whole its policies were determined between 1890 and 1918 by members of the "academic" class who showed little concern about constitutional reform but cared mostly about denominational "parity" or, as we may say, an equal participation of Catholics in positions of social influence.

But the Bismarckian empire failed to gain the adherence of the new working class. If the working-class movement in Europe did not confine itself to the struggle for the betterment of labor's economic position but became a political movement, this was largely the consequence of the efforts of the liberal bourgeoisie to continue inegalitarian practices under the protection of the state. That the workers' movement in Europe in addition turned socialistic was caused chiefly by the fact that property appeared as the real prerequisite of all political and social power and of educational opportunity as well. In Germany, where the bourgeoisie allied itself closely with the feudal class and a strong state, the socialist movement adopted a revolutionary program. Against the authoritarian monarchy it raised the ideal of a democratic republic, against militarism it set pacifism, against nationalism internationalism, against capitalism socialism.

In the end, however, democracy and social reformism proved the guiding ideals of the German Social Democrats. Democracy they practiced almost at once, though under the Second Empire they could do so only within their own party. By 1914 a third of the German electorate gave them their votes. The Social Democrats remained loyal to their democratic ideals during the revolution of 1918 when they made the main contribution to the defeat of communism. Thereafter they became the chief guarantors of the Weimar Republic, although the new Republic did not offer marked opportunities for socialism. The shift of the majority of the socialists from revolution to democratic reformism led to the split of the party during World War I, and after 1919 to the rise of the Communist Party and the ensuing weakness of the German working class. On the other hand, in spite of the moderation of its policies the Social Democratic Party could not overcome its limited class basis and consequently was never likely to gain a popular majority for itself.

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During World War I the political and social system of the Second Empire was put to the test. German diplomacy after 1890 had given up Bismarck's conservative foreign policy and sailed into the open sea of world politics. But the rigid authoritarian and military character of the Empire had been preserved. The contradictions of this situation were revealed during World War I, and they explain why the aims of foreign policy and domestic objectives became closely intertwined. On one side stood those who wanted constitutional reform and a foreign policy of limited ends, on the other those who hoped to preserve authoritarianism and to strengthen it by the successful achievement of nationalistic war aims. Peace through compromise (*Verständigungsfriede*) and revision of the Prussian franchise became the twin demands of the Left, peace through military victory and annexations (*Siegfriede*) and the conservation of the pseudo-constitutional order the battle cry of the so-called "national" groups. The latter, now openly under the leadership of the military element, won out and lost the war. Ludendorff, who through the use of his war powers changed the monarchical authoritarianism into something more akin to modern totalitarianism, conceded with military defeat the necessity of constitutional reform.

But the grave conflict within Germany was by no means settled between 1918 and 1920. Once it became apparent that the Social Democrats could be contained and that the great coalition of world Powers, which had imposed the Versailles Treaty, was falling apart, both Treaty and constitution were passionately denounced by the old upper classes. The strange but bitter fight over national colors, the black-white-red of the Second Empire versus the black-red-gold of 1848 and 1919, was the outward symbol of the social and political division which tore the Weimar Republic apart. But some deeper changes occurred. The Junker class, which was in the days of the monarchy the first estate, lost its dominant position to the high bourgeoisie. For the first time in German history industrialists played a superior and independent political rôle. This is not to deny that the Junkers and big landowners retained great influence and used it to the detriment of German democracy, but even in the *Reichswehr* the Junker influence is usually somewhat over-

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rated. Tirpitz and Ludendorff had not been Junkers, and the process of adopting sons of the bourgeoisie for the officers corps had reached large dimensions during World War I.

In this sense one can say that "Junker" became as much a state of mind as a social rank, and that this development was not confined to Prussia but spread all over Germany. The militarization of German society went far beyond the upper bourgeoisie. The lower middle classes, threatened by war losses and inflation and desirous of not being absorbed by the proletariat, were fervently opposed to the egalitarianism of the Social Democrats and were attracted by a military-rank and -leadership system. The German counterrevolution fed on this militarization of German society, and that it took the form of totalitarianism rather than of monarchical restoration offers proof of the relative strength of the democratic forces, which could be overthrown only by a mass movement. The rising Nazi Party was a popular movement and not the artificial creation of German capitalists. But the contempt and hatred of democracy made many members of the bourgeoisie willing helpers of Hitler before 1933 and practically all of them ready collaborators thereafter. In the Third Empire authoritarianism, nationalism and militarism ruled supreme, democracy was sent to the gas chambers, while the *Rechtsstaat* and *Kulturstaat* suffered in concentration camps. A faint and mocking echo of the latter tradition could perhaps be sensed in Hitler's attempts to cover his policies with the cloak of legality and to drum up Nazism as the new German civilization.

Against this general historical background the fundamental developments since 1945 ought to be seen. In this connection it is much simpler to define the impact of Soviet policy on Germany than that of the Western Powers. Russia has erected in the Eastern Zone a satellite "people's democracy", which, however, has no popular strength behind it. In contrast the Federal Republic is solidly in the Western fold and feels itself an ally of the free world. But if we probe into American influences on the forms of German life we find a very complex situation stemming partly from the occupation of Germany by a coalition of Powers, partly from the nature of Western policies.

Russian policy in the East, though seemingly entirely separated

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from the West, has had a profound effect on Western Germany. The only major change in the social structure of Germany was caused by the expropriation of the Junker class, which had its homes almost exclusively in the territories of the Soviet Zone and east of the Oder-Neisse line. Another change, which is possibly of passing significance only, goes back largely to Russian initiative. With the influx of over ten million German refugees from German and non-German lands, every fifth inhabitant of the Federal Republic is a refugee or a newcomer to his present place of domicile. A drastic political result of Soviet actions has been the practical disappearance of communism from the German scene, which has given the Social Democratic Party a freedom of political choice which it did not enjoy in the Weimar Republic.

While these were unexpected and unpremeditated results that accrued from Russian policy, the Soviet Union has affected American policy with regard to Germany also more directly. In 1945 and 1946 United States policy was dominated by the hope that it constituted a vital element in the achievement of a happy *modus vivendi* with Russia. Beginning with 1947 it became ever more clearly our chief objective to draw Germany into the great defensive alliance of the free world. Ever since 1945 American policies in Germany have been overshadowed by the stark necessities of the international situation and during the last six years they have tended to intervene as little as possible in internal German affairs. Moreover, whereas in 1947–1948 the United States acquired the undisputed leadership of Allied policies in Germany as far as economic and also military affairs were concerned, American authority in the formulation of internal policies was handicapped by the need of coördination with the French and British occupation governments. Disregarding certain punitive measures, it was never the intention of any of the Western Powers to impose on Germany democratic patterns which could not be grafted in some fashion upon conditions and forces existing in Germany. With a diversity of views prevailing among the three nations with regard to what was desirable to plant and likely to take roots in German soil, the Germans could soon assert their own traditions. Even where

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they accepted Allied institutions they may still abolish them in the future, as has already happened here and there.

An analysis of the Bonn constitution shows the competition of American, British, and French influences but with the older German trends hardly deflected from their course. The Bonn law is essentially a revised version of the Weimar constitution. Whether all the revisions are improvements may be questionable. The great powers with which the states were endowed on the insistence of the United States and France is undoubtedly rather unrealistic in a situation in which foreign policy and economic policy intrude into any political problem. American administrators at the time of the Marshall Plan, the establishment of the German frontier police, and the rearmament discussion felt themselves hamstrung by the extensive state rights and have looked thereafter with favor on the assumption of additional functions by the federal government. Outside of Bavaria the present federalism has little German support, which is not surprising since the states in some cases are entirely artificial creations and in addition contain large groups of new citizens from the East. Germans rightly see in the inflation of state organization an unnecessary proliferation of bureaucracy.

Yet except for this last development there is little need to worry about the new federal state system. The Bonn law allows for shifts of legislative and executive authority from states to the federal government and state lines can be redrawn. More important is the construction of the federal government itself, where obviously German memories, fears and hopes were chiefly instrumental in limiting the powers of parliament and in raising the independence of the chancellor and the cabinet. In order to exclude a presidential dictatorship, based on Article 48 of the Weimar constitution, the Bonn law has emasculated the office of the federal president but given the federal chancellor a position which makes his removal by parliamentary vote exceedingly difficult and even allows him under certain circumstances not only to stay in office after losing his majority but also to legislate. The political supremacy of chancellor and cabinet works in the interest of a strong executive and this means also the interest of the bureaucracy.

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Everywhere bureaucracy has multiplied but nowhere as much as in Germany. Allied military government liked to work through the civil service rather than through political parties. The Bonn system has extended the scope of the judiciary and of the government service tremendously and in Germany these two professions are staffed by the same type of civil servant. The Bonn constitution like all the new state constitutions contains grandiose catalogues of civil rights which go far beyond anything known in the United States. The experiences of the arbitrariness of Nazi rule have created in Germany a great belief in judicial procedures. But many of these civil rights are mutually incompatible and a settlement of conflicts calls for a political decision rather than a juristic opinion. One says in Germany that the *Rechtsstaat* has become a *Justizstaat*, a government by justices rather than a government by law. Meanwhile, the administration is busily occupied in determining the claims which the new legislation has granted to practically every imaginable category of human being, and all these claims are justiciable. The main contacts between the hard-working German and his new state are the pleadings of his private claims before an official behind a desk.

German bureaucracy is organized as before 1933. The university diploma is the entrance ticket to a career in the higher service and admission to the university depends in turn on the graduation from high school. Except for some beginnings in Hamburg, Hessen and West Berlin, class privileges in higher education have not been broken. Allied military government utterly failed to broaden the social base of the civil service and of the "academic class" in general. Some changes have taken place. The idea of *Rechtsstaat* does not appear any more as a matter of course and as something that can easily be combined with any other political order, including totalitarianism. But while, therefore, totalitarianism and militant nationalism are being rejected, a positive belief in democracy as the only method that can assure the permanent security of the rule of law in our age is extremely rare. Democracy, or, as one would say among these groups in Germany, the "rule of parties" (*Parteienstaat*), is not a guarantee of freedom. On the contrary,

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it is argued that the democratic *volonté générale* can produce the suppression of all law and freedom. In this line of thought national socialism appears more as a consequence of the French Revolution than as a reaction to it, and this explains, too, why academic historical thought centers so largely on Bismarck.

It is true, however, that this has not led to an openly reactionary attitude or to militant nationalism. Both the judiciary and the general civil service have shown a more coöperative spirit toward the Bonn government than they did to the Weimar Republic. But parliament and parties are eyed with suspicion by the great majority. Germany's most eminent philosopher of education, Theodor Litt, wrote recently: "A champion of democracy must be conscious of the odds against which he is struggling and the dubious support which he can expect from the present state of public life and the average thinking of his fellow citizens."[1] The *Rechtstaat* ideal has come back and come back in greater strength. In the historical and social setting of Germany it is not likely to lose its authoritarian overtones altogether, but it has become noticeable that the authority of the government is being enforced with a firmer hand than in the days of the Weimar Republic, even against the industrialists.

Although their influence is naturally very great, they do not act as a *Fronde* against democracy as they did thirty years ago. Some of them are obviously behind the partly successful attempt to develop the Free Democratic Party into an instrument of antidemocratic policy which it has become outside of Württemberg, Hamburg and Berlin. But the F.D.P. is not a powerful party and most of the industrialists seem to support the Christian Democratic Union of Chancellor Adenauer. Whether the new attitude will last it is impossible to foretell. American decartelization policy, though it has shrunk over the last years to modest proportions, has made the revival of huge economic empires more difficult, and the growing entanglement with foreign economic capital and interests may act as a further brake on exaggerated political ambitions.

[1] Theodor Litt, "Die politsche Selbsterziehung des deutschen Volkes", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 27 January 1954. See also the opinion of the distinguished German philosopher, Karl Jaspers, "The Political Vacuum in Germany", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 32 (July 1954), pp. 595 *et seq.*

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A special word must be said about the ten million refugees who are commonly considered the most likely source of a new German nationalism. It should not be forgotten that they have experienced the consequences of nationalism in a more painful and cruel way than the Western Germans, and they feel not only a deeper hatred but also a more profound dread of the Russians than is common among all Germans. Only one third of them have given their votes to the Refugee Party and this party has not been conspicuous for advocating wars of liberation or the abolition of democracy. It has acted chiefly as a pressure group for the economic interests of the refugees and worked for these ends together with the Christian Democrats and even with the Social Democrats. The absorption of the refugees into the West German society can be judged as approaching a successful solution since by now these refugees have found productive employment. It is a truly great achievement of the Federal Republic and at the same time a proof of the toughness of the social structure of Germany.

The restoration of the middle classes in Germany to their former position with relatively minor modifications raises the question how German society in its present form could ever proceed from the acceptance of the politically ambiguous *Rechtsstaat* ideal to that of a democratic state (*Volksstaat*). This future is clearly dependent on the popular support that the two major political parties, the Christian Democrats (C.D.U.) and Social Democrats (S.P.D.), may be able to mobilize in the future. About the democratic devotion of the S.P.D. there cannot be the slightest doubt, and with the exclusion of communism the party can rely on the support of about one third of the German electorate. American policy imposed the separation of the trade-union movement from the party though the organization of the present trade unions followed the British example. It is too early to say whether this system will last or whether directly or indirectly the former coöperation between party and trade unions will reëmerge. Even now the party with its more than one-half million members and the trade unions with a membership of five and one-half million move along parallel tracks. But large sections of the working population vote for the C.D.U. rather than the S.P.D.

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On its side the S.P.D. wants to be more than an organization of the working class. It has drawn the conclusion from its own history as a reformist party and has officially abolished Marxist dogmatism. The S.P.D. has realized, too, that it can never gain a majority of its own on a mere working-class basis. It has actually cut its socialistic aims to a bare minimum and emphasized its guardianship of national interests to the utmost. The S.P.D. is certainly not a nationalistic party, but one may sometimes wonder whether its demonstrations of German patriotism do not unintentionally work into the hands of nationalism. In general it can be said that the party has not succeeded in producing workable alternate foreign or economic policies to those of the government, and it is not surprising that it still draws its strength from the support of the working class only.

Whatever the more distant future may hold in store for the S.P.D., the present and the immediate future of Germany lie with the C.D.U., which has shown so far a remarkable capacity to unite a large variety of social groups for a constructive national policy. In practice, if not in theory, United States foreign policy has thrown its full support behind this party even after it became clear that it served as the political organization for the social restoration of the German middle classes. No serious attempt was made to establish a coalition government of the S.P.D. and C.D.U. as in Austria. As far as can be seen, it was chiefly Mr. Adenauer's decision to keep the S.P.D. as an opposition rather than a partner, since he believed that it would enable the C.D.U. to use the former forces of the right-of-center for the support of the new republic. That this could be done only by the restoration of the old social stratification was a reflection not only of his cool political judgment but also of his personal predilection. The policy has achieved important results. The C.D.U. relies to a large extent on the tradition of the former Center Party to bring together differing social groups for common political action. But it has now extended this effort to large Protestant groups. Fear of Soviet communism and American assistance, and by no means exclusively the personality of Mr. Adenauer, have been strong allies in these successful attempts.

The experiences of the Hitler period have aroused among Protestants serious doubts about the concepts of the church and

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of church-state relations, which in the past have proved one of the most powerful supports of German authoritarianism. Protestant laymen are attempting to transform the Lutheran Church of pastors into a church of the people. It is also recognized that the political philosophy of modern German Protestantism was more Hegelian than Lutheran, and that the original social ethics of Luther are inadequate for the defense of the Christian cause in our age. The struggle which is taking place in Protestant minds will continue, and the bitter life of the Protestant Church in the Soviet Zone will be a grim reminder of the sinfulness of authoritarianism. But it will take time to translate this thought into clear lessons and even more into social attitudes and habits. Only then will Germany be able to take the step from a *Rechtsstaat*, organized in democratic forms, to a democratic community based on the conviction of the freedom of all its citizens.

Hajo Holborn

Yale University

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REVIEWS

John Maynard Keynes: Economist and Policy Maker. By SEYMOUR E. HARRIS. New York and London, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955.—xiv, 234 pp. $3.00.

This short biography is one of the Twentieth Century Library Series. It is written with high regard and admiration: "I can truthfully say", the author remarks in a foreword, "that I have given more of my mature life to Keynes than to anybody but my wife. . . . But I have tried throughout to be critical and objective. . . ." He goes on, "I should perhaps add that I never met Lord Keynes."

Keynes had this kind of effect on people; few were unmoved, one way or another, who crossed his path. In brilliance, precocity, and diversity of interests and talents, he has had few peers in this century. It is tempting to compare him with Churchill, and difficult to say whether the worldly academician or the learned politician has made a greater impact on our times. For, as Harris comments, "Even though most people remain unaware of the extent to which our daily lives have been affected—indeed, transformed—by his powers of analysis and persuasion, it may be said that the life of John Maynard Keynes touches us all."

This biography is written for the informed layman. Most of the book is taken up with Keynes's professional work; Part 1, dealing with "the man", takes up only forty-one pages. This is much too scant treatment for such a fascinating life, and the book has little of the human interest of Harrod's great biography. Yet since Keynes's chief and lasting influence is in his contributions to economics and his rôle as publicist of ideas, the allocation of space cannot be criticized. The discussion of Keynes's economics is lucid and comprehensive and as nontechnical as can be in dealing with such a technical subject. To be sure, the appreciation of the "informed layman" who reads this book will be greatly enhanced if he has been prepared with a solid course in economics.

What were the important ideas of this man, which have "affected and transformed" all our daily lives?

"Keynes", says the author, "devoted most of his life to assaults on laissez faire." This is true to an extent, and is one of the main reasons why his name is still anathema to the unreconstructed radicals of the Right. But let us be clear that the ikons he broke were those representing the ideal capitalist state with no economic controls. Even so, one

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might say that he did not deprecate the ideal, he simply considered it irrelevant, as irrelevant as Marx's post-revolutionary nonstate utopia. He did hoot at those who supposed that laissez-faire economics is adequate for a non-Ricardian world.

Keynes was first and always a champion of capitalism. His central position might be interpreted as follows: One of the essential characteristics of modern capitalism is the central rôle of money, and money is a creation of the state, not a product of nature, and must be managed by the state with specific objectives in view (Keynes's objective being full employment). Those who seek to simulate the laissez-faire ideal by particular monetary policies, like the prophets of the gold standard, simply refuse to recognize the logical consequences of their policies.

"One of Keynes's great contributions", Harris says, "was to bring money back into economics as an integral part of the theory of employment and output." The reviewer would say that this was his greatest contribution. Keynes's emphasis on money-spending as a crucial process in the money economy, and his search for means of promoting optimum levels of spending, have revolutionized fiscal and monetary policy.

Keynes's real assaults, therefore, were against unrealistic and unintelligent direction of capitalism, of the kind that led England into depression by restoring the gold standard in 1925. Whether he ever really advocated more consequential peacetime controls than were involved in, say, Federal Reserve policies between 1918 and 1930 is questionable. (These policies helped precipitate a ruinous deflation in the early 1920's and a ruinous stock market boom in the late 1920's.)

The seven parts of Harris' book are entitled The Man, Some General Considerations, Significant Aspects of Keynesian Economics (being a discussion of Keynes's theoretical framework), Economic Fluctuations and Fiscal Policy, International Economics, Keynes and New Dealism, and Summary Comments. They are to be commended to anyone interested in social and economic policies of the twentieth century who is not already steeped in Keynes.

LYLE C. FITCH

New York City

Post-Keynesian Economics. Edited by KENNETH K. KURIHARA. New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1954.—xviii, 422 pp. $8.50.

This is a collection of fifteen essays, ranging from the political and economic policies appropriate to a modern industrial economy seeking stable full employment, to theoretical and empirical questions at the frontiers of modern economics. The editor has happily succeeded where

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many editors have failed, in getting each author to begin with a summary of his thesis, and to provide recapitulations along the way.

Probably the two essays of greatest interest to political scientists will be those by Paul Streeten and Martin Bronfenbrenner. Streeten's is a very illuminating account of the relationships among the concepts of the natural harmony of interests, utilitarianism, laissez-faire liberalism, and Keynesian economics. He argues that Keynes was in the utilitarian-liberal tradition, because he advocated policies to increase the general welfare which would still allow a great deal of scope for individual self-interest; but that conflicts of interest have become more clearly revealed in the light that Keynes shed on the actual workings of the economy. Bronfenbrenner ably presents the thesis that continued inflation now serves as a mollifier of the conflict of interests between the suppliers of labor and capital, by permitting both groups to make gains in money income; that this will continue only until the participants realize that their gains are illusory because of rising prices; and that then the conflict of interests will become clearer with the result that labor's share of total income will probably rise. Streeten, Bronfenbrenner, R. C. O. Matthews, and K. K. Kurihara all suggest that some redistribution of income from capital-suppliers to labor-suppliers may help to reduce total saving (whether this is so is a very live and complex issue in economics), and hence help to rescue the economy from the neo-Keynesian dilemma of having both too little and too much investment at the same time.

The dilemma is this: Keynes taught that if full employment is to be maintained, the saving that people choose to do at full employment must be matched by investment. However, investment today creates additional capital equipment tomorrow, and so diminishes the need for continued investment in the near-term future. There is some ground for the fear that in our economy people as a whole want to save too much at full-employment incomes, with the result that the amount of investment required to maintain full employment is so high that the amount of capital equipment would grow so fast that this level of investment cannot be maintained steadily into the future.

Matthews, Kurihara, Shinichi Ichimura, and Anatol Murad all address their essays to this problem. Matthews presents an illuminating review of recent economic theory about it; he then advocates policies to keep private investment steady at a level that provides the right amount of capital, and to augment consumer and government demand if necessary to maintain full employment. Kurihara proposes the rather drastic remedy of a zero rate of interest, so that suppliers of capital per se will receive no share in total income; he does not share my fear that this

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would reduce saving so much that otherwise desirable and possible increases in output would be prevented for lack of capital equipment. Ichimura shows that most of the theories discussed by Matthews can be described in terms of fairly simple systems of nonlinear differential equations (as such systems go), and analyzes their properties, a highly fruitful line of inquiry. This valuable essay illustrates once again the unfortunate barrier between literary and mathematical economics, which is fortified from the one side because too few economics students study mathematics, and from the other because many of those who do do not communicate their results sufficiently well to the rest. There is progress, however. The essays of William Vickrey and Don Patinkin are highly praiseworthy examples in this regard. Murad advances the strange thesis that in an industrialized economy, net investment in additional capital must eventually cease, while capital accumulation and industrial progress can continue. He arrives at this because of his strange definition of net investment (pp. 229, 245), and his erroneous contention that no sacrifice of present consumption is required (and hence no net investment) when, through technological improvement, one old machine is to be replaced by two new ones that together will cost the same as the old one but will produce twice as much output (pp. 246–47). In fact present consumption *is* sacrificed; for, if the second new machine is not built, then goods for present consumption can be produced instead. These flaws obscure what could otherwise have been an enlightening essay on capital accumulation and industrial progress.

The most interesting essay, in my opinion, is that by Franco Modigliani and Richard Brumberg. They have taken a fresh view of the important relationship between consumers' expenditures and their income, based on the premise (derived from the accepted utility-maximizing approach) that each consumer implicitly has a planned pattern of consumption expenditure over his lifetime. Their essay provides penetrating insights into consumer behavior, and into the nature of good empirical economic work as well. Lorie Tarshis provides and ably documents an all-too-necessary reminder that business saving is quantitatively even more important than consumer saving in its effect on income fluctuations, and that realistic income theory must account for it. Lawrence Klein gives a valuable comprehensive review of the empirical evidence concerning Keynes's theory of income, much of which evidence he himself has amassed, and shows that no contradictions have been found except for a possible depressing effect of real wealth on consumption.

Patinkin shows clearly that in full employment there is no necessary contradiction between Keynesian economics and the famous classical quantity theory of money, according to which an increase in the quantity

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of money simply raises prices but leaves real incomes and employment the same after an initial adjustment period. Vickrey argues skilfully that in an economy where there is a steady price inflation that is generally anticipated and allowed for, the money rate of interest will be high to make up for the fact that a lender's money will be worth less when he gets it back than when he lent it, so that monetary policy operating on the rate of interest via the quantity of money will be a powerful tool for stabilizing the level of real income and employment. I question whether we are sophisticated enough to adopt and adhere to such a policy, however. Mabel Timlin gives a patient analysis of Canadian monetary and fiscal policy since the 'thirties in the light of Keynesian theory. Howard Bowen and Gerald Meier plead that stabilization policies must take account of the character of economic institutions if they are to be successful in the real world. Dudley Dillard gives a review of Keynes's position, concentrating on the monetary aspects. Shigeto Tsuru compares the aggretative economic variables used by Keynes with those of Marx.

CARL F. CHRIST

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

The Political Element in the Devleopment of Economic Theory. By GUNNAR MYRDAL. Translated by Paul Streeten. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954.—xvii, 248 pp. $5.00.

This provocative little book by the eminent Swedish economist and general scholar, Gunnar Myrdal, was written about twenty-five years ago and published first in a Swedish, and in 1932 in a German, edition. The latter became widely and favorably known to economists in all countries, though the language barrier kept many from reading it. Those editions, however, have now been long out of print; and it is good to have this new English edition—an unrevised translation of the German edition. Owing to its nature the book is in no way out of date; and in this new form it should find many new readers.

It attacks this important and difficult problem: how to disentangle, and then *properly* relate to each other, (1) economists' contributions to the positive science of economics and (2) their normative, political philosophies. The "approach" lies through a historical and critical analysis of one composite intellectual tradition—that of the "main line" of political economists, the Physiocrats, Adam Smith, and the "classical" and "neo-classical" economists, who all involved their developments of economic-scientific theory in an intimate union with the philosophy of the classical liberalism. The two early and fundamental formulations of the latter—the one in terms of eighteenth-century ideas of "natural

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law" and the other in the terms of utilitarianism—are rejected (dismissed) much too completely, I think, and with much too little discussion. But the book incisively and brilliantly exposes the positive-and-normative ambiguity inherent in them, and the long perpetuation of that in the subsequent development of all economic theory presented as conclusively supporting economic-liberal policy precepts.

Within its limitations, that critical survey of the history of blended liberal and economic thought has much value. But while it succeeds in throwing some light on the general problem—how economists can put their scientific studies into right instead of wrong relations with their political philosophies—the book's treatment of that problem itself, in my opinion, is not as illuminating as it might be. For the author's anti-philosophical philosophy of strict positivism results in a much too simple conception of the problem. The complexity and richness of political philosophies, and of (both) their debts and contributions to economics and all social sciences, are entirely unrecognized. The sole "content" ascribed to liberalism, or to any such philosophy, is its core of metaphysical-and-ethical ideas; and the positivistic dismissal of the metaphysical aspects leaves as "content" of any recognized significance only the "value judgments", viewed as merely subjective, personal desires or preferences. Economists then are told—in the unrevised text of the book itself—that they should simply (1) develop economics as a purely objective, morally and politically neutral science, and then (2) add to that in separate statements their personal "value premises" *when* they discuss problems of public policy.

In the new preface, however, which he wrote for this new English edition, Professor Myrdal acknowledges the untenability of the position underlying *that* advice and takes a new, more mature, and much sounder position. That is, he now recognizes that one's "value judgments" cannot be simply added afterward to scientific findings first attained through research entirely uninfluenced by them; but are always present from the outset as interests (valuations) determining the choice of scientific problems to be studied, and hence the part of economic truth discovered. The latter then becomes the means of implementing the policy-aims regarded as desirable. In other words, so it seems to me, political philosophies and theories of economics develop together and have reciprocal interconnections which neither can nor should be eliminated but can and should be fully conscious and critically controlled. Space limits forbid any further explanation of this, my own view, alternative to Professor Myrdal's. But I can heartily recommend this book in spite of my personal disagreement with its point of view.

O. H. Taylor

Harvard University

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A Critique of Socioeconomic Goals. By HENRY M. OLIVER, JR. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1954.—vii, 191 pp. Paper $2.50; Cloth $3.00.

Professor Oliver has performed a highly useful service in beginning a logical analysis of social values in their economic context. Instead of wordy arguments about the relative importance of undefined abstractions such as liberty and equality, he seeks to find out the meaning of several concepts which have been proposed as standards for the evaluation of economic policies; quite correctly, he sees social values as the criteria by which the state chooses among alternative policies open to it. He takes up the different criteria in turn, trying to discover the operational meaning of each as judged from their intrinsic meaning and from the applications made of it to choice of policy. He points out how little content remains to most of them upon careful analysis.

The first criterion studied is that of natural liberty, the right to do as one will with one's person and property. The author argues that, in the modern world, property really means the right to restrict others' liberties, and hence the natural-liberty doctrine, if not contradictory, becomes a pure tautology The doctrine also ignores the origin of property rights. Further, if natural liberty is given some of its many possible meanings, the policy implication may be very far from the usual laissez-faire view. Some variants of the doctrine are considered; the general conclusion is that the concept of "liberty" turns out to mean little more than "legitimacy", the latter still having to be defined in terms of other concepts.

The second criterion analyzed is that of distribution according to contributions. The main part of the discussion relates to the idea that income ought to be distributed to those who created it. The many difficulties in attributing the creation of income to specific individuals are brought forth very skilfully. Part of the discussion relates to the uses of the market as a measure of contributions; its limitations are shown convincingly.

The third criterion is that of equality. The discussion here is somewhat less pointed than in the previous two cases. While there are many interpretations of the concept and difficulties in applying any of them, it is not possible to argue that the concept is meaningless. Much of the author's discussion is devoted to the effects of egalitarian measures on incentives; while important from a practical point of view, the incentive argument is not really a basic ethical criterion but an appeal, based on alleged empirical evidence, to utilitarian ethics of some kind.

The fourth criterion studied is the traditional economic criterion of

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maximum satisfaction. Actually the discussion runs in terms of the utilitarian (Benthamite) argument for laissez faire. The different strands in the classical arguments are neatly disentangled; however, I think the author is somewhat cavalier in his dismissal of the difficulties in interpersonal comparison of utilities. The author continues with some further criteria; a particularly interesting discussion concerns the right to the maintenance of established expectations. The book concludes with some refreshing common sense on the much-discussed question of the cumulative dangers allegedly inherent in governmental intervention.

I hope I am not distorting the meaning of the author excessively when I regard his book as the beginning of an axiomatic approach to social ethics. The concepts of liberty, equality, and so forth do indeed correspond to real ethical attitudes, but they are in a primitive state from the viewpoint of operational significance. Critical study and reflection on the common uses of these words, such as Professor Oliver has done here, are needed to arrive at what Carnap would call their explication. It is only when the socioeconomic goals have been made clear that we can speak intelligently about the best policies for their achievement.

KENNETH J. ARROW

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

The Social Contract. By JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU. Translated and with an Introduction by Willmoore Kendall. Chicago, The Henry Regnery Company, 1954.—xv, 171 pp. $2.75.

Willmoore Kendall's new translation of Rousseau's *Contrat social* departs from the other available versions[1] in three respects: explanatory words have been added to the text; a number of phrases have been rewritten; and the meaning of some passages has been altered.

In a "Translator's Note" Mr. Kendall refers to "a number of liberties" he has taken with the text. One of the most obtrusive of these is the insertion of italicized words and phrases chiefly designed, he notes, to convey "what the sentences concerned actually communicate to me." "Ignore the italicized words, phrases, sentences," he writes, "and you have a complete 'literal' translation of the *Contract*." This device is a

[1] I used, for purposes of this review, the following recent versions: F. M. Watkins, in *Rousseau, Political Writings* (Edinburgh, 1953); G. D. H. Cole, in *The Social Contract and Discourses* (New York, 1950); Gerard Hopkins, in Ernest Barker, ed., *Social Contract* (London, 1952); Charles Frankel, revision of an anonymous 18th-century translation, *The Social Contract* (New York, 1947).

I used several critical French editions. All quotations are from the edition by Bertrand de Jouvenel (Geneva, 1947).

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substitute for the common editorial practice of clarifying a difficult or obscure passage in a footnote. At its best it transforms Rousseau's laconic prose into a spongy verbosity; at its worst it makes explicit that which is obviously implied. What is obscure in Rousseau remains obscure, what is clear is made elaborately clear.

Rousseau is hard to translate; his vivid style lacks the famous limpidity of Diderot and Voltaire. But his French has a spare, curt energy which Kendall's interpolations (which appear several times on every page) turn into mush. Thus, when Rousseau is being sarcastic about the "droit de conquête" (I, 4) Kendall translates it "*so-called* right of conquest". When Rousseau writes with characteristic economy: "Puisqu' aucun homme n'a une autorité naturelle sur son semblable, et puisque la force ne produit aucun droit, restent donc les conventions pour base de toute autorité légitime parmi les hommes" (*ibid.*), Kendall has: "No man, *as we have seen*, has any natural authority over his fellow-man, and might, *as we have seen also*, makes no right. We have nothing left save agreements, then, *to serve* as a basis for all legitimate authority among men." On occasion, the italicized additions make gibberish of Rousseau's sentences, as in I, 9, where a misplaced and superfluous "*merely*" and a "*that is to say*" make two whole sentences incomprehensible.

Mr. Kendall's claim that without the italicized additions his translation is literal does not stand up. Even without them, his prose is verbose. Compare Rousseau's "S'il y avoit un peuple de Dieux, il se gouverneroit démocratiquement. Un Gouvernement si parfait ne convient pas à des hommes" (III, 4) to Kendall's "While a people made up of gods, if one were to exist, would govern itself democratically, no such perfect form of government is advisable for one made up of mere men." Again, he repeatedly changes Rousseau's text without indicating that he has done so. "Car cet acte étant nécessairement antérieur à l'autre est le vrai fondement de la société" (I, 5) becomes: "For this act, which necessarily precedes the other, is for that reason the true basis of society." "Jusqu'à ce que, le pacte social étant violé, chacun rentre alors dans ses premiers droits et reprenne sa liberté naturelle" (I, 6) becomes: "Whence it follows that each individual immediately resumes his primitive rights, surprising as this may seem, when any violation of the social pact occurs; i.e., he recovers his natural freedom. . . ." These (and many other) alterations are not indicated, and there is no warrant for them in the French.

Some of the most familiar phrases of the *Contrat social* have been recast in this version. "L'homme est né libre, et partout il est dans les fers", which has usually been translated "Man is born free, and every-

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where he is in chains",[2] here becomes: "Man was born free, but is everywhere in bondage." Kendall's use of "bondage" comes home to trouble him: the other translators, having rendered "fers" by "chains", can remain consistent and continue the same usage when "fers" reappears, while Kendall feels compelled to vary it. In I, 2, "fers" becomes "shackles", in II, 8 it becomes "irons", and in III, 15 it becomes "chains". This is not flexibility, it is caprice.

Again, the phrase "la volonté de tous" (III, 3 and elsewhere), which we know as the "will of all", becomes "the will of everybody". Familiar, straightforward pronouncements are made complicated. To take but one example: "Car si l'opposition des intérêts particuliers a rendu nécessaire l'établissement des sociétés, c'est l'accord de ces mêmes intérêts qui l'a rendu possible. C'est ce qu'il y a de commun dans ces différens intérêts qui forme le lien social . . ." (II, 1), which becomes: "What made the establishment of societies necessary was, if you like, the fact that the interests of individuals clashed. But what made their establishment possible was the fact that the same interests *also* coincided. *In other words:* It is the overlap among different interests that creates the social bond."

A prose translator must force himself to be passive; he must permit the text he is translating to master him and he must resist the temptation to quarrel with or to improve the original. He must acknowledge that there are only a few ways of translating a passage correctly, and that it is better to be accurate than to be unique. Mr. Kendall has neglected these canons. Possibly for eventual didactic purposes—in the "Introduction" he deplores the lack of "the kind of textual analysis that patiently weighs every sentence against every other, that wrings from each phrase its last elusive scrap of meaning"—he has transformed a literary masterpiece into a kind of memorandum. The sort of analysis for which he calls demands a scrupulous respect for the text which the present translator does not show. He fails to reproduce Rousseau's tone, he liberally alters details, and he introduces a number of substantive changes without giving reasons.

The most significant of these changes is his treatment of Rousseau's celebrated assertion that "la volonté générale est toujours droite" (II, 3). This phrase has been the subject of some controversy. Thirty-five years ago Bernard Bosanquet defended the commonly accepted translation, "the general will is always right", on the ground that Hilaire Belloc's suggested rendering of "droite" by "direct" was "too neutral morally."

[2] Except for one difference in punctuation, Cole, Watkins, and Hopkins agree. Frankel has "Man is born free, and yet we see him everywhere in chains", which is wordy but remains close to the traditional version.

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He made the point that "the general will by definition aims at the public welfare"[3]—that Rousseau was setting up an ideal standard against which the will of all could be measured. All four English versions I have been using agree on the translation "The general will is always right". In the absence of convincing reasons, the traditional translation deserves to remain untouched.[4] Mr. Kendall, however, translates the passage "The general will is always well-intentioned", without comment. Elsewhere he uses a footnote to explain that he has substituted a "but" for an "and" (which in no way affects the meaning); on this major point he remains silent.

These failings conceal the merit of this translation: it calls attention to the need for a critical edition of the *Contrat social* in English, an edition that would point to and try to resolve difficulties in the text. We have some good literal translations—particularly Cole's and Watkins'—but a good critical edition is still a desideratum.

PETER GAY

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German Marxism and Russian Communism. By JOHN PLAMENATZ. London, New York, Toronto, Longmans, Green and Co., 1954.—xxiii, 356 pp. $4.25.

Democracy and Marxism. By H. B. MAYO. With a Foreword by Walter Bedell Smith. New York, Oxford University Press, 1955.—xi, 364 pp. $4.00.

The authors of these two books have tried to do the same thing: to make understandable and to criticize Marxism. Both believe that the Marxist philosophy of dialectic materialism has no importance for an understanding of the U.S.S.R. Plamenatz says that Marx attempted to develop the philosophy of dialectic materialism because he wrote at a time when all theories of society were based upon a theory of the universe. To be respectable he had to have a philosophy. Plamenatz thinks that Marx proved himself to be no philosopher, and he finds that Marxists since the author's time have not been interested in the theory. For this reason Plamenatz decides not to discuss it. His interest is with historical materialism which he finds to be of great concern to Marxists today. He searches for its antecedents in Saint-Simon and Hegel, but concludes that the theory of historical materialism, taken as a whole,

[3] *The Philosophical Theory of the State* (London, 1951), p. 101n.

[4] I do not wish to appear to be foreclosing debate on this tricky sentence. I am arguing only that a drastic departure should be justified.

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is unintelligible and the evidence adduced to support it refutes the most intelligible parts of it.

Mayo has the same general view of dialectic materialism. He notes that Soviet authors give it lip service, but he thinks that it has no importance for any Soviet scientist, unless it be Lysenko. He notes that Lysenko's experiments are now being discredited even within the U.S.S.R. itself. Mayo prefers to save his fire along with Plamenatz for historical materialism. He proceeds to demolish the theory with some forthright denials of the facts on which it is supposed to rest and of the conclusions drawn from the facts presented. He finds that in one bright moment Marx himself ridiculed theories based upon the concept of the general march of peoples throughout history, yet he refused to apply his ridicule to his own theory which presented such a general march.

Both Plamenatz and Mayo have been the product of the Oxford environment. Plamenatz came from the Balkans and Mayo from Canada. Plamenatz has remained in Oxford at Nuffield College, while Mayo has returned to Alberta since the termination of his Rhodes scholarship. Both books reflect the background and present occupation of their authors. Mayo has written for North American students. His book is easy to read. He refers to contemporary problems of security and the limits on democracy. His views have a British flavor in their determination to adhere to the heritage of liberalism even in the face of the trying conditions of the cold war. He would not ban the Communist party or restrict its press short of a shooting war.

Plamenatz is more complicated in his presentation. He prefers to emphasize the extent to which the Russians have gone beyond their German Marxist heritage. In doing so he appeals more to the graduate student who is interested in origins and development of ideas than to the undergraduate. He concludes that Marx has inspired adherents with his criticism of capitalism, not because of historical materialism, but because he arouses pity and indignation. The Bolsheviks of Russia seem to him to have built upon this base and to have distorted the doctrine to meet their needs, thus winning many adherents among those who understand little of the ideology.

It is possible to quarrel with some of the readings of both authors. Mayo seems to give rather too much emphasis to Lenin's expectation that the administrative functions of the state would wither away with its repressive measures. There is language in Lenin to justify such a conclusion, but Engels' concept that after the state had withered away there would remain the problem of administering things suggests a different meaning. He could not have but expected that the administrative apparatus would survive, even though no police would be necessary

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to enforce its directives. When Lenin condemned "bureaucracy", it is likely that he meant the conglomeration of slow-moving unimaginative clerks which he thought typical of the state bureaus rather than the new imaginative and frequently changing clerical staff which he expected to create in the new Russia.

Plamenatz' reading of Engels on the transition from primitive to slave-holding society can also be questioned. Plamenatz reads the pertinent paragraphs to conclude that Engels has failed to follow the requirements of his own theory in that he has not shown how the transition was the result of the development of new methods of production based upon new tools of production. The same paragraph may be read to argue that slaveholding had to await the invention of tools of sufficiently productive character to permit an individual to produce more than required for his own maintenance. This would establish a consistency in the argument.

Mayo adds to his book a splendid bibliography of original sources and critical commentaries. Plamenatz has no suggested readings. Again there is emphasis upon Mayo's concept of his book as a teaching tool, while Plamenatz appeals to the mature reader who knows a lot about Marx and would enjoy dropping in upon a discussion over the apples and the port in an Oxford combination room.

JOHN N. HAZARD

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Federal Tax System of the United States: A Survey of Law and Administration. BY JOSEPH P. CROCKETT. New York, Columbia University Press, 1955.—xxiii, 288 pp. $4.75.

Despite the vast amount of published material now available on the United States tax system, gaps remain, and Mr. Crockett has filled one of them with his excellent description of federal taxes and federal tax administration. As he notes, "there was no comprehensive description lying between a bare outline and an exhaustive presentation" (p. xiv). The book was prepared "to meet the needs of those persons who wish to become acquainted with the Federal tax system and its administration, . . . to answer requests received from foreign governments or institutions for a survey of the system; and to serve as a ready reference work for the American tax technician sent abroad as consultant to a foreign government" (pp. xiv–xv); but despite this emphasis on serving the needs of the foreign inquirer, it may be anticipated that the book will prove useful to a large group of domestic consumers, especially teachers of public finance.

For them, the most valuable section is likely to be Part Two, which in some hundred pages gives a clear description of the organization

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and operation of the Internal Revenue Service. A considerable amount of detailed information is presented, first, on the office of a District Director of Internal Revenue, and, later, on the National Office. The much briefer sections in between, on judicial review and on the offices of the Regional Commissioners, are less interesting, partly because of the degree of compression of the material; the bare outline of the routes the taxpayer may take in suing for refund (pp. 192–93) will not be very helpful to anyone who is not already well acquainted with our legal system. The description of the Tax Court, on the other hand, is in adequate detail for the author's purpose.

The technical details given in the section on the office of the District Director make fascinating reading for one who, like the present writer, knows only in a general way what is done, and has often wondered how it could be done, on the huge scale and with the speed and smoothness that characterize the procedure for refunding over-withheld tax, to name just one example (see the description of what the electronic calculator does with forms 1040A, pp. 155–56).

The first section of the book, describing the present federal tax law, seems slightly less satisfactory perhaps because Mr. Crockett here tries to solve a truly insoluble problem: how to present in simple, readable, and reasonably brief form the contents of the tax law. He confines himself to a straightforward description, essaying no value judgments and giving no background on how and why such things came to pass. Considering the aim he had in view, it is therefore quite understandable that he should merely describe the depletion provision, for example, without comment (pp. 20–21). But then he might have omitted the questionable interpretation of the intent behind the present $600 personal exemption (p. 22); and if reference is to be made to "apparent double taxation of corporate profits"—presumably distributed profits—a word might have been dropped about apparent deficient taxation of a large part of corporate withheld profits.

No mention is made of the exemption of state and local bond interest. The further fact that some descriptions are so compressed as to be virtually meaningless to one who has no prior acquaintance with the problems (e.g., Life inventory accounting, p. 26) leads to the general conclusion that this first part will be helpful chiefly to those who already have an extensive knowledge of various types of tax problems, but who do not know, or who have forgotten, how the federal law treats them. A useful complement to Mr. Crockett's book, for those who do not have sufficient background, is Roy Blough's *Federal Taxing Process*.

CARL S. SHOUP

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy: Its Concepts, Strategy, and Limits. By WILLIAM Y. ELLIOTT and others. Report of a Study Group Sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and the National Planning Association. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1955.—xv, 414 pp. $6.00.

If, as the old saying goes, "there is safety in numbers", there may also be increased courage and wisdom in increased numbers. The nine men who have authorized this immensely stimulating study report may be an illustration of these sayings on human behavior; at least they have tackled a host of difficult problems and faced up squarely to the most vexing questions in the whole gamut of our contemporary foreign relations. Critics of group research and group writing might well ponder this well-written, thorough, and at times profound and penetrating study of our governmental and personal responsibilities and opportunities to provide leadership in the free world.

In the lengthy and often quite detailed discussion of current economic foreign policy the authors have not lost sight of the pervasive, perhaps overriding, political requirements and conditioning factors for economic health and development. The study maintains a good balance between an analysis of existing institutions and facilities for economic and political foreign relations, but there is also a very salutary emphasis in many instances on the importance of the ideas and the sense of direction which inspire and motivate institutions and administrative processes. Hence the reader finds a very comprehensive discussion of the existing economic organization of the "Western" community followed by proposals for new economic instruments (e.g., an organization for Atlantic Economic Cooperation, OAEC, with Japan as an "associate" member) but this part of the report is preceded by and invigorated with an account of the inadequacy of nineteenth-century theories of trade and economic development compared with the essence and force of modern economic demands and aspirations.

The report of the study group seems to this reviewer to be most rewarding in its treatment of the dynamic questions of our day. How will the rapidly rising expectations of more and more people for a better way of life be satisfied? Is this great ferment in the world to be directed into satisfying channels of peaceful production and distribution or will this mighty tide of discontent and striving break out in great violence or follow the will-o'-the-wisp of the totalitarian superstates which may also—almost surely—lead to violence? How can America, "so enamored of its own material progress, and so admiring of its particular brand of private competitive enterprise, talk convincingly to peoples with different

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value systems and goals? How does a nation which has apparently mastered its major internal economic difficulties by economic expansion find something relevant to say to countries which are unable to solve their economic problems in this way, due to unfavorable historical circumstances?"

There is one question not fully considered in this report which deals particularly with the political part of "political economy". The question is, what will be the reaction of the American people to the steadily rising demand from foreign peoples for more and more help from the United States, when at the same time there is likely to be increasing anti-Americanism abroad as the masses of mankind become aware of their relative poverty and concentrate only on what they think we might do for them, disregarding the abundant aid we have provided the less well-developed countries of the world? The study group's report deals adequately with our economic limitations in respect to this question, but leaves unclear how we can cope with the explosive force of this political conundrum except in their general prescription of "rational understanding, the will to organize, and the sense of moral mission" if the United States is to realize a "successful and morally valid world leadership."

From the happy reintroduction of the term "political economy" into current use to the concluding forthright evaluation of three broad alternative courses of action for America, this book does great credit to its sponsoring organizations and its authors and renders a most valuable service to every American.

JOHN GANGE

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

Psychological Warfare. By PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER. Washington, Combat Forces Press, 1954.—xv, 318 pp. $6.00.

This work is the second edition of a history and analysis of psychological warfare, based on the field experiences of the author—a political analyst and an officer in the United States Army. The book is composed of four parts. Three are reprints from the earlier edition, while the fourth consists of new material on the period following World War II. An appendix provides details on military "PsyWar" operations connected with the Korean conflict, 1950–1953.

Part One treats the definition and history of psychological warfare. It opens with a lively and informative chapter of historical examples, ranging from biblical times through the Boer War. Chapters 2 through 4 present the author's views on the function, definition and limitations of psychological warfare. Chapters 5 and 6 contain a history of psychological warfare during World Wars I and II, respectively.

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Part Two contains three chapters on the analysis of enemy propaganda, the collection of propaganda intelligence, and the problems of deriving a military "estimate of the situation" in psychological warfare.

Part Three concerns practical problems in the planning and operation of propaganda. Two chapters deal with organization and planning and two focus on operations against civilians and troops, respectively.

Part Four, the new section, contains three chapters. Two describe the history of United States wartime and peacetime propaganda since the end of World War II. The third discusses research, development and the future.

The tone of this book is reflective and empirical rather than scholarly. The author himself describes the original edition as "the product of experience rather than research, of consultation rather than reading." And his second edition, "like the first, is the product of field experience." Within the limits of such an approach the author achieves a high level of interesting, informative and stimulating discussion. For example, the book brings to life, for the layman, such cryptic organizations as O.W.I., O.S.S., C.O.I., F.I.S., S.S.G., G-2, P.W.B., and M.I.S. It not only sorts them out for the reader, but also discusses their history, overlapping functions, formal and informal organizational structure, problems and solutions. Equally interesting and valuable are Linebarger's first-hand account and opinions on the political and technical difficulties involved in the planning and operation of psychological warfare. Here he documents his points abundantly with 79 photographs of propaganda devices which dramatize psychological warfare for the reader in a manner that few texts could achieve.

Nevertheless, it seems to this reviewer that the second edition of this work is subject to several criticisms which were not applicable to the original volume. These criticisms derive mainly from the fact that the revised work takes little account of other histories and researches in psychological warfare and propaganda which have been published during the six-year interim between the two editions. As an example of a neglected history, Lerner's excellent book *Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany, D-Day to VE-Day*, receives only a minor, although favorable, reference in an eighteen-line footnote to a chapter which has nothing to do with the history of World War II (p. 244). The need for a revision of Dr. Linebarger's views on psychological warfare would have been more compelling, to this reviewer, had such a revision incorporated and discussed these published views of Lerner and other experienced psychological warriors.

Equally desirable would have been a discussion of some of the post-war research on propaganda and mass persuasion. For example, the

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recent experiments in mass communication by Hovland and his associates might have been reviewed with reference to their implications for psychological warfare. Or, the earlier work of Herz on leaflets, or that of Shils and Janowitz on primary groups in the *Wehrmacht*, might have been useful for the reader. The need for a convenient discussion of such works is strikingly documented by Linebarger himself, who notes:

> . . . PsyWar being conducted by the United States Army in Korea showed little sign of having been influenced by developmental research into this field of activity. The leaflets were not better than the leaflets of World War II, nor even very different. . . .
>
> Developmental research had a great deal to offer, but the gap between initial scientific advance and practical military application appeared to be too broad to warrant the assumption that the research had transformed the U. S. PsyWar program. (p. 288)

Assuming that it is in the interests of national welfare to narrow this "gap between initial scientific advance and practical military application" it seems regrettable that Major Linebarger did not make the revision of his highly readable and popular volume the occasion for bringing some of this new research to the attention of his military and civilian colleagues who may be charged with the future of American propaganda.

CHARLES R. WRIGHT

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Rebels and Democrats: The Struggle for Equal Political Rights and Majority Rule During the American Revolution. By ELISHA P. DOUGLASS. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1955.—xiv, 368 pp. $5.00.

This is the story of the inner struggle for power which marked the American Revolution, of the effort of the radicals to obtain equal political rights and majority rule, and of the obstructions placed in their path by the conservatives. Mr. Douglass' succinct, balanced, and perceptive retelling of this story makes it clear that the Revolution was not fought to achieve democracy, but rather to win political independence. Nonetheless, the democratic and sectional forces, long-suffering discrimination, capitalized on the opportunities provided by new constitution-making to seek a redress of the political balance.

That the democratic forces were in the short run unsuccessful in every state save Pennsylvania and Georgia is tribute to the vigorous Revolutionary leadership of the Whig conservative forces and their awareness of the fundamental issues at stake. Mr. Douglass reminds us that it was the Whig conservatives, not the regulators in North Carolina or

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the back-country dissenters in Massachusetts, who took the lead in the movement toward independence. Only where the Whig élite seemed timorous and unwilling to move from protest to revolution did the democratic and back-country forces have any chance of seizing power. That was the case in Pennsylvania, where the conservatives had abdicated their political leadership, and to a lesser degree in Georgia, where the story still remains to be spelled out in more detail than it is in this book and where the democratic victory was by no means as clear-cut as in Pennsylvania.

Mr. Douglass gives us an especially illuminating picture of the back-country grievances of the regulators, although he tends to accept them at their face value. His lucid analysis of the discontents voiced by many Massachusetts town meetings and regional conventions and still buried in the archives of that state lays the foundation for any proper understanding of the still unresolved issues which called forth Shays's Rebellion.

The inner struggle for power which marked the politics of the Revolution was truly a conflict of ideologies, but in some respects the Whig conservatives held more-advanced views than did the radicals. The majoritarians, whose constitutional ideas were best expressed in the unicameral legislatures of Pennsylvania and Georgia, were not always liberal as judged by present-day standards. Back-country enthusiasts of the Great Awakening, they were by no means as ready to tolerate non-Protestant religious beliefs as were Deistically-minded Whig leaders. In fact some of the most revealing evidence in this book is that which indicates that left-wing Protestants of Pietist or evangelical inclinations were fundamentalists in outlook and often basically conservative on political issues. Nor did the majoritarians always act in democratic ways. Witness the shocking abuse of power by the radicals in Pennsylvania who established the Constitution by fiat and did not dare submit it to the people and actually required the people to take an oath to support the Constitution as a prequisite to exercising the franchise.

As for the Whig conservatives, their distrust of the masses is virtually identical with that of the Loyalists. Compare the attitude of that firebrand Patriot, James Otis, who observed, "When the pot boils, the scum will rise", with the royalist Governor Wright of Georgia, who found it "really terrible" that "a parcel of the lowest people" should "sport with other men's lives, liberties and properties." While the Whig republicans advocated confining the vote to those who had an economic stake in the community and favored a balanced government in which the executive would not be a figurehead, they also stood for certain basic human rights which were considered fundamental and not subject to change at the caprice of majority rule. Fortunately for the evolution

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of American democracy the principles of the Revolutionary Whigs and their democratic opponents were largely complementary to each other. Although almost everywhere the radicals were defeated in their efforts to seize the machinery of Revolution, the liberative effects of the war proved a deterrent to the kind of social revolution which would have enshrined class hatreds and ensured violent reaction.

RICHARD B. MORRIS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

A Whig Embattled: The Presidency under John Tyler. By ROBERT J. MORGAN. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1954.—xiii, 199 pp. $3.50.

When Arthur M. Schlesinger asked fifty-five distinguished American historians to rank the Presidents of the United States, there was general agreement that John Tyler belonged in the "below the average" category, those "poor without being wholly unfit." Robert J. Morgan, of the University of Nebraska, believes this appraisal unfair, and in the book under review he endeavors to prove that our Tenth President should "command admiration for his political courage, as well as respect for his honesty of conviction and personal dignity in office." Dr. Morgan claims that Tyler's accomplishments were considerable. Through repeated use of the veto power, which he regarded as the "great conservative principle of our system", the President defended the executive against legislative encroachment. Tyler dominated his cabinet and ousted secretaries who disagreed with him, reminding them: "I am the President, and I shall be held responsible for my administration." "Constrained to mimic Jackson in his legislative struggles with Congress," Tyler employed the executive prerogative with considerable skill, as in the Dorr Rebellion, where he adhered "to his principle of not extending unnecessarily the influence of the national government, while at the same time arriving at a solution based upon conciliation and compromise." In foreign relations Tyler's achievements "are outstanding among those of the early Presidents"; for with "a remarkable display of tenacity and single-mindedness, and a striking example of presidential leadership" he forced a hostile Congress to accept both the Webster-Ashburton treaty and the joint resolution annexing Texas.

Dr. Morgan admits that, along with his strength, Tyler had his weaknesses, which derived from his faulty view of the nature of the American Presidency rather than from personal deficiencies or political aspirations. As Chief Executive, he "considered it to be the President's function to inform, but not to lead, Congress." With only the negative goad

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of repeated veto messages, Congress pursued its own course. Nor could Tyler bring recalcitrant leaders in line through political pressure; for he was trying an experiment in "constitutional administration", a policy of looking "to the public good irrespective of either faction", of administering "the government for the best interests of the country, and trust[ing] the moderates of all parties to sustain us." The result, of course, was that "he failed utterly to build effective, organized partisan support for his administration" and was repudiated by both parties in the election of 1844.

This sober, thoughtful study is not a biography but a topical analysis of Tyler's "theory and practice in the Presidency". Lacking dramatic interest and color, it presumes a fairly detailed acquaintance with the political history of the Middle Period. Based chiefly upon official, printed sources, though with some good quotations from the Tyler manuscripts, Dr. Morgan's book is factually sound and accurate. Rather surprisingly, however, the author has not used C. M. Wiltse's *Calhoun*, which refutes the legend that Henry Wise brought Calhoun into Tyler's cabinet, or L. D. White's *The Jacksonians*, which perhaps appeared too recently for him to consult. Chiefly concerned with correctness of his hero's constitutional and administrative theories, Dr. Morgan rather understresses Tyler's political ineptness, for, in fact, it is hard to see that his administration really accomplished much. Still, *A Whig Embattled* is prejudiced in the right direction, and it should do a good deal to restore this neglected President to his rightful place in our history.

DAVID DONALD

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

America's Rise to World Power, 1898–1954. By FOSTER RHEA DULLES. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1955.—xviii, 314 pp. $5.00.

At the close of World War I, the late Professor John H. Latané published a small volume on American foreign policy entitled *From Isolation to Leadership*. In view of the events that quickly followed, the title proved not only premature but tragically ironic. Mr. Dulles might have given his book the same title, and with much better hope of its proving appropriate, for this volume in the new *American Nation Series* is the story of the half-century of advance, retreat, and advance again from nineteenth-century isolationism to the position of free-world leadership which the United States occupies today—a position which appears to have been accepted by the responsible leaders of both political parties and to have substantial popular support.

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Mr. Dulles is careful at the beginning to make clear what he means by isolationism. The United States, he remarks, has never been isolationist in the sense that Japan was isolationist before 1854. American isolationism, he points out, "has gone no further than an assertion of complete independence and a refusal to accept any foreign political commitments which might infringe upon the nation's full freedom of action." It is mainly over the making of such commitments in the interest of collective security that the battle has raged between isolationists and internationalists. In the face of traditional isolationism, all efforts of leaders like Presidents Roosevelt and Taft before World War I "to awaken the nation to a realization of what being a great power really meant" were futile. Wilson and the events of World War I effected a brief conversion, but the convert quickly backslid into the traditional attitude of aloofness from the rivalries and strife of Europe and Asia. In the late 1930's the threat of Axis world-domination aroused many, including Franklin D. Roosevelt, to the perils of aloofness, and the Pearl Harbor attack, in the words of Senator Vandenberg, "ended isolationism for any realist." Isolationism reared its head again after 1945 but, as Mr. Dulles assesses the situation, with little prospect of success.

This volume is not a history of United States foreign policy since 1898. It centers attention consistently upon one aspect of that policy—the contest over whether the United States should or should not accept the responsibilities appropriate to World-Power status. While Mr. Dulles makes every effort to portray fairly the arguments on both sides in the long debate, it is clear that he views the acceptance of international responsibilities as both inevitable and desirable. Perhaps simply for want of space, he provides no critical discussion of such controversial subjects as Wilson's conception of neutral rights or Franklin Roosevelt's "non-belligerency", and he appears to accept rather too uncritically the official justification of United States policy in such matters as the 1941 negotiations with Japan, the Yalta Conference, and the preliminaries of the Korean War. Presumably these topics will be treated in more detail and more critically in other volumes of the series, as Wilson's foreign policy has already been treated in Arthur S. Link's *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era*. While rather superficial in its treatment of the details of diplomacy, the Dulles volume is unusually good in its analysis of intellectual currents, of sectional and partisan attitudes, and of public opinion in general. It should be welcome for these features and for the clarity with which it presents the over-all trend. Nineteen pages of critical bibliography enhance its usefulness.

JULIUS W. PRATT

THE UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALO

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The Roosevelt Leadership, 1933–1945. By EDGAR EUGENE ROBINSON. Philadelphia and New York, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1955.—491 pp. $6.00.

Professor Robinson set himself the task, not of writing a biography of Franklin Roosevelt or a history of his administration, but rather of analyzing the nature and purpose of Roosevelt's leadership and its effects upon democratic government. In addition the author has written a highly useful essay at the close of the book on the published and unpublished material on the Roosevelt era. It is, to me, the most valuable portion of the book.

Mr. Robinson's conclusions on the nature and purpose of Roosevelt's leadership and its effects upon democratic government are best stated on page 14: "When he ceased to lead, the effect of his years in power was manifested in a weakened Constitutional system, in imperiled national security, in diminished national morale, in deteriorated political morality, and in an overburdened economy."

I think there is little doubt that Mr. Robinson tried to write a book without partisanship. He is far too balanced to accept the extreme statements of the "hate Roosevelt" group. On the other hand, his own view of the powers of the presidential office, his suspicion of, if not distrust of, the masses, and his evident association of the word "elite" just with business men and experts (never clearly defined) lead him to write what can be described as history from the patrician point of view. In analyzing the Democratic victory in 1932, for instance, he stresses that the Democrats formulated a program that was based upon the challenge of widespread distress, upon promises of reformers of the past, and upon using President Hoover as a scapegoat. "In taking this road and securing the mandate of the people to follow it," he writes on page 74, "Democratic leaders were not utilizing the advances that had been made toward more effective government. They said merely, in effect, 'let the people rule, for the people have been thwarted by evil, immoral, and selfish interests who have sought to govern the United States for the benefit of a minority. Let the majority take possession of its household.'"

Frequently, during this study Mr. Robinson compares Roosevelt to Hoover. In almost every case Hoover emerges favorably almost to the degree of an apologia while Roosevelt appears as an evil politician, sometimes making the author sound quite unintentionally, I am sure, like the writer of the Republican party platform. Mr. Robinson, from his past studies like *They Voted for Roosevelt*, knows that politics is an essential ingredient in a democracy. Yet, it is puzzling to read from his pen that Franklin Roosevelt "might be expected to play politics to win"

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the Democratic nomination of 1932. Why should he not have? And, one might add, Roosevelt did not "play politics", he was a master of the art! Too little attention is given in this book to Roosevelt's skill in building the Democratic party into the majority party of the nation. Certainly one should expect a book on the leadership of Roosevelt to contain at least a chapter on the presidential leadership that brought about this basic shift in American political power.

It would be great fun and no doubt profitable to discuss many statements in this book with the author. He uses the word "radical" with great frequency but seldom with perceptive definition. Can he really defend: (1) the statement on page 17 that the American masses have always been "radical in outlook and aspiration, though infrequently in action"; or (2) on page 404 that Mr. Roosevelt refused "to take the stand for a distinctively American approach to the basic problem of capitalism. No political program that emerged in the Roosevelt administration was distinctly the expression of the American tradition"; or (3) on page 400 that the Roosevelt Revolution "consisted in the complete shift of the American view of the role of government. *Government* under Roosevelt, and particularly the Executive, was to be all powerful"? Earlier in the book the author points out how the Populists, Bryan, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson and a host of others contributed to the New Deal. Certainly these ideas from the Progressive Era were as American as Hoover's and they represented a shift before Roosevelt's presidency in the attitude of the American people toward the rôle of the government in the economy. It seems to me that Ernest K. Lindley in *The Roosevelt Revolution* (1933) came closer to the point when he wrote, "The Roosevelt Revolution is democracy trying to create out of American materials an economic system which will work with reasonable satisfaction to the great majority of citizens."

The author presents many shrewd insights into Franklin Roosevelt and his leadership in the hectic years from 1933 to 1945. I am not persuaded, however, that the material presented in the book leads to such conclusions—really overstatements—as the quotations already cited or to such statements on page 374 as "In truth, the office of President had been altered beyond recognition as Mr. Roosevelt exercised the powers of a dictator", or "contemporary democracy was adrift in a sea of uncertainty, because for a dozen years the issues had been blurred and the basis for definite and positive judgment weakened." It is hard for me to agree that President Roosevelt left the country in such bad shape as Mr. Robinson obviously feels. In spite of Roosevelt's weaknesses—his oversimplifying of many issues, his love of a "devil" to belabor, his scorn of the foreign service, and his too easy playing of hunches—he made

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two vastly significant contributions to American life. He helped to adjust capitalism to democracy—what Frederick Lewis Allen has described so well in *The Big Change*—and he helped the American people to rise to the responsibility of world leadership.

WALTER JOHNSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Conservatism in America. By CLINTON ROSSITER. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1955.—327, xii pp. $4.00.

The basis for this interesting work might be found in one part of a sentence in the Introduction: ". . . conservatism is one of the most confusing words in the glossary of political thought and oratory." Mr. Rossiter, therefore, sets himself the task of discovering what the true American conservative is. In general, the conservative "is committed to a discriminating defense of the social order against change and reform." The conservative "insists that it [change] be sure-footed and respectful of the past." "He is pessimistic, though not always darkly so, about the possibilities of reform, and his natural preferences are for stability over change, continuity over experiment, the past over the future. The essential difference between conservatism and liberalism is one of mood and bias." The author then examines American conservatism from 1607 to 1933. From this examination he concludes that the period before the Civil War gave us more true conservatism than the period after it, when conservatism was popularly linked with the ideas of plutocracy and individualistic capitalism. He wants us to understand that real conservatism has nothing to do with standpattism, reaction, or the Right-wing Republicanism of Colonel McCormick or Senator McCarthy. The ideological father of conservatism is Edmund Burke, translated to fit the ideas of American democracy, industrial progress, and technical know-how.

For some years people have been saying that what we need in this country is a sound and intelligent philosophy of conservatism. It was commonly pointed out that Walter Lippmann walked the path of real conservatism almost alone. These past regrets for the tragic lacunae in our political thinking need no longer haunt us. Whether it is owing to that periodic swing of the political pendulum from active reform administration to the more quiescent "consolidation of gains" administration or to some other cause or causes less obvious, the prevailing mood is one of conservatism, progressive conservatism, or conservative progressivism. This mood has brought a host of writers, some quite young and able, who have set themselves the task of delineating the fundamental philosophy of the new conservatism.

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Normally, the reader of their works may find himself either elated over his status, completely depressed, or utterly confused. Since with most of these writers the genuine conservative is both the ideal man and the ideal citizen, the reader tries to fit himself into the very respectable pattern drawn of the conservative or, not being able to fit himself into the pattern, feels himself cast into the outer darkness or, finding parts of the pattern that fit and parts that do not, concludes that he has been living in an ideological state of anarchy. While Mr. Rossiter also draws us a picture of the ideal man (who is incidentally the real conservative) he very realistically gives us the sins and temptations that dog the footsteps of the conservative and even brutally in one chapter shows us how far modern conservatives fall from the ideal. And, after all, we have to admit that the corruption of the best is always the worst.

It is true that liberals, and young men in a hurry generally, have in the immediate past given evidence of being pragmatists in the worst sense of that term. What was morally true in 1950 could not, so it would seem with most of them, be true in 1955. They were, and many still are, moral relativists every hour on the hour and vehement dogmatists every hour on the half-hour. Now the conservative, Mr. Rossiter points out, has deep regard for unchanging moral standards. This leaves the liberal and others of his like with either no morality or a morality so indeterminate that it is here today and gone tomorrow. Most liberals, obviously, are very humane and as moral as any middle-class Victorian. They are much better than their muddle-headed moral philosophy, as most conservatives are not quite so good as their inimitable standards.

Most conservatives, says Mr. Rossiter, are Christians and "prefer to call the motivation for iniquitous and irrational behavior by its proper name: Original Sin." What is this doctrine? "Man's nature is essentially immutable, and the immutable strain is one of deep-seated wickedness." As a description of the doctrine of Original Sin, many Christians (many conservative Christians) would call this a Calvinistic heresy. If conservatism is to have a theological base—as everything having to do with fundamental existence must—conservative apologists should be correct in their theology. Conservatism as a political philosophy also requires a pretty thorough knowledge of traditionalist philosophy, particularly of the Aristotelian natural-law school. And on this most social scientists are not accurately informed.

Mr. Rossiter's approach is moderate and reasonable. It provides a good examination of conscience for conservative and liberal alike.

JEROME G. KERWIN

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Commerces et marchands de Toulouse (vers 1350–vers 1450). By PHILIPPE WOLFF. Paris, Librairie Plon, 1954.—xxxii, 710 pp.

Mr. Wolff has written a large and detailed monograph, replete with maps, statistical charts and plans. Its size presents a problem. In today's haste, one either reads or writes. There is not time for both. Being a "human adventure", as Mr. Wolff calls it, however, a book must be taken seriously and read word by word. Duty is not always pleasure, but it turns out to be in this case. It is the human, perhaps even the incidental, that first catches the reader's eye and that brings him close both to the book and to medieval man. We admire the humble Bearnese carter who came to town and amassed a fortune in twenty-five years. We smile at the soap merchant who engaged a university clerk "to instruct himself and his son in science and good mores." We are reminded of man's brief comedy by the merchant family of Najac that rose to play the rôle of gentlefolk. First seen in 1377, they attain the pinnacle of success upon being ennobled in 1412. Impoverished by 1450, they then sink quickly into obscurity. Mr. Wolff's pages are crowded with human aspirations, human failures and successes.

Once caught up, the reader searches for the reasons why this study begins and ends where it does. As the title shows, this is the business history of a modest-sized French town during the Hundred Years' War. As many books do nowadays, this one reminds us that this was a period of crisis, of depopulation and of economic collapse. Toulouse enters this age with five bridges across the Garonne, and leaves it with only one. But, unlike so many modern authors, Mr. Wolff shows us the advantage of this time of troubles, illustrating the inventiveness induced by adversity. He comments on the increasingly intelligent growth of state fiscal policies. He remarks upon the artisan's technical inventiveness, notably in the foundry of cannon. And, regarding the famous Bazacle mills, he stresses the intellectual advances in business techniques, such as the start of a concept of limited liability. In short, his picture of the late Middle Ages is unusually well balanced. Not only is there collapse; there are also repair and innovation.

Mr. Wolff's study is built upon fresh researches in the archives of Toulouse. This is its greatest virtue. It is also its one element of narrowness. At times, his book could use fuller treatment of secondary works relating to analogous institutions and subjects. Moreover, more systematic treatment built around analogy could be given to the rôle of the state. This is not only caused by lack of time and by a scholar's need to make unhappy choices. It is also a question of intellectual commitment. The historical humanism of Marc Bloch which inspires

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this work has great strengths; but it also has some weaknesses. In its realization of the meaningfulness for history of each individual's passion, it tends to neglect the institutions which bind individuals into groups and communities.

Nowhere can this mixture of grand virtue and minor vice be more clearly seen than in Mr. Wolff's treatment of usury. He neglects to use or even to mention useful secondary treatises on this subject. Nevertheless, his social humanism prevents him from making the errors so common in recent analysis of medieval economy. While recording many examples of fraudulent contracts, while telling that the archiepiscopal court largely busied itself in excommunicating recalcitrant debtors, Mr. Wolff is quite aware that the church's regulation of usury was meaningful for Toulousan business. Nor does he go to the other extreme. He reminds us of the money-changer Jacques de Saint-Antonin who gave pious legacies from the wealth "that God has furnished him, and that, with the aid of God, he has gained in this world."

In short, Mr. Wolff's is a solid and honest book, written with humanity and detailed knowledge. It is even more to be praised when we remember the extraordinary difficulty of collecting and even of reading the archival materials which the author has set before us.

JOHN H. MUNDY

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Renaissance Diplomacy. By GARRETT MATTINGLY. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1955.—323 pp. $6.00.

Among the many changes that marked the transition from medieval to modern civilization, one of the most fundamental was the break up of the *Respublica Christiana* and the rise in its place of those modern Leviathans, the sovereign states of Europe. This was an event of epoch-making importance, not only for political and constitutional history, but also for the history of European morality. It involved abandonment of the medieval conception of membership in a universal society subject to common laws, and its replacement by the basic axiom, to quote Professor Mattingly, "that the State is sovereign, subject to no exterior controls and amenable mainly to consideration of its own self-interest" (p. 294). Between the world of Thomas Aquinas and the world of Thomas Hobbes a great gulf was fixed, and into that gulf had slipped the concepts of public law and public morality by which, however frequently honored in the breach, medieval Europe had striven to guide its conduct.

That this was so becomes increasingly clear when we turn from the well-trodden paths of political history to the less frequently explored

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by-way through which Mr. Mattingly here serves as a genial guide. Diplomacy was one of the essential functions of the new kind of state, which appeared first in Renaissance Italy and later spread in modified form throughout the rest of Europe, a function as essential as the standing army and one used for much the same purpose. Anyone who has followed the complex story of either the internal or external policies of the major states in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has become aware of the part played by that novel phenomenon, the resident ambassador, but relatively little attention has been paid hitherto to the formation of diplomatic institutions and practices, nor to the theories by which men of good will sought to rationalize an office and a function as unprecedented in character as the states they served. This soundly based study of the origins of European diplomacy during the Renaissance will fill in a lacuna in most students' knowledge of this crucial period. It is a wise as well as a scholarly book and written, moreover, in clear and cogent prose.

While keeping his eye firmly fixed on his special subject, Mr. Mattingly is careful throughout to set the developing practices and theories of diplomacy in their proper framework of international or interdynastic politics. Not the least valuable part of his work is the running commentary on the power politics of the Italian states after the Peace of Lodi, the dynastic rivalries of the period that opened with the invasions of Italy, the wars of religion, and, finally, the formation of a heterogeneous and precariously balanced state system after the Peace of Westphalia when "the period of modern diplomacy really begins" (p. 207). The final chapter on the hesitant evolution of a "law among nations" to replace the ancient *jus gentium* is a fitting epilogue to the book. I found the chapter on the wars of religion particularly interesting, with its thoughtful analysis of the disastrous effect upon European diplomacy of an ideological conflict. In such a conflict ambassadors are prone to forget that their traditional function is to make peace, and they may become in fact "ambassadors of ill-will" whose principal activity is espionage and subversion. There is a timely appositeness in Mr. Mattingly's comment: "Successful diplomatic negotiations require that the parties involved can at least imagine a mutually satisfactory settlement, that neither assumes that the only permanent solution is the total destruction of the other. As long as the conflicts between states are about prestige or profit or power, grounds of agreement are always accessible to sane men. But the clash of ideological absolutes drives diplomacy from the field" (p. 196).

WALLACE K. FERGUSON

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

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Members of the Long Parliament. By D. BRUNTON and D. H. PENNINGTON. Introduction by R. H. Tawney. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954.—xxi, 256 pp. $4.25.

The Long Parliament, 1640–1641: A Biographical Study of Its Members. By MARY FREAR KEELER. Philadelphia, The American Philosophical Society, 1954.—ix, 410 pp. $6.00.

In the past two or three years there has appeared a spate of solid studies of various subjects bearing on the English Revolution that began about 1640: Haller's splendid study of revolution Puritanism, Stearns's fine biography of Hugh Peter, Trevor-Roper's reëxamination of the problem of the gentry, the first lively volume of C. V. Wedgwood's history of the revolution, and the two works here reviewed. Diverse in focus of interest and method, all six books nevertheless impinge on a great historical question—*why* was the English Revolution?

Brunton and Pennington's *Members of the Long Parliament* and Mary F. Keeler's *The Long Parliament, 1640–1641* inevitably invite comparison since they approach the great question by the same route—an investigation of the personnel of the Parliament, whose doings precipitated the revolution. The two works differ greatly in length. Brunton and Pennington's book contains about 250 pages of moderate size, Mrs. Keeler's 400 double-columned giants. Mrs. Keeler's pages are mainly devoted to the individual biographies of the original members of the Long Parliament up to 1642. That she was able to dig up considerable information on these nearly 550 men, most of them obscure back-benchers three centuries dead, is a miracle of erudition. The biographical register is preceded by a study of the parliamentary elections of 1640–1642, constituency by constituency, and both are prefaced by a "Portrait of a Parliament". It is in this last section that Mrs. Keeler's work overlaps that of Brunton and Pennington both in purpose and in method. The purpose is to discover, if possible, the springs of action that set the revolutionary Parliament on its course; the method is a statistical investigation of the entire membership of the Parliament. In their researches Brunton and Pennington include the "recruiters", the men elected between 1645 and 1648 to fill the places left open by death and by the defection of a large number of the members to the Royalist cause. They also include fairly detailed supplementary studies of two special areas, the Eastern Association and the Southwest.

At the point where the statistical categories investigated in the two books coincide, the results with a single exception are mutually confirming. With respect to number of members, number of Royalists and Roundheads, number of lawyer and merchant members, age grouping, prior

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parliamentary experience, and education, the figures arrived at in the two studies do not diverge by more than 5 per cent. Only with respect to the allegiance of the merchant members is there a distinct difference; for Brunton and Pennington find very few more merchants among the Roundhead members than among the Cavaliers, while Mrs. Keeler asserts that three fourths of the merchant members were Roundheads. Since it is not hard ordinarily to decide whether a member lined up with the King or with the rebels, the similar figures suggested in the two books for the number of merchants must conceal an actual difference of opinion as to who in fact were merchants in the Long Parliament. For this difference there may be two causes: (1) Mrs. Keeler's detailed biographical researches may have turned up more provincial merchants than Brunton and Pennington discovered; (2) her classifications "courtier" and "government official" may have caught up a number of men, classified by Brunton and Pennington as merchants, who made their money in projects controlled through court favor.

The common outcome of the two studies, independently executed, is no less remarkable for being negative: *as between Parliamentarian and Royalist members of the House of Commons the differences in social status, education, and parliamentary experience are insignificant and wholly insufficient to account for their ultimate party alignment in the Civil War.* Barring the difficult and uncertain case of the merchants, previously referred to, rank and social class seem to show the least variation of all. In any case, however the merchants outside Parliament lined up, the merchants inside were too few and of too little prestige to direct or even seriously to affect the course taken by either faction. In fact the House was overwhelmingly the preserve of the gentry. At least 450 of the 550 men returned in 1640–1641 were gentry or sons of gentry, and of this minimum of 450 a minimum of 411 had fathers who were gentlemen, esquires, knights, baronets, or lords. In other words for about 75 per cent of the members gentility was not an acquisition but an inheritance. Except for the presence among the Royalists of a higher proportion of the sons of peers there is no discernible difference in status between the gentry of the two parties in Parliament. Mrs. Keeler has made a separate study of the wealth of the members which seems to indicate that there was little economic difference either. That study suggests the tentative conclusion that the vast majority of members on both sides of the struggle varied from well-to-do to very rich. For the theory that the conflict of social classes or the clash of economic interests was of major consequence in precipitating the English Revolution the study of the personnel of Parliament offers no support. And if the "rising urban middle class" of textbook fame made the revolution, it certainly did not do it through

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the politically divided and politically unimportant business men that comprised a bare 10 per cent of the membership of the House.

If the two books on the personnel of the Long Parliament served only to cast doubt on a number of theories, frequently stated and never verified, about the relation of class structure to the onset and the outcome of the English Revolution, they would fully justify themselves. Actually they serve to confirm the importance of two lines of cleavage which for reasons difficult to discern Mrs. Keeler refers to only casually and Brunton and Pennington scarcely mention. They are the rifts that from the last days of Elizabeth opened ever wider between Anglican and Puritan, court and country. For, regardless of age, status, education and income, by and large the members of the House who became Royalists did not favor extensive changes in the established church, and by and large the members who became Parliamentarians did favor such changes. And since it is impossible to draw a social or economic line to distinguish between Cavalier and Roundhead, it may be well to conceive that men can be brought to the verge of revolution by divergence of feeling about the nature, the destiny and the whole duty of man.

Unfortunately neither Brunton and Pennington nor Mrs. Keeler organized their evidence to make clear the growing division between court and country. The evidence nevertheless is there, and its implications are easy to see when one compares the Long Parliament with one from the middle of Elizabeth's reign. In contrast to what happened in 1584 the attempts to find places in the Long Parliament for men well inclined to the court met with catastrophic failure. While the number of courtiers and officials in the House declined by one half from 1584 to 1640, the borough seats became a near-monopoly of the neighboring gentry. And it was that part of the gentry that had already showed its distaste for the court by resisting and sabotaging royal authority in the country which became the solid core of the Parliamentarian faction. And the original nucleus of the King's party in Parliament was made up of courtiers, royal officials and sons of peers—the men, that is, who stood closest to the economic and moral emanations of the court.

Yet while the breach between court and country, Puritan and Anglican, had grown dangerously in the preceding two decades, few of the very substantial men who made up the Long Parliament thought that breach irreparable or desired to widen it. There is much wisdom, based on long study, in Mrs. Keeler's conclusion:

> Although a considerable number [of the members] had gained prominence in resisting Stuart policies, the views of most on politics and even on religion were in 1640 set on no predetermined goal except the securing of relief from the parts of the king's program which had been most irri-

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tating. Loyal . . . at the start . . . they might have wrought their changes wisely and in a fashion that the majority in any party would have preferred to war. But the blind obstinacy of the king and his intimates, their attempts to halt the progress of the Parliament, and the increasing bitterness that developed in the House regarding religion and the means of controlling the king, hastened the break that could not be repaired.

J. H. HEXTER

QUEENS COLLEGE

Assignment to Catastrophe. Vol. I: *Prelude to Dunkirk, July 1939–May 1940.* Vol. II: *The Fall of France, June 1940.* By MAJOR-GENERAL SIR EDWARD SPEARS. New York, A. A. Wyn, Inc., 1954 and 1955.—xv, 332; xviii, 333 pp. $5.00 each.

Sir Edward Spears is known to students of the First World War as a British officer who served on liaison duties with the French Army and had the ability and wit to write good books about it afterwards—notably *Liaison, 1914.* In the Second World War he had even greater opportunities, and he has not muffed them. The two volumes of *Assignment to Catastrophe* are an important contribution to our knowledge of the collapse of the Third Republic and the Anglo-French alliance in 1940, and are extremely good reading to boot.

In 1939 Spears was a back-bench Conservative M.P., an admirer of Churchill, a member of the "Eden Group", a hater of Munich. On May 8, 1940, he voted against Chamberlain in the division that brought down the government—a "very painful" occasion which he describes in moving terms. On May 22 the new Prime Minister sent him to France as his personal representative to Paul Reynaud. From then until June 17, when he took off from Bordeaux for England, carrying with him in his plane, as Churchill said, "the honour of France" in the person of General de Gaulle, he was at the center of events. On May 25, when for the first time he attended a meeting of the French War Committee, he started keeping a diary, and it is clear that he has been able to consult the official papers he wrote at the time. With respect to earlier events, and events with which he was not himself connected, he is sometimes inaccurate and unfair, and occasionally sinks to the level of gossip; but he is a firsthand witness to the death-throes of the republic, and his narrative is a significant source for those dramatic events. It includes detailed accounts of many of the important conferences. By it we can check the apologias of some of the French defeatists—especially Weygand and Baudouin, to whom Spears pays his respects in forthright terms. Occasionally he even takes it on himself to correct Churchill on a point

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of detail. And his descriptions are pungent. "'What was the situation when you left General Blanchard?' asked Reynaud crisply. In the voice of a seasick passenger asking a passing steward for a basin, Commandant Fauvelle said: 'I believe in a very early capitulation.'"

The book is full of personal portraits. Churchill and Reynaud are the chief; there are many striking glimpses of the former, and a sympathetic portrayal of the latter. Madame de Portes appears from time to time; Spears had no doubt of her sinister influence on events. Georges Mandel, the Jewish patriot who paid for his patriotism with his life, is powerfully depicted. Spears's account of his own long interview with Marshal Pétain on June 6 (the object of which was to seek to prevail on him to restrain Weygand from "blackguarding England and everything British on all occasions") leaves no doubt of the old man's childishness; he was a dotard, not a plotter. There are also pictures of many lesser actors in the drama.

One thing General Spears does not succeed in doing, or indeed attempt to do. He knew France well in inter-war days, and defended French policy to such an extent that he was sometimes called "the Member for Paris". For him the moral and military collapse of 1940 was doubly tragic. He describes it as few other witnesses have done or could do, but he does not explain it. Perhaps that would be a task for a psychologist rather than for a mere student of affairs. But no one can read his book without realizing that the real causes are not to be sought on the battlefield alone. The roots of the French disaster lay very deep, and much examination of the history of the twenty years before 1939 will be required before they are fully laid bare.

C. P. STACEY

ARMY HEADQUARTERS
OTTAWA, CANADA

The Death of Hitler's Germany. By GEORGES BLOND. Translated by Frances Frenaye. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1954.—vi, 302 pp. $4.50.

Hitler and his cohorts used to threaten that if their Thousand Year Reich ever went down, all Germany would go down with it; and the subject of M. Blond's book (translated from the original French *L'agonie de l'Allemagne 1944–1945*, Paris, 1953) is the last and most dreadful year of the Nazi tyranny—1944–1945—when Hitler's prophecy came so very close to being realized.

Blond begins in July 1944, when to all intents and purposes the Nazis had lost the war, when the Soviets were moving relentlessly upon Berlin, and the great conspiracy against Hitler—the Plot of July 20—was heading

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toward its fateful and futile climax. From there Blond moves in almost strict chronological order through the continuing German disasters in the fall of 1944, the fiendishly clever and almost successful Ardennes counter-offensive in December 1944, and finally on to the very last months and weeks of the war—to Hitler's suicide and the surrender at Rheims. What dramatic times, these! And the chief virtue, perhaps, of M. Blond's account is the effectiveness with which he re-creates this drama, the power and tension he generates on almost every page. His book abounds, too, in direct quotations, all without documentation, and often so vivid as to make one think that at least a few of them are slightly less than completely factual. But no matter: *The Death of Hitler's Germany* is not intended as the last historical pronouncement upon the subject.

Everything is seen as through German eyes: it is almost as if the reader were most of the time located right in the Führer's (or some other military) headquarters, with regular "flashes" to the front to see how the German armies there are faring—a most effective method of presentation, if also, at times, somewhat restrictive a form.

Blond's book, as already indicated, is devoted chiefly to military events. It says little or nothing about such aspects of the Nazis' last year as the dreadful intensification of the Gestapo terror, the development of the resistance movement after July 20, the reaction of the population at large to the approaching defeat. (There has been much study, by the Strategic Bombing Survey, for instance, of the effect of mass air attacks but no comparable studies have yet been made of such subjects as the German civilian and military reaction to the now much-questioned "Unconditional Surrender" policy.) As 1944 gave way to 1945, and the defeat of the Nazis became inescapably clear to all but their die-hard followers, what did most Germans think or want to do? What in fact could they have done? Could there have been, as was occasionally suggested in this country at the time, a revolution in Germany in early 1945—the kind of cataclysmic upheaval Germany had never undergone before? Indeed is it possible for the people of a totalitarian state to rise against their masters, even at the very moment these are being overthrown by military action from the outside?

M. Blond is not a professional historian, and none of these questions is asked, much less answered, in his book. Yet these are some of the most interesting and important problems in recent European history, and likely to occupy scholars and seminars, here and abroad, for a long time to come.

FRANCIS L. LOEWENHEIM

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Toward Our Common American Destiny. By John M. Cabot. Medford, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1955.—xvii, 214 pp. $3.50.

This volume by President Eisenhower's first Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs is a collection of speeches and interviews given by Mr. Cabot during the thirteen months he was in that office. A career diplomat who had served in six Latin-American countries, Mr. Cabot showed in these speeches a wide and sympathetic understanding of the changes which are under way in Latin America. He correctly attributed many of the problems facing these countries to "growing pains" and several times expresses great optimism about their future. The volume might make worth-while reading for some of those Latin Americans who are so concerned with the weight of immediate problems that they do not often have the time or the inclination to step back and take a broader view of the real progress which their nations are making.

Much in this volume is repetitive. However, several of the chapters are worth special comment. Chapter X, which is a speech made to a group of students of the Canadian War College, is one of the best general statements of the problems now facing Latin America—economic, social and political—and the background of these problems, which this reviewer has ever seen. Chapters VI and VIII concerning technical aid and capital aid for the development of the Latin-American economies are full of wisdom and good sense. Chapter XVI, entitled "Why Diplomats Don't Behave Like Human Beings", is a reasoned but amusing explanation of the ills which diplomats suffer and a plea for more consideration from the general public and most particularly from Congress.

The burden of Mr. Cabot's argument is that "our problems in our Inter-American relations are largely economic". He is well aware of the complex economic and social revolution through which Latin America is passing and feels that the United States should, through a program of wide and judicious economic aid, place itself on the side of this revolution. It would be foolhardy, he stresses, for the United States to appear to be blocking this necessary transformation of Latin-American society. The Communists are constantly picturing us as doing so and, he says, we must make sure that this charge has no basis.

Although dubious about a "Marshall Plan for Latin America", Cabot while Assistant Secretary was in favor of an expansion of lending activities by the Export-Import Bank and other United States agencies, and was enthusiastic about Point Four. Both of these points of view are reflected many times in this volume. He is not against private foreign investment, but he recognizes its limitations. He realizes that some

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of its sins of the past have lately been coming home to roost; and that with the heightened nationalism of the Latin-American countries, those countries are not willing to allow certain key segments of their economies to be in the hands of outsiders.

If economic aid for Latin America is one of the fundamental ideas put forward by Mr. Cabot in this book, non-intervention is another. Many times he emphasizes that the United States cannot impose democracy on the Latin-American countries by openly intervening in their affairs. With this, this reviewer would agree, but that is not the end of the problem. He does not deal with the question of the attitude of positive approval and approbation which the United States government has too often taken toward particular Latin-American dictators. He himself in several passages in this book is more sympathetic toward Perón than one would like.

This is a serious work, the expression of the point of view of one who was an important policy-maker in United States foreign affairs. It is worthy of serious attention from both scholars and men of affairs interested in in United States relations with Latin America.

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER

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BOOK NOTES

All students of Russian history will warmly greet the appearance of *The Mind of Modern Russia: Historical and Political Thought of Russia's Great Age* (New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1955; xii, 298 pp. $5.50), edited by Professor Hans Kohn of the City College of New York. In his latest contribution to European intellectual history, Professor Kohn has focused upon Russian historical and political thought in the nineteenth century, which he adjudges to be Russia's "great age". He chooses to begin, not with the Decembrists or even earlier figures, but with the crucial appraisal offered by Chaadayev, and he sees an end put to the "great age" by the Bolshevik Revolution. The fundamental, although not the only, problem developed throughout the book is the relationship of Russia to the West. Underlying this question was the common belief of Slavophiles and Westernizers alike that profound differences existed between Russia and the rest of Europe. To illumine this problem, the editor has offered the testimony of fifteen Slavs, of which thirteen are Russian—Chaadayev, Pogodin, Tyuchev, A. S. Khomyakov, Ivan Aksakov, Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, Herzen, Danilevsky, Solovev, Lenin, Berdyayev, and Fedotov. In what seems to this reviewer an unnecessary, albeit interesting, departure from the otherwise "all-Russian" authorship of the selections, Professor Kohn has included passages by the Polish poet Mickiewicz and the Czech journalist Havlíček. These famous Slavs function as protestants against the notion of Russian hegemony in the Slavic world. Less arbitrary might have been the inclusion of a Ukrainian critic of Great Russianism. Doubtless, many readers will regret the omission of such thinkers as Leontyev, Plekhanov, and Pobedonostsev. It can also be maintained that advocates of constitutionalism, as represented in part by the Decembrists, Speransky, the Tver liberals, and Milyukov, do not get a fair hearing. To be sure, such figures for the most part either lacked the brilliance and originality characteristic of the editor's choices or did not treat significantly the Europe-Russia theme, which dominates the volume. Moreover, the editor, in his excellent introduction and in his explanatory remarks at the beginning of each chapter, gives a great deal of information about many other Russian and Slavic thinkers who, for considerations of space, could not be given a forum. It is quite clear that the editor is prepared to see not only a persistence of *differences* between Russian

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and non-Russian Europe but also to emphasize the *continuity* between Russian and Soviet attitudes. In a few cases, it would appear that some violence has been done to the word "Slavophile" in an effort to relate Stalinism to Russia's heritage. For example, it is suggested that the "democratic autocracy" of the Slavophiles was the political arrangement "which Stalin in a slightly disguised form tried to establish as a reality" (p. 108). Certainly the autocracy favored by the Slavophiles was quite remote from the totalitarianism of the Soviet state. Elsewhere, it would seem that Slavophilism is too loosely equated with nationalism in general, and that consequently the contrast between the Slavophiles' Christian universalism and the chauvinism of the Pan-Slavs may be blurred. All in all, once again we are indebted to Professor Kohn for a serviceable book of high merit.—KERMIT E. MCKENZIE, Columbia University.

One of the thorniest problems which face authors of general books about Latin America is that of cutting across the national histories of twenty countries whose diversity is always a surprise to the uninitiate. This problem is deftly solved by William Lytle Schurz in *This New World: The Civilization of Latin America* (New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1954; xii, 429 pp. $6.00). Mr. Schurz's chapter on "The Brazilian" is the only one that he devotes to a regional or national unit, and it constitutes recognition which Latin America's largest and most populous country, with its distinctive Portuguese heritage, well deserves. Of the remaining nine chapters, three are concerned with the setting and institutions (physical environment, the church and the city), and six deal with human types (the Indian, the Spaniard, the conqueror, the Negro, the foreigner and the woman). Although it is primarily an introduction to Latin America, and although it proffers no original interpretations, this book will reward even the specialist. The writing has fluency and charm, while the material which Mr. Schurz presents seems fresh even when familiar. This freshness is attributable to his having gone diligently to source materials and to modern interpretive studies, generous and colorful excerpts from which are quoted in his footnotes. The patient interweaving of data and impressions from firsthand accounts allows a constant juxtaposing of details concerning the many regions of Latin America as well as its various historical eras. The unity thus achieved, however, is of a mosaic rather than of a structural character. The most illuminating chapters are not necessarily those which utilize the largest numbers of chroniclers' notes. They are, rather, ones such as that on environment, informed by the author's own extensive travels

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through the jungles and on the rivers of the Amazon basin, and by his own felt response to the extravagance of South American geography; or the chapter on the Spaniard, which capitalizes on the sophisticated insights of such writers as Madariaga, Havelock Ellis, Menéndez Pidal and Ortega y Gasset. His greater reliance in other chapters upon eye-witness narratives sometimes makes his own account choppy and inhibits him from interpretation and synthesis. To cavil further, however, would be ungracious. Mr. Schurz claims to have done no more than to follow his own broad interests, with no attempt at exhaustiveness or systematization. He sees Latin America with a widely experienced, sympathetic and unclouded eye. He assures us that the Aztecs, conquistadors, missionaries and *autos de fe* are an indispensable background for the modern scene, and presses his point with a wealth of lively vignettes and knowledgeable impressions. The reader will look far for a more felicitous introduction to our southern neighbors.—RICHARD M. MORSE, Columbia University.

It is the expressed purpose of Albert Salomon's essay, *The Tyranny of Progress: Reflections on the Origins of Sociology* (New York, The Noonday Press, 1955; 115 pp. $3.00), to show that there are "strong connections" between the thought of Saint-Simon and Comte and "the modern phenomenon of totalitarianism". Toward this end, the ideas of these men are examined in some detail. Along the way, there are taken up also, at varying length, the ideas of de Tocqueville, Burckhardt, Marx, Turgot, Montesquieu, Diderot, Condorcet, de Bonald, Hegel, de Maistre, Durkheim, Lenin, Scheler, Weber, Proudhon, Schlegel, Bakunin, Goethe, Spencer, and others. This is, then, primarily, an essay in intellectual history. "It is clear", says Salomon (p. 16), "that one cannot overestimate the role of ideas in social and political life." Although the argument is not always easy to follow, Salomon seems to be saying that the emphasis on societal order, on authority, on hierarchy, on the belief in progress, and on the worship of science in the thought of Saint-Simon and Comte somehow contributed to the rise of modern totalitarianism. The specific connections between these several new emphases and contemporary totalitarian societies, however, are never established. Instead, a set of shifting and shifty metaphors, that do not begin to explain these connections between ideas and the other elements in society, is employed. The fault is no greater than in much of that kind of intellectual history characterized by a strong intellectualistic bias, but it is here nonetheless. Mr. Salomon's moral animus in this essay is a noble one. He proclaims the worth of the individual. He despises the hierarchical control of totalitarian society. He feels "we

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can secure the continuity of our social and intellectual worlds as conservative reformists" (p. 105) rather than as totalitarian revolutionaries. But these values of his will stand on their own. They do not require the vehicle of inadequate intellectual history. Of course the thought of Saint-Simon and Comte had some ideological consequences, but these men were also creative social scientists. We shall perhaps be better able to achieve Mr. Salomon's values if we treat Saint-Simon and Comte as social scientists as well as ideologues. For one essential task that is neglected by Mr. Salomon is to see how valid and relevant their ideas are for contemporary social problems.—BERNARD BARBER, Barnard College.

Perhaps the most important procedural right that needs to be safeguarded in the legal system of a liberal democratic country is the right to counsel. This is especially true in criminal cases, where a defendant's life or liberty is at stake. Various other rights may prove to be meaningless in practice if the defendant is not permitted to avail himself of legal counsel. Of equal importance is the necessity of appointing effective legal counsel in those cases where the defendant cannot afford to retain private counsel, for a defendant's chances of winning a case should not be made to depend upon his wealth. The entire question is dealt with comprehensively in William M. Beaney's work, *The Right to Counsel in American Courts* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, London, Oxford University Press, 1955; xi, 268 pp. $4.50). The author applies himself to the task of discovering whether the right to counsel in criminal cases "is enjoyed as consistently and widely in the United States as the needs of justice require." His general conclusion, stated explicitly in the text and implicit in the mass of material which he reviews, is a negative one: the right to counsel in American criminal procedure is not adequately protected. Professor Beaney goes about his task in logical and consistent fashion: he reviews the historical background of the problem, as seen in English and colonial law and judicial practice; he summarizes the relevant federal and state constitutional and statutory provisions; he examines the standing of the right to counsel in federal and state courts; he evaluates federal supervision of state criminal procedure by means of the Fourteenth Amendment; finally, he deals with some of the practical aspects of the right to counsel. The bulk of the book is a review of the relevant judicial decisions, both federal and state. Almost six hundred cases are examined; the rule of law in each case and its relation to the general problem are made clear. The more important cases, such as *Powell v. Alabama*, *Johnson v. Zerbst*, and *Betts v. Brady*, are dealt with at considerable

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length and the implications of the decisions clearly demonstrated. Errors mar some of the lines of this book as, for example, those dealing with the Connecticut public defender. Such errors are perhaps inevitable in a work of such scope, attempting as it does to give the reader a review of the right-to-counsel picture in every state. Whatever errors there are do not noticeably affect the smooth flow of the narrative nor do they detract at all from the conclusions drawn. In summary, Professor Beaney has written a clear, well-organized, comprehensible and comprehensive volume in an important area of public law. Political scientists, lawyers and laymen concerned about the future of the American legal and judicial system would be well advised to become acquainted with the contents of this book.—David Mars, The University of Connecticut.

To know the "shame of our cities" is to guard the morals of our nation. For, while we have outgrown the limits on loyalty imposed by the area of the Greek *polis*, time has not made it easier to leap over those boundaries in terms of political morality. Frederick Shaw's work on *The History of the New York City Legislature* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1954; 300 pp. $4.50) is at once a splendid analysis of the political ills of our greatest city and a timely warning of the need to put the politics of our cities in order. Municipal government is, per se, "highly visible" government where direct participation by citizens is most possible. It is no accident that American constitution-makers, in drafting the new democratic constitution for Japan, laid great stress on the creation of local self-governments as the basis of a sound democracy. Unfortunately, with the exception of recent decades, New York City's legislature provides few worthy examples for other cities in its century-long history. From 1852 to 1901, New York City's "discredited legislature" was controlled by Tweed's "Forty Thieves" (and his successors). It gradually rose in prestige from 1902 to 1937 to a position where it merited the title "ineffective legislature". For almost a century, however, the city's government remained a national disgrace. Indeed, this situation's prevailing as late as 1933 (from 1918) leads the author to conclude that the city was ruled by a "totalitarian government in which a token representation of the opposition was tolerated." Fortunately, the political climate was free, and an aroused citizenry, disgruntled by the depression and nettled by the alarming revelations of an investigatory committee, was no longer even willing to tolerate the Board of Aldermen's gentler side: "While they sleep, the city's safe." A new charter was voted and a brief experiment with proportional representation was undertaken. Here, then, in profuse detail, are the results of voter apathy, and its concomitants of one-party domination

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and "bossism". Dr. Shaw has not only gone to the recorded sources, but he has also thoroughly investigated by personal interviews the human resources. His penetrating comments on home rule for cities and the uses of the controversial proportional representation on local levels should provide food for much further thought in these areas. The Appendix is replete with tables, lists of important dates and people, and digests of principal laws.—ALBERT ALEXANDER, New York, N. Y.

American historians tended to ignore military affairs during the years between the two World Wars. In an essay dedicated to Laurence B. Packard, John Bowditch indicated how seldom college courses, textbooks, and scholarly writings of those years dealt with war and its instruments. He also pointed out how this astigmatism has been correcting itself since World War II. Teaching and writing on military affairs have been steadily on the rise. Any number of military history and policy surveys are in progress, and one, dealing with the United States, has now come into print—*American Military Policy: Its Development Since 1775*, by C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon (Harrisburg, The Military Service Publishing Co., 1955; 512 pp. $5.00). Although the authors are card-carrying academicians, with Ph.D.'s from Georgetown, their volume is less a scholarly novelty than an addition to a long shelf of professional military works. It belongs with Huidekoper's 1916 tract on preparedness, some of Frederick Palmer's writings, the histories of the Army by Colonels Ganoe and Spaulding, and other volumes traceable to Major General Emory S. Upton's nineteenth-century *Military Policy of the United States*. Although Elihu Root, prefacing the 1903 edition, remarked that some of Upton's issues were already dead, Bernardo and Bacon renew the General's attack on the bounty and the independent militia. Chronicling recommendations and legislation, as Upton did, they also restate most of Upton's theses. Upton denounced legislative parsimony and short-sightedness before the Civil War. The new authors extend the indictment through the Eighty-first Congress. Expanding another of Upton's themes, they open with an attack on "the fiction . . . that an American army can be a threat to democratic institutions" and end by declaring: "Far from being antagonistic or a threat to democracy, the nation's armed forces are one of its principal bulwarks and inspirations." The volume stresses peacetime experience, devoting only nineteen out of five hundred pages to the interval between Pearl Harbor and V-J Day. Stressing, too, the history of the Army over that of the other services, it will probably find a place on Army school reading lists, reënforcing Upton's argument that the Army has usually been right in its recommendations to civilian authorities and that the failings of American

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military policy have been mainly civilian failings. No more than Upton's study will it educate the military reader in the relation of military policy to American life and objectives. Although referring occasionally to foreign policies, usually in revisionist asides, the authors deal, as did Upton, with military strength as an end in itself. They explain neither the constant and shifting policies that required military backing nor the sources in knowledge, logic and faith for America's antimilitarist tradition. Their volume is General Upton's manual brought up to date and energetically footnoted. It defines military policy chiefly as preparedness and deals with it outside the context of American objectives and institutions.—Ernest R. May, Harvard University.

In his *The United States and Argentina* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954; xv, 272 pp. $4.75) Arthur P. Whitaker very aptly defines the peculiar character of the Perón régime as "Tyranny of a majority over a minority under democratic forms" (p. 140). It grew out of a military dictatorship, but was endorsed by a large majority in honest elections (Perón could afford nonfraudulent ballots after plainly rigged campaigns), and now it closely observes constitutional procedure (after the Constitution was amended to suit the purposes of a "democratic" dictatorship). In Perón's success two factors played a major rôle. The United States, suspected of insincerity even in the heyday of the Good Neighbor Policy (see my *Argentine Riddle*, pp. 14 *et seq.*), came unwittingly to his aid by Hull's and Braden's senseless policy of thundering speeches without the will to action behind them, culminating in the "Blue Book" issued on election eve as if made to order to prove Perón's charge of "Yankee meddling in the affairs of Latin-American nations." This incident undoubtedly pushed into the Peronista camp many Argentines otherwise opposed to his domestic rule of force. The second factor was Perón's labor policy. The masses just had to vote for him if they wanted to keep the wage increases he had given them and to get the annual one-month's bonus he had promised. They had warning of what the opposition's victory would mean by the lockout instituted by the employers' associations against Perón's wage increases. The author mentions several times the opposition's ineptness and disunity. But he might also have stressed that its weakness is no accident: it is unable to top Perón's wage policy by a better offer. In recent times inflation has largely nullified the wage gains. But to hold Perón responsible would require a far better understanding of the economic process than the average worker has. Perón has maintained himself in power by playing his "beloved" *Descamisados* against the equally coddled armed

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forces. As long as he can continue this line he is in no danger. Of course, a palace coup is always possible, but it would only replace his person by another one, not the system. The author rightly emphasizes that even if the *Radicales* came to power little change could be expected in foreign or economic policy. True, there would be less disregard for personal rights, but a people that has never really known these rights will not rise up just for the the sake of increased civil liberties. In recent years the United States has replaced Britain as Argentina's foremost customer. In consequence the fireworks of but a few years ago have been replaced by a *modus vivendi*, an uneasy truce likely to continue. On a few matters the book invites criticism. For example, the author fails to mention that it was the American Navy, not the British, that in 1831 ousted the Argentine authorities from the Falkland Islands and that the United States recognized British sovereignty over them long before Britain occupied them in 1833. In calling the old meat problem a "cliché" that "disappears when one looks at the list of things" (p. 196) the United States is now buying from Argentina, the author overlooks the fact that Argentines do not have to be Peronistas to resent "Yankee duplicity" in this matter, as evidenced by the reimposition in 1943, for other than "sanitary" reasons, of the embargo on uncanned meat from Tierra del Fuego, which Argentine island in 1941 had been declared free of *aftosa* by the United States. Finally, the author's use of Bunge's statistics on the distribution of Argentina's working population 1914–40 (p. 35) is objectionable. In 1944 I proved these figures to be nothing but purposely misleading estimates made by Bunge for a propaganda campaign of the Argentine manufacturers' association which "should be discounted as erroneous if not completely discarded" (*Riddle*, pp. 231–43), which conclusion to my knowledge remains unchallenged. However, in spite of these few shortcomings the book is highly informative and of excellent scholarship.—FELIX J. WEIL, Santa Monica, California.

In *Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939–1941* (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954; v, 218 pp. 19.— guilders) Gerhard L. Weinberg presents what he describes as a "straightforward account of German-Soviet relations" during this period. Students of international politics are familiar with much of the widely scattered evidence upon which this study relies, but the author skilfully has woven it into a plausible narrative. Moreover, using much new material discriminatingly culled from war-crimes-trial evidence and testimony, he has illuminated—if in tantalizingly fragmentary form—some previously hazy features of Russo-German economic

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relations during the 1939–1940 "honeymoon"; particular attention is paid to the character and value of Soviet economic and naval aid to the Nazi war effort before the fall of France. (The German Navy, it would appear, was one of the most eager enthusiasts of continued collaboration; relatively the weakest of the Nazi armed forces pitted against the West, it came to have positive, and not, as in the Army's case, negative, reasons for opposing a turn against Russia.) The author argues that rubber and oil channeled through Russia ironically both hastened a German victory in the West and made feasible the June 22 attack upon Russia itself; and that the German "decision" to attack was made as early as the summer of 1940, months before the Molotov-Ribbentrop Berlin impasse (November 12–18) and Hitler's ensuing *Barbarossa* directive of December 18, 1940. Mr. Weinberg's resolve to concentrate upon diplomatic and negotiatory aspects of his topic, while ably discharged, limits the range of his inquiry and doubtless accounts for some rather blurred conclusions. "The impression we get", he writes, "is . . . one of two great powers plodding fitfully along the path of expediency . . ." "We see no Germany plotting anxiously from the very beginning to bring fire and destruction to the Soviet Union, nor do we see a Germany thoughtfully determined to do away with a communist menace to Europe" (p. 173). The decision to attack Russia, a "purely military one", "had nothing to do with the system installed in that country" (p. 171).—Paul Seabury, University of California at Berkeley.

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WILLIAM LINN WESTERMANN

The Editors of the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY with great sorrow record the death of their colleague, William Linn Westermann, who died in White Plains, New York, on October 4, 1954.

William Linn Westermann upheld the highest traditions of American scholarship in ancient history. Born in Illinois in 1873 and graduated from the University of Nebraska in 1894, he began his teaching career in the classics, serving as assistant in Latin at his alma mater and as instructor and assistant professor of Latin and Greek at the University of Missouri. But as a student at the University of Berlin, where he came under the influence of Wilamowitz-Möllendorff and Edward Meyer and took his doctorate in 1902, his major interest was in ancient history, and from 1906 to 1908 he was assistant professor of history at the University of Minnesota. Thereafter he held professorial positions in history at the University of Wisconsin (1908–20), Cornell (1920–23), and Columbia (from 1923 until his retirement as professor emeritus in 1948). His teaching was not yet at an end, however, for in 1949 and again in 1953–54 he was visiting professor at Alexandria University in Egypt.

Ancient social and economic history, particularly as illuminated by the Egyptian papyri, was the field which he cultivated most assiduously and intensively and in which he made his greatest contributions. He loved research and was tireless in carrying it on until he was disabled by a fatal brief illness. The list of his publications is long and impressive. He contributed articles to the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY through the years. Ancient slavery was a subject that he made peculiarly his own and on which his authority was universally recognized. The long article on it that he contributed to Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *Real-encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Supplementband VI (1935), served as the basis of what he regarded as his most important work, *The Greek and Roman Systems of Slavery in Antiquity*, which was in press at the time of his death and is to be published by the American Philosophical Society in the immediate future. But for all his devotion to specialized research, Westermann was no esoteric. He believed in making the work of the specialist available to nonspecialists, as many of his articles attest.

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He took time off, moreover, to serve his country—as adviser on Turkish affairs and chief of the division of Western Asia in the American Commission to Negotiate Peace at Paris in 1919, as delegate on the Greek Territorial Commission at the Paris Peace Conference, and as a member of the commission reporting to the State Department on the Armenian boundary decision in 1920.

He was president of the American Historical Association and the recipient of many academic honors. The Trustees of Columbia University voted to award him the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters, to be conferred at the Columbia Bicentennial Convocation on October 31, 1954, but death prevented him from receiving it.

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